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Summary 
Modeling intertemporal decisions is essential to understand many financial decisions 
both at the household and at the company level. Most of the time, these decisions are very 
complicated and it is very difficult to develop a single model that can describe the inter-
temporal decision making process in different contexts. Still, this does not prevent many re-
searchers from attempting to understand preferences of individuals in intertemporal decision 
setting, since people face intertemporal decisions very often.  
For intertemporal decision modeling, we can distinguish between two different types 
of theories: normative and descriptive. Normative theories try to explain how decision makers 
ought to approach to intertemporal decisions and they derive simple guidelines for rational 
decision making. The most renowned normative theory tackling intertemporal decision pro-
cess is the standard discounted expected utility (DEU), which basically consists of two parts: 
expected utility theory and constant subjective discount rates.  
Despite its normative quality, expected utility theory is unable to describe the human 
decision process accurately in many cases, as it emanates from unbounded rationality. In re-
ality, we observe deviations from rational human image that lead to certain unexplained puz-
zles such as the disposition effect or the equity premium puzzle. These puzzles can only be 
explained by alternative theories that integrate decision biases resulting from bounded inves-
tor rationality into the decision making process. Descriptive theories simply intend to fill this 
gap and explain the actual preferences in intertemporal decisions.  
This point sets up the motivation of this dissertation, as we analyze the relevance of 
these descriptive decision theories in actual intertemporal decision settings in the fields of 
corporate and household finance. We begin with a brief introduction presenting the standard 
discounted expected utility (DEU) theory that aims to solve the intertemporal decision prob-
lem. Consequently, we discuss the deviations from the assumptions of DEU model that are 
 
 
revealed by numerous studies. After this detailed motivation, we analyze the implications of 
these deviations from DEU model for corporate and household finance in four papers. We 
specifically focus on the relation between decision anomalies and dividend policy, cash poli-
cy, saving/borrowing decisions and credit spreads in P2P markets.  
Generally, we use the following approach in each one of our papers: After a brief in-
troduction, we develop hypotheses connecting the behavioral biases to our research question 
based on a (mathematical) theoretical framework. Consequently, we conduct experiments in 
settings resembling the actual intertemporal decision process that we want to analyze. Based 
on these results, we investigate the connection between the behavioral biases revealed in ex-
periments and intertemporal decisions in different scenes of corporate and household finance. 
In all four papers, the empirical results clearly suggest that DEU model is incapable of ex-
plaining the decision process in intertemporal setting completely and it should be extended 
utilizing the findings obtained in experiments analyzing human decision process from a psy-
chological perspective.  
In sum, in all four papers, we reach the conclusion that the limited rationality of inves-
tors and the resulting biases identified in experiments shape the intertemporal decision pro-
cess both in the fields of corporate and household finance. Furthermore, we study new behav-
ioral patterns modifying the designs of some well-known experimental studies and demon-
strate that our experiments reflect the actual preferences of individuals quite accurately. Thus, 
based on this work, we find supporting evidence for the general assumptions of the “Behav-
ioral Finance” story. Additionally, our experiments also strengthen the view defending the 
relevance of experiments in economics, as not many researchers try to bridge the gap between 
“Experimental Economics” and “Household Finance”. 
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1. Introduction 
A large portion of our daily life decisions are intertemporal choices requiring us to 
choose between costs and benefits that are due at different points in time. Some of these 
choices are very simple and of very little importance to our lives such as deciding whether to 
study for an exam today or go to a party instead. The planning horizon for these types of deci-
sions is relatively short and the decision process is consequently simple. On the other hand, 
life-cycle consumption planning can present very difficult challenges to individuals, as they 
are required to forecast many unknown parameters like their potential future labor income, 
own retirement age and of course, their time of death. Furthermore, planning retirement con-
sumption demands very high information processing abilities and very sophisticated analyti-
cal skills.  
Sometimes, the intertemporal decisions do not concern the decision maker directly, 
but she makes the decision on behalf of someone else. For instance, board members of large 
corporations had to determine the corporate strategy with long term consequences on behalf 
of their investors. For instance, an integral part of the corporate strategy, dividend payouts are 
decisive for the consumption path of investors in imperfect capital markets. As a result, inves-
tors’ character traits and preferences should have implications for the financial policies of the 
company, if managers try to “cater” to investors’ needs (see e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2004; 
Polk and Sapienza, 2009). Thus, modeling intertemporal decisions is essential to understand 
many financial decisions both at the household and at the company level. Most of the time 
these decisions are very complicated and it is very difficult to come up with a single model 
that can describe the intertemporal decision making process in different contexts. 
Still, this does not prevent many researchers from attempting to understand time pref-
erences of individuals, since they have far reaching implications. The research in this field 
goes back to the standard discounted expected utility (henceforth, DEU) model proposed by 
Samuelson (1937). He developed a theory to explain the tradeoff between future and present 
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consumption with the help of a single parameter, which he referred to as the discount rates. 
To be more precise, Samuelson (1937) works with standard utility functions based on ex-
pected utility theory to calculate the expected utility of a given lottery at a given time. He ar-
gues that decision makers discount this expected utility using “constant” rates to calculate the 
present value for each lottery. This way, a decision maker can compare the “subjective” val-
ues of lotteries that are separated by temporal distance.  
Thus, the DEU model has two components: expected utility theory and constant sub-
jective discount rates. Expected utility theory can be justified based on very simple axioms 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). It is very difficult to disagree with the four axioms 
that should be satisfied in order to derive expected utility theory: completeness, transitivity, 
independence, and continuity. The idea of using constant discount rates is also very hard to 
refute. If subjective discount rates vary over time, there is a possibility that people cannot stay 
committed to their previous decisions as the decision time approaches and time inconsisten-
cies are contradictory with the rationality assumption underlying DEU model (Strotz, 1956).   
Despite its normative quality, expected utility theory is unable to describe the human 
decision process accurately in many cases, as it emanates from unbounded rationality. How-
ever, the reality cannot be simplified this way and many experimental studies reveal evidence 
of systematic deviations from expected utility theory in individuals’ actual preferences (see 
Camerer, 1995; Rabin, 1998 for reviews). For instance, Allais (1953) presented an experiment 
challenging the independence axiom of expected utility theory. Of course, these deviations 
from rational human image lead to certain unexplained puzzles even on aggregate market lev-
el such as the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) or the equity premium puzzle 
(Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). These puzzles can only be explained by alternative theories that 
integrate biases resulting from bounded investor rationality into the decision making process.  
Both the expected utility theory and the constant discount rate concepts are unable to 
describe decision patterns properly. Furthermore, the descriptive quality of exponential dis-
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counting functions is doubted by many researchers. Experimental studies have again attempt-
ed to illustrate the shortcomings of the idea of constant discount rates (see e.g., Kirby and 
Herrnstein, 1995; Kirby, 1997). These studies demonstrate a declining pattern for discount 
rates over time and hyperbolic discounting functions fit the data much better than exponential 
discount functions. Later, Laibson (1997) showed that hyperbolic discounting functions ex-
plain the interdependence between consumption and income much better than exponential 
functions, although consumption smoothing arguments do not anticipate such a strong posi-
tive correlation (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954).  
Moreover, some researchers have identified other types of anomalies in intertemporal 
decisions which are related to discounting functions such as size or sign effects (Thaler, 1981; 
Benzion et al., 1989). These anomalies reveal an interesting relationship between outcome 
characteristics and the time value of money and suggest that it is not possible to separate utili-
ty and discounting functions in intertemporal decisions entirely. In other words, a simple dis-
counting approach might not be very accurate and some researchers have come up with alter-
native theories to explain intertemporal decisions such as the added compensation approach 
(Benzion et al., 1989).  
In the following series of papers, we are going to investigate these patterns in the inter-
temporal decision making context that cannot be fully captured by the standard DEU model. 
Like previous literature, we again rely on experiments to analyze behavioral biases first in 
simple decision tasks. For this purpose, we carefully design experiments that we expect to 
reflect the real decision making process more accurately. As a result, we predict that our ex-
perimental results have real-life implications. This relation can occur in two different direc-
tions: 
 indirect impact of the preferences of naïve investors for financial decisions of corpora-
tions and  
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 direct impact of these behavioral biases related to own financial decisions (saving and 
borrowing decisions). 
The first point is related to a branch of literature that focuses on the impact of limited 
rationality of unsophisticated investors on financial markets and the reaction of “rational” 
managers to the investor biases. In other words, we question whether and which investor bias-
es shape the strategy of the company. Research talks about the “catering” motive with respect 
to this relationship between managers and the investor base (see Baker, 2011 for a review). 
This story conjectures that managers try to satisfy the investor base to increase the stock price, 
which is related to their compensation and job security.  
On the other hand, the second bullet point deals with the question how the proneness 
to behavioral biases affects own saving, borrowing decisions or stock market participation of 
naïve investors or households (Rooij et al., 2011; Stango and Yinman, 2009). Hence, under 
the second point, we analyze the impact of households’ personal biases on their non-delegated 
personal decisions.  
To recap, the objective of this dissertation is to understand the shortcomings of the 
DEU as a descriptive theory. For this purpose, we conduct experiments isolating certain as-
pects that might lead to deviations from the DEU model. After that, we discuss and analyze 
the direct and indirect implications of these deviations empirically. Based on these results, we 
hope to fill the gaps in the literature dealing with descriptive theories for the intertemporal 
decision making process and develop new theories that can overtrump the DEU model. 
2. Modeling Intertemporal Decisions 
For intertemporal decision modeling, we can distinguish between two different types 
of theories: normative and descriptive. Normative theories try to explain how decision makers 
ought to approach to intertemporal decisions and they derive simple guidelines for rational 
decision making. On the other hand, descriptive theories simply intend to understand the deci-
sion making process. There is no single descriptive theory that is universally valid in every 
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intertemporal decision context. Instead, descriptive theories mostly tackle certain aspects of 
normative theories separately and show that their assumptions might be sometimes unworldly. 
Still, there have been some attempts to replace normative theories with comprehensive de-
scriptive theories such as prospect theory (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahnemann, 1992) or hyperbolic discounting functions (Ainslie and Herrnstein, 1981). In the 
following subsections, we present some of the most renowned existing normative and descrip-
tive theories and demonstrate their differences. 
2.1 Normative Decision Theories 
2.1.1 Expected Utility Theory  
Researchers laid the foundations for the expected utility theory a long time ago. Even 
before the axiomatization of this theory, it was clear that individuals cannot evaluate the out-
comes solely according to the expected monetary value. In simple lotteries such as the St. 
Petersburg paradox, the expected monetary value of the lottery is infinite but individuals are 
only willing to pay a very small amount to purchase it. This observation implies that utility 
cannot be simply defined by expected values (Bernoulli, 1954). The main reason for this find-
ing is the diminishing marginal value of money. In Bernoulli’s own (translated) words: 
“There is no doubt that a gain of one thousand ducats is more significant to the pauper than to 
a rich man though both gain the same amount.” 
Hence, due to the diminishing marginal utility, it is necessary to assume a concave 
utility function instead of a linear one. Linear utility functions imply risk neutrality and lotter-
ies are going to be ordered according to expected monetary payoffs. On the other hand, con-
cave utility functions with diminishing marginal utility entail risk aversion and the certainty 
equivalent of a lottery is lower than the expected value by a positive risk premium in this 
case.  
Researchers have proposed several forms of utility functions such as exponential or 
power utility functions where the degree of risk aversion can be defined by a single parame-
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ter. The most important distinction for different forms of utility functions is the implied de-
gree of absolute and relative risk aversion (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964).  
After defining utility functions, it is possible to model the decision making process 
under risk according to expected utility theory. First of all, expected utility theory assumes 
that the probability of occurrence is known for every possible scenario in a lottery. With this 
assumption, for a specific utility function u(x), one can calculate the expected utility of a lot-
tery, x with state probabilities p(i) for respective states, i. This is equal to: 
																																																									ܧ൫ݑሺݔሻ൯ ൌ 	෍ݑሺݔሺ௜ሻሻ ∙ ݌ሺ௜ሻ.																																								ሺ1ሻ
௜
 
If the lottery outcome is a continuous random variable with the probability distribution 
function, f(x), the expected utility of the lottery is going to be equal to: 
																																																							ܧ൫ݑሺݔሻ൯ ൌ 	න ݑሺݔሻ݂ሺݔሻ݀ݔ.
ஶ
ିஶ
																																																				ሺ2ሻ 
An important feature of expected utility theory is the assumption that individuals eval-
uate a lottery with respect to its relation to total wealth. Hence, the choice between two lotter-
ies can be different for people with different initial wealth level even if these individuals have 
the same utility functions, as long as the absolute risk aversion is not constant and/or the lot-
tery return is not stochastically independent of the initial wealth.  
2.1.2 Exponential Discounting Function and DEU 
As we mentioned above, the best-known normative theory for intertemporal decisions 
is the DEU. The DEU model arises from the assumptions of expected utility theory and ex-
pands it to intertemporal decisions. It integrates a time discounting function in the expected 
utility model in order to model the tradeoff between present and future consumption. This 
way, the DEU model allows a decision maker to discount the expected utility of lotteries that 
accrue at different points of time back to a common point of time. Thus, with the help of time 
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discounting, the value of future consumption is going to be comparable to the value of present 
consumption. This way, decision makers can eliminate the time component from lotteries.   
Samuelson (1937) has proposed in his model a discounting function which can define 
time preferences with a single parameter. He also realized that in order to model decision 
makers as rational individuals, subjective discount rates should be constant. Otherwise, deci-
sion makers’ preferences would change over time, as the decision time moves closer and this 
produces inconsistent behavior (Strotz, 1956). For a discounting function φ(t), discount rates 
are equal to 
																																																														ߩሺݐሻ ൌ 	െሾln ߮ሺݐሻሿᇱ.																																																											ሺ3ሻ	 
Hence, in order to obtain constant discount rates, the discounting function φ(t) should 
be exponential. For instance, an exponential discounting function, ߮ሺݐሻ ൌ ݁ିఘ௧ produces a 
constant discount rate equal to ρ according to (3). Thus in the DEU model, the expected dis-
counted utility is equal to: 
																																																															෍෌ ݑ൫ݔ
ሺ௜ሻ௧൯௜
ሺ1 ൅ ߩሻ௧௧
	.																																																																				ሺ4ሻ 
2.2 Descriptive Decision Theories 
2.2.1 Deviations from Bernoulli Utility Functions 
In this section, we point out the differences between the thought process of an ideal-
ized rational decision maker (“homo economicus”), which normative theories work with and 
the actual decision makers. Based on these differences elicited with the help of experimental 
studies, researchers have developed descriptive theories that we present here. Firstly, we out-
line psychological biases that imply that the utility functions employed by expected utility 
theory should be modified. Prospect theory takes most of these biases into account and adjusts 
the expected utility theory accordingly.  
For instance, expected utility theory assumes that individuals have the capability to 
evaluate total wealth in aggregate. This means a new project or a lottery is judged with respect 
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to its relationship to total wealth. Yet, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrate, setting 
different reference points for two identical choice tasks can lead to preference reversals. This 
means that gains and losses are defined with respect to a reference point wealth level. This 
manipulation of choice behavior resulting from rephrasing a question is called “framing ef-
fect”. The reference-dependent evaluation also implies that depending on the task at hand 
different lotteries might be treated separately in different accounts. Due to this separation, 
people do not treat money in different accounts as fungible. Researchers refer to this problem 
as “mental accounting” or “narrow framing”. For instance, households sometimes do not 
terminate pension accounts and instead borrow at a rate, which is higher than the return for 
their savings. Moreover, narrow framing causes people to overlook the correlation between 
the returns of different investment opportunities. As a result, people cannot make the most of 
the diversification potential. 
Furthermore, due to the reference-dependent evaluation of lotteries, some outcomes 
will be treated as “relative” losses with respect to a reference point in Kahneman and 
Tversky’s prospect theory. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979): “The aggravation 
that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associ-
ated with gaining the same amount.” Hence, the utility function should be steeper for losses 
than for gains, which is called the “loss aversion” and reference point shifts might also affect 
the desirability of lotteries. 
Last, but not least, Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) also argued that the sensitivity to 
both losses and gains decline with increasing distance from the reference point. Hence, the 
marginal utility is diminishing for gains and increasing for losses, which implies risk averse 
and risk-seeking behavior for gains and losses, respectively. 
Taking these deviations from expected utility theory into account, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) have developed a new form of utility function that can accommodate these 
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features of the decision making process. They refer to this utility function as the value func-
tion (v) and this function has the following form: 
																																																ݒሺݔሻ ൌ ൜													ݔ
ఈ																						݂݋ݎ	ݔ ൐ 0,
					െߣሺെݔሻఈ														݂݋ݎ	ݔ ൑ 0. 																																ሺ5ሻ 
The parameters λ and α define loss aversion and risk attitudes, respectively. Just like in 
the expected utility theory, maximizing the expected value of the value function is the target 
for the individual. This is calculated by replacing u(x) with v(x) in the equations (1) or (2), 
respectively. Furthermore, instead of integrating the monetary consequences form other deci-
sions, the expected value of the value function is calculated for each mental account separate-
ly.1 
2.2.2 Decisions under Ambiguity 
Another unrealistic feature of the expected utility theory is the assumption regarding 
the availability of probability distributions. Real-life decisions are not like coin tosses. Deci-
sion makers are most of the time not fully informed about the probability distributions of their 
investment returns (Ellsberg, 1961). Researchers speak of decisions under uncertainty in this 
context and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) develop the maxmin expected utility theory to 
characterize preferences in ambiguous settings. They simply state that individuals behave 
based on the worst-case scenario in an ambiguous setting. We borrow the term “ambiguity 
aversion” from previous literature to describe fear of uncertain returns. 
Yet, the maxmin expected utility model is too simple and for uncensored return distri-
butions such as the normal distribution, the value of the lottery is going to approach −∞ re-
gardless of the mean or the standard deviation of the distribution function, which is not very 
realistic. In order to solve this issue, Klibanoff et al. (2005) offer an alternative “smooth am-
biguity model” (see also Klibanoff et al., 2012). Simply put, this model integrates an ambigui-
                                                            
1 Instead of the objective probabilities, the expected utility in each scenario is actually multiplied by probability 
weights that might be sometimes overvalued or undervalued. Still, we do not mention this problem and  it  is 
also neglected in the following empirical analyses, as we mostly focus on decisions under ambiguity. 
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ty aversion parameter into the expected utility model. The ambiguity aversion parameter leads 
to underestimation (overestimation) of the probabilities in good (bad) states. In other words, if 
there is a set of possible probabilities for a certain scenario and investors do not know which 
one is a better estimate; decision makers calculate first the certainty equivalent of the uncer-
tain probability set. Consequently, this certainty equivalent is used to compute expected utility 
according to one’s risk preferences. This way, the model of Klibanoff et al. (2005) also allows 
us to describe different levels of ambiguity aversion unlike the maxmin rule of Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989). Furthermore, the smooth ambiguity model can be utilized to explain the 
decisions concerning uncensored continuous random variables, as is shown later.  
2.2.3 Discounting Anomalies 
Not only the assumptions regarding the shape of utility functions or the probability 
distributions, but also the exponential discounting function model came under careful review 
in the decision making literature. Experimental studies show that exponential discounting 
functions prescribing time-consistent behavior are not descriptively accurate. These studies 
disclose how people err in intertemporal decisions systematically (see Frederick et al., 2002 
for a survey). Thus, we want to discuss here a couple of examples for the discounting anoma-
lies that we pick up later on in our empirical work. 
Decreasing Discount Rates and Hyperbolic Discounting Functions 
Samuelson (1937) has come up with the idea of exponential discounting functions 
with the purpose of ensuring consistent choice behavior in intertemporal decisions. Yet, some 
researchers argue that this assumption is not very convincing and that inconsistent behavior is 
the norm rather than the exception. The simple example of Strotz (1956) showed that as deci-
sion time approaches, people get less patient and instant gratifications become less resistible. 
Thus, discount rates seem to be increasing as decision time approaches. Thaler and Shefrin 
(1981) touch on the same subject as well and show that people cannot commit to their long-
term plans and how these self-control problems lead to inconsistent behavior due to an ongo-
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ing conflict between the “rational and emotional aspects of an individuals’ personality”  
(O'Donoghue and Rabin, 2000). Neurological studies confirm this theoretical work as their 
evidence suggests that separate systems are involved in decisions evaluating immediate and 
delayed gratification (McClure et al., 2004).    
In order to model this inconsistency, some researchers have proposed discounting 
function models, which produce decreasing discount rates over time. Mazur (1987) proposes 
hyperbolic discounting which implies that discount rates are a monotonously decreasing func-
tion of t and therefore, it can accommodate time inconsistent behavior. Hyperbolic discount-
ing can also describe time preferences with one single parameter k and is modeled the follow-
ing way: 
																																																				߮ሺݐሻ ൌ 11 ൅ ݇ݐ , with	݇ ൐ 0	.																																																		ሺ6ሻ 
Similarly, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) offer an alternative discounting function 
which also yields decreasing discount rates as the discounting model in (6). In contrast to (6), 
this function has two parameters (see equation (7)). The advantage of this model is that the 
discounting function approaches exponential discounting as α goes to zero. Hence, this model 
can reproduce the hyperbolic and exponential discounting models only by varying the param-
eter α: 
																																												߮ሺݐሻ ൌ 11 ൅ ߙݐఉ ఈ⁄ , with	ߙ, ߚ ൐ 0.																																											ሺ7ሻ 
Laibson (1997) has also chimed in with a model involving two parameters. This model 
suggests that only the discount rates of the first period are larger than the discount rates of 
subsequent periods, yet the subsequent discount rates are constant (see also Phelps and Pollak, 
1968). Laibson (1997) refer discounting model as quasi-hyperbolic discounting and it dis-
counting function has the following form: 
																																							߮ሺݐሻ ൌ ߚ ∙ ߜ௧, with	ߚ, ߜ ൏ 1	and		ߚ, ߜ ൐ 0																															ሺ8ሻ 
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This model can only elucidate the bias towards present consumption and the prefer-
ence reversals during the first period. On the other hand, in quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
models, decision makers are not prone to time inconsistencies if decisions do not involve im-
mediate gratification. Indeed, experimental studies reveal that much of preference reversals 
occur at early periods, therefore, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting can capture a significant 
portion of the time inconsistency problems (Frederick et al., 2002). 
Sign Effect 
In his experimental study, Thaler (1981) has compared discount rates between 
tradeoffs involving negative and positive outcomes. According to the DEU model, if the out-
comes in a given decision task are small compared to the total wealth (as is the case in Thaler 
(1981)), the shape of utility functions cannot explain large discrepancies between discount 
rates in tradeoffs with positive and negative outcomes. Yet, he observed significantly smaller 
discount rates in decisions involving negative outcomes compared to discount rates in deci-
sions involving positive outcomes with an identical absolute value. Thus: 
																																																											ݒሺݕሻ ∙ ߮ሺݐ, ݕሻ ൌ ݒሺݔሻ,																																														ሺ9ሻ 
																																																	ݒሺെݕሻ ∙ ߮ሺݐ, െݕሻ ൏ ݒሺെݔሻ	݂݋ݎ	ݕ ൐ ݔ																									ሺ10ሻ 
This result suggests either that discount rates are a function of the outcome sign or that 
the expected utility theory is not descriptively accurate to explain the valuation of lotteries. 
Hence, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) replace expected utility theory with a prospect theory 
value function and show sign effects are explainable even if ߮ሺݐ, െݔሻ ൌ ߮ሺݐ, ݔሻ, i.e. the dis-
count rates are identical for negative and positive outcomes. Prospect theory emanates from 
reference-point dependent evaluation and the shape of the utility function is different in gain 
and loss frames. Different studies have shown that the power coefficients of the value func-
tion are higher for losses (Fennema and Assen, 1999; Abdellaoui et al,. 2009). This implies: 
																																																		ݒሺെݕሻݒሺെݔሻ ൐
ݒሺݕሻ
ݒሺݔሻ ൌ
1
߮ሺݐ, ݕሻ ൌ
1
߮ሺݐ, െݕሻ.																																									ሺ11ሻ 
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Thus, the higher sensitivity to losses explains the emergence of sign effects according 
to Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).  
Size (Magnitude) Effect 
Besides sign effects, Thaler (1981) revealed another discounting anomaly in his paper.  
His results suggest that discount rates are decreasing in the magnitude of the underlying out-
come which is referred to as the size or magnitude effect in the literature (see Frederick et al., 
2002). In other words, discount rates are smaller for larger payments or receipts:  
																																																											ݒሺݕሻ ∙ ߮ሺݐ, ݕሻ ൌ ݒሺݔሻ,																																													ሺ12ሻ		 
																											ݒሺߙݕሻ ∙ ߮ሺݐ, ߙݕሻ ൐ ݒሺߙݔሻ	݂݋ݎ	ߙ ൐ 1	ܽ݊݀	ݕ ൐ ݔ.																						ሺ13ሻ 
Similar to sign effects, size effects also indicate that the DEU model is not accurate in 
terms of describing intertemporal decision processes. There has been no attempt to integrate 
outcome size into discounting functions as another variable, either. Instead, Loewenstein and 
Prelec (1992) try to explain this relationship again based on the characteristics of utility func-
tions. They argue that increasing relative sensitivities of value functions can accommodate the 
size effect. Increasing relative sensitivities imply that:  
																																																														ݒሺߙݕሻݒሺߙݔሻ ൐
ݒሺݕሻ
ݒሺݔሻ.																																																	ሺ14ሻ 
Yet, the value functions of prospect theory do not meet this requirement which Loe-
wenstein and Prelec (1992) also use to justify size effects. Prospect theory assumes constant 
relative sensitivities as it works with power utility function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
Hence, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) cannot exactly explain this particular discount-
ing anomaly. Alternatively, some researchers suggest that people tend to linearize exponential 
functions (Stango and Zinman, 2009). Due to this inability to accurately work with exponen-
tial functions, decision makers might err systematically and these errors can lead to size ef-
fects. Yet, there is no reason to believe that these errors should be more noticeable for larger 
outcomes.  
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Instead, size effects might possibly imply that the simple discounting/compounding 
concept is not enough to explain intertemporal decision making processes. Indeed, Benzion et 
al. (1989) justify size effects with a different approach, which they call the added compensa-
tion approach. According to this model, individuals ask for a premium to adjust their con-
sumption position and we can deduce from this model that if this premium is not related to 
outcome size, discount rates are going to be smaller for larger outcomes. Hence, according to 
the added compensation approach, a later larger reward is perceived to be equally attractive as 
the smaller sooner reward if,    
																																																								ݒሺݕሻ ∙ ߮ሺݐ, ݕሻ ൌ 	ݒሺݔሻ ൅ ܤ.																																								ሺ15ሻ 
If we multiply both the sooner smaller and the later larger reward with the same factor, 
we have the following relation for prospect theory utility functions even if φ(t,αy) = φ(t,y):  
																																																ݒሺߙݕሻ ∙ ߮ሺݐ, ߙݕሻ ൐ 	ݒሺߙݔሻ ൅ 	ܤ.																																				ሺ16ሻ 
Thus, the later larger reward becomes more attractive if both alternatives are multi-
plied with the same factor and size effects can be justified by the added compensation ap-
proach, since the added compensation premium (B) does not depend on the outcome. Fur-
thermore, this theory can also explain emergence of size effects together with loss aversion, if 
underlying outcomes are negative (Benzion et al., 1989).   
3. Application of Descriptive Decision Theories in Intertemporal Decisions 
After citing the set of anomalies that previous research has revealed over the years, in 
what follows, we discuss the relevance of these issues for financial decisions of households or 
corporations. As we mentioned in the introduction, many complicated decisions in the field of 
household and corporate finance involve an intertemporal tradeoff and those decisions shape 
the life-cycle consumption stream of individuals.  
For instance, in corporate finance, managers have to determine whether they should 
retain earnings to invest more in the future or to distribute earnings so that investors can con-
sume more right away. Obviously, this requires that investors do not treat capital gains and 
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dividends as substitutes. As we mentioned above, due to mental accounting issues, the wealth 
is indeed not fungible. As a result, investors cannot replace the consumption from one account 
(dividends) using funds in another account (capital gains). Although this seems rather unreal-
istic at first glance, researchers have found plenty of empirical evidence for framing effects 
resulting from mental accounting of wealth and that dividend income is processed in a differ-
ent account than capital gains (see e.g., Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). In our first paper, “The 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Cross-Country Analysis”, we com-
bine the principles of mental accounting with investors’ biases that we mentioned above such 
as loss aversion and ambiguity aversion to analyze empirically whether “rational” managers 
cater to investors’ consumption preferences by adjusting dividend payouts. We also try to 
understand the relevance of time preferences, i.e. discount rates for corporate dividend strate-
gy. We also contribute to the catering literature by analyzing which behavioral biases are ex-
actly responsible for the relation between dividend policy and market value of a company. 
In a related manner, we examine cash holding polices in another paper entitled “Am-
biguity Aversion and Cash Holdings”. Previous literature conjectures that cash holdings serve 
as an insurance tool for illiquidity and based on this theory we investigate how investors value 
cash with increasing ambiguity aversion. We distinguish between financially constrained 
firms and unconstrained firms. Our results suggest that the relationship between ambiguity 
and cash holdings is only significant for companies facing a noticeable risk of being financial-
ly constrained in line with or theoretical model. Again, our study contributes to the existing 
literature by demonstrating how limited rationality of investors affects cash management deci-
sions and how managers react to investors’ biases. This catering related explanation for cash 
holding decisions has not been explored before us and we also elaborate on why only ambigu-
ity aversion (and not risk aversion) should be relevant for cash holdings. 
In both papers, we rely on a cross-country data set collected with the international test 
of risk attitudes (INTRA) survey (Wang et al., 2010; Rieger et al., 2011, Rieger and Wang, 
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2012) to investigate our main hypotheses. Thus, we study the link between country-specific 
behavioral preference parameters and company-specific financial policies. In this sense, our 
studies are also linked to literature branches such as “Law and Finance” (see e.g., La Porta et 
al., 2008) or “Cultural Finance” (see e.g., Breuer and Quinten, 2008) that try to explain differ-
ent international financial practices considering cross-country differences in legal institutions 
or differences in fundamental cultural values as main determinants. Yet, instead of analyzing 
legal institutions or cultural values, in our papers, we rely on investors’ preference parameters 
as the main explanatory variables. This approach is called “Behavioral Finance” and in broad 
terms, it tries to explain puzzling financial behavior that cannot be explained by traditional 
approaches relaxing the assumption of rational market participants. Although it is not unusual 
to rely on findings from behavioral decision making analyses in the research field of corporate 
finance (see Baker and Wurgler, 2011 for a review), the cross-country differences in financial 
practices of corporations have not yet been studied based on this framework due to lack of 
data. With our unique dataset, we are able to fill this gap in research. 
In the first two papers, we discuss the indirect influence of behavioral biases on inter-
temporal decisions in a company. We assume that managers try to satisfy their investors even 
when this might be detrimental to the company value in the long run. Yet, limited rationality 
implies that investors cannot ascertain the market value of future dividends accurately. There-
fore, managers pursue increasing the present (subjective) market value of their company, 
which would minimize the takeover risk and increase their job security, even when their ac-
tions are detrimental to the market value of the company in the long term.  
As we mentioned above, we also try to understand the relevance of behavioral biases 
for personal financial decisions of households. In “Framing Effects in Intertemporal Choice 
Tasks and Financial Implications”, we discuss how shifting the reference point of time affects 
the saving/borrowing decisions of households and under which conditions households are 
especially prone to framing effects. For this purpose, we design an experiment investigating 
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framing effects in choice tasks. In choice tasks, framing effects are based on the principle of 
shifting the reference point of time, instead of the reference point of outcome. This way, we 
can effectively reduce the impact of framing effects. In choice tasks, the reference point shifts 
due to framing effects are only related to the difference amount between the sooner and the 
later outcome because of the editing process that we discuss in the paper. Moreover, our de-
sign resembles the actual decision frame in intertemporal saving/borrowing decisions more 
and as a result, our experimental results mirror the framing effects in actual saving/borrowing 
decisions more accurately. 
Similarly, in the paper “Size Effects and Implications for P2P Credit Markets”, we in-
vestigate size effects in intertemporal decisions with the help of an experiment. Unlike the 
previous experiments, we have described the magnitude of the later alternative not with 
monetary units but with return on investment. Like in “Framing Effects in Intertemporal 
Choice Tasks and Financial Implications”, the design that we rely on is closer to the decision 
tasks in real life. Therefore, we speculate that the results of our experiments should reproduce 
the relation between the credit amount and interest rates in P2P lending markets much more 
accurately. Our results support the added compensation theory and reject the notion that size 
effects are due to the inability of naïve investors to discount correctly, as size effects are still 
existent, even if the underlying discount rates are given. 
In sum, in all four papers, we reach the conclusion that the limited rationality of inves-
tors and the resulting biases identified in experiments shape the intertemporal decision pro-
cess both in the fields of corporate and household finance. Furthermore, we study new behav-
ioral patterns modifying the designs of some well-known experimental studies and demon-
strate that our experiments reflect the actual preferences of individuals quite accurately. Thus, 
based on this work, we find supporting evidence for the general assumptions of the “Behav-
ioral Finance” story. Additionally, our experiments strengthen the view defending the rele-
18 
 
vance of experiments in economics, as not many researchers have tried to bridge the gap be-
tween “Experimental Economics” and “Household Finance”. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate dividend policies vary a lot across different countries. Traditionally, these 
variations are explained by differences in the tax system and the relevance of informational 
asymmetries depending on the cross-country differences in legal frameworks (see La Porta et 
al., 2000; Brockman and Unlu, 2009). Recently, cultural aspects have been suggested as an-
other reason for this finding (see Khambata and Liu, 2005; Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010; Shao et 
al., 2010; Bae et al., 2012). Moreover, it is often argued that behavioral biases resulting from 
bounded investor rationality identified by descriptive decision theory may be a main determi-
nant of corporate dividend policy as well, since firms adapt their policies in order to cater to 
investor demand (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Becker et al., 2011). However, up to now, there 
has been no empirical analysis aiming at explaining cross-country differences in corporate 
dividend policy by behavioral patterns. Furthermore, previous behavioral approaches have not 
discussed which factors would drive investors’ demand for dividends in the first place and 
they have not yet succeeded in tying behavioral factors to investors’ dividend demand empiri-
cally in a straightforward way. 
In this paper, we want to close these gaps: We show that loss aversion, ambiguity 
aversion, and the level of time discounting (i.e. the extent of investors’ (im-) patience) are 
main determinants for corporate dividend policies across a sample of 46,000 firm-years from 
31 countries for which data on behavioral variables have been collected via a comprehensive 
survey. By doing so, our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways: First of 
all, we seem to be the first who address empirically the influence of loss aversion and ambigu-
ity aversion on corporate dividend policy. Secondly, we contribute to the literature which in-
vestigates the relevance of time preferences for optimal dividend levels, as up to now this 
issue has only been examined in an indirect manner. Thirdly, by doing so, we are able to offer 
an alternative behavioral explanation for cross-country differences in corporate dividend poli-
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cy and the valuation of dividends. Finally, our paper also provides a new theoretical model 
that can explain the impact of different preference parameters simultaneously. 
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the current state of re-
search with respect to the determinants of corporate dividend policy. Section 3 explains the 
role which behavioral patterns may play in determining corporate dividend policy and how 
preferences of boundedly rational investors become relevant for dividend policy decisions. In 
order to examine these relations in a more rigorous manner, we present a formal model that is 
motivated by Shefrin and Statman (1984) as well as by Shefrin and Thaler (1988). Based on 
our theory, we state our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our data and in Section 5 empirical 
results are presented. Section 6 is devoted to the discussion of our results and robustness tests, 
where we study an alternative measure of time preferences, analyze the relevance of local 
investors’ preferences for companies controlled by foreign investors, investigate the investors’ 
reaction to changes in dividend policy and allow for additional control variables. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. The Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy: Literature Overview 
The analysis of the determinants of corporate dividend policy belongs to the core is-
sues in modern financial theory. Beginning with the celebrated irrelevancy theorem of Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) which relies on cash dividends and capital gains being substitutes in a 
perfect capital market, several avenues have been taken to identify reasons for the importance 
of corporate dividend policy. First of all, it is easy to understand that the tax system may in-
fluence corporate dividend policy. Although it started to change in recent years, dividends are 
typically taxed more than capital gains and, thus, paying dividends makes very little sense 
under those considerations. This finding leads Black (1976) to speak of a dividend puzzle (see 
also Feldstein and Green, 1983). In order to resolve the dividend puzzle, informational asym-
metries have been propagated as another main determinant of corporate dividend policy. In 
this regard, in a world with less informed investors, dividend payments may have benefits, 
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since they can be perceived as a signal for the future profitability of a company (Bhattacharya, 
1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; Kumar, 1988). 
In addition to signaling aspects, agency problems may affect corporate dividend poli-
cy. According to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), managers invest 
in projects with negative net present values in order to increase personal utility by a growth in 
power and company size. Such an overinvestment problem can be counteracted by increasing 
dividend payments in order to reduce free cash flow available to the firm. Therefore, all other 
things being equal, corresponding agency costs are decreasing in dividends. This will enhance 
the popularity of dividends as a commitment device (see Grossman and Hart, 1982; Easter-
brook, 1984). 
However, dividend payments also increase the risk of default by reducing the amount 
of assets that is accessible for debt holders. Thus, Kalay (1982) suggests that the observed 
dividend restrictions serve as a prerequisite for borrowing to take this issue under control. 
This would imply that firms with higher debt-equity ratios should favor lower dividend rates. 
This linkage is going to be especially strong for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk (Brav et 
al., 2005).  
Still, tax considerations, signaling aspects, and agency problems can only account for a 
small portion of the variation in corporate dividend policies. Furthermore, these theories come 
up short to explain several issues such as reactions to stock dividends, which are basically 
stock splits (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985), or a preference for non-decreasing dividends (Lint-
ner, 1963). Moreover, many empirical studies suggest a higher marginal propensity to con-
sume from dividends than from capital gains (see Baker et al., 2007) indicating that investors 
do not treat dividends as a substitute for capital gains and process them in different accounts 
as a result of their limited information processing abilities.  
Hence, those observations led to a discussion regarding the role of bounded investor 
rationality for dividend policies. The behavioral explanation of dividend policy of Shefrin and 
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Statman (1984) provides such an approach. Its main element is the distinction of different 
mental accounts for dividends and capital gains which brings us to the behavioral life cycle 
model of Shefrin and Thaler (1988). According to this model, people allocate their income in 
three different accounts: the current income account (I), the (current) asset account (A), and 
the future income account (F). Based on this differentiation, several reasons have been pro-
posed to explain why investors with different preferences may prefer different dividend dis-
tributions. 
1) Consumption financed from the account A and especially from F involves subjec-
tively felt “penalties”, as investors want to exercise self-control regarding the potential danger 
of excessive consumption due to time-inconsistent behavior. Current cash dividends are 
placed into the I account and therefore there is no penalty involved for the consumption fi-
nanced by cash dividends, whereas future dividends are placed into the F account and con-
suming from this account will cause disutility. Hence, dividends are better suited for con-
sumption purchases and impatient investors who want to consume with a clear conscience 
will prefer firms that pay out a larger share of their earnings as dividends. On the other hand, 
when investors want to save, but lack the willpower to do so, companies should retain earn-
ings. In both scenarios, the dividend policy should account for investors’ time preferences 
(Shefrin and Statman, 1984; Becker et al., 2011). 
2) Dividends are “a bird in the hand”, while retained earnings only lead to uncertain 
future earnings so that ambiguity averse investors prefer dividends even if retained and future 
earnings are completely reflected in current stock prices. Investors thus tend to perceive divi-
dends as a safety net. This is solely a psychological phenomenon, because investors can ob-
tain the same consumption path by selling their stocks. The study of Cyert and March (1993) 
emanates from this “bird in the hand” explanation as well and argues that people prefer divi-
dend payments to retained earnings, because they are ambiguity averse.  
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3) Dividends reduce the exposure of investors to future shocks. If there is a positive 
probability that future shocks cause negative returns, dividends can be utilized in order to re-
duce the exposure to potential future losses for investors. This result is driven by the specific 
curvature of the investors’ value functions which have a kink according to prospect theory 
implying that avoiding a loss is more important for investors than to acquire a gain of the 
same size. Due to this “loss aversion”, investors may try to avoid potential future losses by 
increased current dividends. 
These behavioral aspects of investor preferences thus provide an alternative approach 
to explain the relevance of corporate dividend policies. Moreover, they explain why corporate 
dividends and share repurchases are not perfect substitutes for investors as – according to 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) – share repurchases are evaluated in investors’ current asset ac-
count and not in their current income account and the consumption financed by share repur-
chases involves subjectively felt penalties. In addition, according to this theory we would ex-
pect different clienteles with different preferences to favor different companies because of the 
respective dividend policies which suit investors’ consumption preferences best.  
Up to now, there are two kinds of empirical approaches in order to verify the relevance 
of behavioral aspects for corporate dividend policy – with both of them being of a somewhat 
indirect character. Some empirical studies show that traditional approaches considering tax 
disadvantages of dividends, signaling aspects, and agency problems are not fully capable of 
explaining actual corporate dividend policies and thus conclude that there must be “something 
else” missing in these analyses, i.e. behavioral aspects of dividend policy (see, e.g., Baker et 
al., 2007). Secondly, one may refer to potential clientele effects which may have a behavioral 
background compatible to the arguments presented above. For instance, the early empirical 
study of Lease et al. (1976) supports the theoretical conclusions of Shefrin and Statman 
(1984) by comparing the investment decisions of different clienteles with potentially different 
preferences distinguished by demographic factors. According to their study, different clien-
 28 
 
teles with potentially different time preferences prefer stocks with different dividend to earn-
ings ratios. While long-term oriented young investors favor stocks distributing lower divi-
dends, the elderly prefer stocks with high dividend ratios. No possible reason other than men-
tal editing can account for this outcome, since both groups can achieve the preferred con-
sumption stream with the help of secondary market transactions regardless of the dividend 
policies of the companies they hold a share of. The later empirical works of Graham and Ku-
mar (2006) and Becker et al. (2011) focus on the relation between portfolio structures and 
demographic factors as well and confirm the earlier findings of Lease et al. (1976).  
Apparently, there is a lack of studies examining the relevance of behavioral aspects in 
corporate dividend policy in a more straightforward way. The simple reason for this gap is 
that this requires access to investors’ preference parameters for different firms under consid-
eration in order to identify the consequences of those differences for corporate dividend poli-
cies. In this paper, we want to resolve this issue by referring to differences in preference pa-
rameters across countries. This makes it possible for us to trace back cross-country differ-
ences in corporate dividend policies to behavioral differences among investors, since thanks 
to the well-documented home bias, investors prefer to invest in companies of their own coun-
tries (see also Section 6). Moreover, this approach allows us to identify other preference pa-
rameters besides time preferences that can explain the investors’ demand for dividends and 
we do so by using straightforward proxies. 
 Our empirical approach is also related to recent literature which focuses on the role of 
cultural values and utilizes cross-country data sets on cultural aspects in order to explain dif-
ferences in dividend policy choices. Although such studies can rely on comprehensive cross-
country data, cultural analyses still lack a sound theoretical foundation which can connect 
these aspects to investor preferences and their economic decision making process. A clear 
advantage of investigations based on descriptive decision theory lies in this regard. 
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3. Behavioral Patterns of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Simple Model 
As outlined in the preceding section, most of the theoretical literature on “behavioral 
corporate dividend policy” is based on an intuitive presentation of the most relevant relation-
ships separately. Instead, we present a formal model in order connect the aforementioned 
three different behavioral preference parameters to dividend policy decisions in the same 
framework. This helps us to broaden the basis for our empirical examination in the next sec-
tion. 
The main purpose of our formal model is to demonstrate the relation between dividend 
policy and the level of self-control problems (i.e. investors’ “(Im-) Patience”), of ambiguity 
aversion and of loss aversion which have already been mentioned in the informal discussion 
of the preceding section. Investors will attach a higher weight to future income, if they are 
patient, and will thus transfer more wealth from the present time to the future; therefore they 
will not ask for immediate compensation for their investments and will be more willing to 
wait for future dividend payments (see argument 1 of the preceding section). Furthermore, 
ambiguity aversion should lead to higher dividend payout levels, as ambiguity averse inves-
tors will shy away from uncertain investments more and instead prefer to realize their gains as 
quickly as possible (argument 2). Moreover, we propose that loss averse investors will experi-
ence more fear, when they invest in projects with potentially negative returns. Since there is a 
loss possibility linked with corporate investments, loss averse investors may prefer higher 
dividend ratios (argument 3). Although the aforementioned empirical papers analyzing differ-
ent dividend clienteles indirectly support the first argument, there has been no study focusing 
on this aspect of dividend policies in a more straightforward way. Moreover, there is no em-
pirical work at all concerning the second and the third argument. 
To grasp these ideas more rigorously, it is necessary to set up a formal model. Unfor-
tunately, at least up to now, such approaches seem to be quite rare in the literature. We only 
know of Yang et al. (2009) who have tried to analyze some aspects of behavioral corporate 
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dividend policy in a more formal manner. However, they assume a value function that is not 
completely in line with prospect theory, they refrain from taking ambiguity aversion into ac-
count and they do not distinguish between different mental accounts for dividends and assets 
which are at the core of the general ideas of Shefrin and Thaler (1988). In what follows, we 
mainly attempt to depict the approach of Shefrin and Thaler (1988) in a more quantitative 
framework. As opposed to their original work, which focuses on the possible influence of 
wealth transfer among accounts on household savings, we take a closer look at the subjective 
perception of these simple wealth transfers by investors. 
In order to do so, consider a two-period model (see also Figure I). At time t = 1 a divi-
dend d1 is paid out, thus reducing the value of the company x1 (before dividends) to S1 = 
x1d1. The company is now investing the remaining value S1 into its operations yielding an 
uncertain return r1 with probability distribution f. At time t = 2, the company’s value is there-
fore S2 = (1+r1)S1.  
For this very simple setting, we are now interested in that dividend policy d1 that max-
imizes the (representative) investor’s overall utility U which is computed as the sum of utility 
( )
1 1( ) Ru d d  and ( )1 1( ) Ru S S  in the first period and the subjectively discounted expected utili-
ty 
0
( ) ( )
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
0
(2 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )


        R Ru S S f r dr u S S f r dr  of the second period: 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
0
( ) : ( ) ( ) (2 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .R R R RU d u d d u S S u S S f r dr u S S f r dr


            (1) 
In (1), the index “(R)” denotes reference values to distinguish between gains and loss-
es, i.e. for x  {d, S} we assume 
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with  being a loss aversion parameter typically greater than 1 and + as well as − be-
ing variables that determine the curvature of u for ( ) Rt tx x and ( )Rt tx x , respectively. Follow-
ing Shefrin and Thaler (1988), we interpret the term ( )1 1( ) Ru d d as the utility contribution of 
the current income account while ( )2 2( ) Ru S S  stands for the (uncertain) utility component of 
the future income account and ( )1 1( ) Ru S S  for the investor’s current asset account. 
>>> Insert Figure I about here <<< 
The future income account is discounted by the factor . In addition, we want to allow 
for ambiguity aversion. However, as a general problem, up to now, it is not clear how to for-
mally model ambiguity aversion in a consistent way. As we are mainly interested in compara-
tive static results, we refer to just one main consequence of ambiguity aversion: Instead of 
simply evaluating a future alternative by its expected utility, ambiguity averse individuals will 
levy a discount on this value thus reducing the overall utility, since an uncertain return distri-
bution is disturbing for ambiguity averse investors. We account for ambiguity aversion by 
introducing an ambiguity parameter  between 1 and 2 where for  = 1 investors are ambigui-
ty neutral and ambiguity aversion is increasing in . As a consequence, the subjectively dis-
counted expected utility in the future income account is decreasing in ambiguity aversion. Our 
way of modeling ambiguity aversion can be interpreted as a simplified version of the ap-
proach by Klibanoff et al. (2005).
 Certainly, an investor exhibiting such preferences is only boundedly rational, as full 
rationality would imply to set all reference values equal to zero and the ambiguity aversion 
parameter equal to 1, neglect the asset account and to discount expected future stock prices by 
a risk-adjusted capital market interest rate. It is well-known that under these conditions we 
would arrive at the irrelevancy of corporate dividend policy. Nevertheless, we are interested 
in the consequences of limited rationality and mental accounting for optimal dividend deci-
sions.  In particular, we ask how certain investors’ preference parameters (loss aversion , 
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ambiguity aversion δ, and patience ) affect the optimal dividend level d1. In order to do so, 
we assume ( )2
RS  to be identical to S1 which means that changes in the value of an investor’s 
stock holdings from t = 1 to t = 2 enter the future income account. We thus have 
( )
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) .         RS S x d r x d x d r  (3) 
In such a situation, there will be a loss in the future income account only for r1 < 0 and 
hence independent of the specific level of d1 (at least, as long as dividends at time t = 1 are not 
greater than the overall value of the firm x1). Nevertheless, the “exposure” for potential losses 
is determined by d1. From this finding, we may directly conclude that higher values of the loss 
aversion parameter  will lead to greater dividend levels d1 at time t = 1 just in order to reduce 
the exposure to potential losses in the future income account. At least, this holds true as long 
as there are no violations of stock price reference points at time t = 1 in the current asset ac-
count. 
Similarly, dividends will also reduce the exposure to uncertainty concerning future 
shocks which (only) affects the utility of the future income account. For investors with higher 
ambiguity aversion δ, this problem will be more acute and they will prefer to realize capital 
gains rather than to wait for the uncertain outcomes from investments. 
On the other hand, the impact of the patience level  on the optimal dividend level is 
somewhat more complex. First of all, higher values of  also enhance the importance of the 
utility contribution of the future income account. For this reason, increased values of  imply 
decreased values of d1 only if future reference point violations are sufficiently unlikely. Oth-
erwise, we should expect to find a positive relation between  and d1. Therefore, in particular, 
the distribution of r1 becomes relevant as determinant of the connection between  and d1. If 
the overall utility contribution of the future income were indeed negative, the investor would 
certainly prefer to liquidate his or her stock holdings at time t = 1. This means that investors 
who are willing to hold their stocks will be characterized by quite positive subjective expecta-
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tions regarding future rates of return r1. Therefore, we should typically observe a negative 
relation between  and d1 for our simple decision problem. 
All of our arguments so far can also be verified by a more formal analysis of the deci-
sion problem under consideration. The maximization of (1) with respect to d1 thus gives us 
the following necessary condition for an inner solution:  
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
0
1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) : '( ) '( ) '( ) (2 ) '(( ) ) ( )
'(( ) ) ( ) 0.
R Rg d U d u d d u x d S u x d r r f r dr
u x d r r f r dr


            
     


(4) 
First, we observe that as long as g is a decreasing function around the optimal value of 
d1, i.e. the sufficient condition for an inner maximum is fulfilled, 
( ) ( ) 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
0
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
'( ) ''( ) ''( ) (2 ) ''(( ) ) ( )
''(( ) ) ( ) 0,

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           
     


R Rg d u d d u x d S u x d r r f r dr
u x d r r f r dr
   (5) 
the root of g increases when g increases. We therefore just need to study how g chang-
es, when , δ, and  change, thus we determine g/, g/δ, and g/: 
Dependence on : Only the last two terms of g depend on . Rewriting 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
'(( ) ) ( ) Prob( 0) E '(( ) ) 0

            u x d r r f r dr r u x d r r r   and the analogous 
integral for r1 < 0, we have 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
(2 ) Prob( 0) E '(( ) ) 0
Prob( 0) E '(( ) ) 0 .
             
         
g r u x d r r r
r u x d r r r
   (6) 
As long as positive rates of return being sufficiently probable, i.e. Prob(r1 > 0) being 
sufficiently large, we get g/ < 0 and therefore a negative correlation between optimal divi-
dend level d1 and . As a consequence, for high enough probabilities of positive rates of re-
 34 
 
turns, the investor should be willing to hold the asset until t = 2 and optimal dividends d1 
should be decreasing in the investor’s patience level . 
Dependence on δ: Again, just the last two summands of g depend on δ, 
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
'(( ) ) ( ) '(( ) ) ( ) .


              g u x d r r f r dr u x d r r f r dr  (7) 
This term is clearly positive, as the left integral with positive returns is positive and the 
right integral with negative returns is negative. This means that the optimal dividend payout 
level d1 should be increasing in ambiguity aversion.   
Dependence on : First, consider a situation without a reference point violation at 
time t = 1. Then, regarding t = 2, the loss aversion coefficient increases the marginal utility u’ 
in losses, i.e. for r1 < 0, and leaves u’ otherwise unchanged so that only the fourth term of g is 
affected. As 
0
1 1 1 1 1 1'(( ) ) ( )

    u x d r r f r dr   is a decreasing function of , we get g/ > 0. 
Now consider a situation with ( )1 1 Rd d . Apparently, the first summand of g is a decreasing 
function of  as well. Hence, only in situations where there is a reference point violation in 
the current asset account ( ( )1 1 RS S ) with certainty, the sign of g/ could become negative. 
Nevertheless, at least for long-term oriented investors with reference points ( )1
RS  being identi-
cal to former (small) purchasing prices of their shares, we are allowed to refrain from this 
countervailing effect completely. Moreover, in our empirical analysis we only investigate 
firms with positive earnings and cash flows and this also reduces the possibility of decreasing 
stock prices and thus violation of corresponding reference points in the current asset account. 
As higher loss aversion could lead to smaller optimal dividend payments only for firms with 
the majority of investors already facing violations of their reference points ( )1 ,
RS  we consider 
a positive relationship between optimal dividend payments and loss aversion parameter  to 
be the more plausible case. 
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Summarizing, we arrive at the following three hypotheses on the basis of our theoreti-
cal analysis so far:  
Hypothesis 1: More patient investors (i.e., investors with larger β) will prefer lower dividend 
ratios.  
Hypothesis 2: Investors with higher ambiguity aversion δ will prefer higher dividend ratios. 
Hypothesis 3: The general dividend level is increasing in loss aversion λ.  
The empirical testing of these hypotheses is the object of the next section. 
4. Empirical Analysis of Cross-Country Behavioral Patterns of Dividend Policy 
As our dependent variables are left-censored at zero for firms that do not pay divi-
dends, we need Tobit estimations in our empirical analysis. Furthermore, since we have mul-
tiple observations for the same firms, we cluster our robust standard errors by firms and use 
year dummies (see Brockman and Unlu, 2009). We refrain from adding industry dummies as 
well in order to avoid multicollinearity problems and to restrict the number of independent 
variables to a reasonable size. However, our empirical results remain valid even after adding 
industry dummies (although we get variance inflation factors larger than 10 for some industry 
dummies). 
While we study mainly behavioral aspects, Section 2 has made it clear that there are 
other factors that may influence dividend policy besides behavioral biases. Therefore, we in-
clude a set of company- and country‐specific control variables in our regressions. All varia-
bles in our regressions are explained in more detail in the following subsections. 
4.1 Data on Behavioral Dimensions 
For our behavioral variables, we refer to data on subjective preference parameters ob-
tained from the international test of risk attitudes (INTRA) survey carried out mainly between 
2005 and 2009 among undergraduate students of economics in 46 countries. A total of 6,000 
university students participated in the survey. Each participant was asked to fill in a question-
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naire that included several questions on risk and time preferences and some information about 
his or her personal background (Wang et al., 2010; Rieger et al., 2011).  
In order to measure time preferences, participants answered a hypothetical question 
involving a smaller sooner and a larger later reward. It should be mentioned that purchasing 
power differences were taken into account when asking the questions and that the questions 
were formulated in the countries’ own currencies. Differences between countries were large, 
even when considering the variation in inflation rates (see Wang et al., 2010, for more details 
on methodology and results). In the empirical part of our study, we use as a proxy for Pa-
tience the percentage of subjects in a country willing to wait in this binary choice task.  
Similarly, loss aversion has been determined via hypothetical lotteries with a fifty-fifty 
chance of winning or losing money. The participants had to declare a minimum acceptable 
gain prospect of X for a given potential loss of Y both in the domestic currency of the respec-
tive countries, so that they were just willing to participate in the lottery. The magnitude of the 
loss aversion has been elicited from this answer. Its theoretical fundaments go back to 
Kahnemann and Tversky (1979). In a similar manner, the level of ambiguity aversion has 
been deduced with the help of a modified version of the well-known Ellsberg’s urn experi-
ments where participants can choose between a risky and an uncertain lottery with the win-
ning probability (for the same potential payoff) being higher for the uncertain lottery. There-
fore, investing in the less profitable risky rather than the more profitable uncertain lottery 
points to ambiguity aversion. 
In what follows, we utilize the data on our survey participants’ time and risk prefer-
ences as proxies for preference patterns of the whole population in the respective countries. 
One might criticize such an approach because students are relatively young and inexperienced 
compared to the rest of the society. Yet, several papers in the field of experimental economics 
have demonstrated similarities between their experiments with non-student (sometimes even 
with non-human) and student participants. For instance, King et al. (1993) have shown that 
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asset market bubbles occur in a similar way, when professional fund managers instead of uni-
versity students participate in the same experiments. In dictator and ultimatum games, Car-
penter et al. (2003) have found no significant differences between choices of student and non-
student participants. This result has been confirmed later with a trust game designed by Falk 
et al. (2012). Moreover, since we are conducting a cross-country empirical comparison, the 
differences between the students of different countries are more important for our analysis 
than the absolute levels of loss and ambiguity aversion as well as patience and there is no rea-
son to believe that the cross-country differences in these preference parameters should be dis-
tributed differently for students compared to the general population.  
In addition, in Section 6, we replace one of our behavioral parameters, Patience, with 
an alternative proxy for long-term orientation, which is obtained from a survey based on man-
agers’ judgments (data taken from the “Project Globe”). It turns out that both measures of 
time preference are very highly correlated and that replacing Patience with this alternative 
proxy has no noticeable effect on our empirical results. We conclude that time and risk pref-
erences as revealed by students in different countries should enable us to perform reasonable 
cross-country comparisons even for the field of corporate finance. 
We assume furthermore that, despite globalization, a country’s dividend policy is 
mainly determined by preferences of domestic investors. Though this view is certainly a sim-
plification of actual capital market conditions, according to the well-known home bias anoma-
ly, most individuals are reluctant to invest in stocks listed in foreign countries. For instance, 
French and Poterba (1991) report that investors with residence in the U.S., Japan, and the 
U.K. hold 94 %, 98 %, and 82 % of their equity investments in domestic stocks, respectively 
(see Lau et al., 2010 for a more recent study). We are in line here with all recent papers that 
investigate the influence of cultural differences across countries on corporate dividend policy, 
since they must ultimately also rely on this argument. Hence, we deem it admissible to exam-
ine the potential consequences of only domestic investors’ preferences for corporate dividend 
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policies. Still, in Section 6, we examine whether our results look different for those companies 
where a majority of shares is owned by foreign investors and observe that local investors’ 
parameters are less decisive for the dividend policy in these companies, as we predict. We 
also observe that the subsample of companies owned by foreign investors is very small which 
is again in line with the home bias effect. This additional finding also serves as an indirect 
confirmation of our assumption regarding the representative quality of students’ preferences 
for the whole underlying respective population. 
4.2 Data on Dividend Ratios 
There are several possible ways to measure firms’ dividend levels. In particular, we re-
late total dividends to EBIT (Div/EBIT), to total cash flow (Div/Cash) and to net sales 
(Div/Sales). All these measures have different merits and weaknesses. For instance, Div/EBIT 
can easily be manipulated by firm management. Furthermore, different accounting conven-
tions in different countries aggravate the problem of cross-country comparability based on 
this measure. Besides, in some cases, dividends are reported before the final net earnings are 
reckoned, which also casts doubt on the relevance of earnings measures like EBIT for corpo-
rate dividend policy. On the other hand, sales and cash flows are only poor proxies for a 
firm’s actual earnings situation. Hence, we take all three dividend measures into account, 
which will also serve as a robustness check due to the qualitative differences of these items. 
Data regarding company information including annual returns and other control varia-
bles are extracted from Datastream, a service of Thomson Reuters. We have chosen to ana-
lyze all the companies listed under the constituent list “World Market” provided by 
Datastream consisting of 6,922 companies from 59 countries. Our analyses cover all the firm 
years between 1992 and 2012. Cross matching this sample with the countries for which we 
have data for our behavioral preference parameters leaves us with at least 45,721 firm-years 
(3,382 companies) from 31 countries. We find this sample much better suited for our purposes 
than the Compustat Global Data, since Compustat Global Data are dominated by companies 
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located in the United States, especially in the early years (over 38 % even for 2002). On the 
other hand, our sample is much more balanced across different countries, as US located firms 
comprise only 21.66 % of the total firm-years. Furthermore, we omit all financial and utility 
companies (four digit SIC classification numbers between 6000-6999 and 4900-4949, respec-
tively), since these firms are mostly regulated. Moreover, we exclude all firms with negative 
EBIT, cash flow and net sales, as negative dividend payout ratios are not comparable with 
positive values. 
4.3 Data on Control Variables 
According to our discussion of Section 2, we have to control for other market imper-
fections in our analysis, which may have an impact on corporate dividend policies. Our goal is 
not to challenge the theories that claim such aspects to be relevant; rather we try to reveal 
some missing ingredients of corporate dividend policy. We allow for firm-specific as well as 
country-specific control variables. 
We rely once again on the Datastream database in order to utilize firm-specific con-
trols, which are Firm Size, Debt-Equity Ratio, Sales Growth and Profitability in our analysis. 
Besides, we extend the set of our control variables by including year dummies. 
Firm Size is simply defined as the logarithm of the total assets in constant 1992 dol-
lars. The relevance of such a variable is well-known from the empirical literature regarding 
firm capital structure decisions. The information flow between investors and managers is 
slower for larger companies, since their shares are spread among more investors, which ag-
gravates free rider problems attached to manager monitoring (Fama and French, 2001). In 
order to counteract the agency problems resulting from inefficient monitoring, the investors of 
larger firms will demand higher dividend payouts. We therefore deem it reasonable to control 
for company size effects also when looking at corporate dividend policy.  
Debt-Equity Ratio is the ratio between the book value of debt and equity. We would 
expect a negative correlation between Debt-Equity Ratio and our dividend measures because 
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of dividend constraints set by debt holders in order to reduce the agency problems of debt 
financing.  
Sales Growth is computed as the quotient of net salest at time t and net salest1 one pe-
riod earlier of a company (see Brockman and Unlu, 2009). According to Fama and French 
(2001), firms with higher growth rates are less likely to pay out dividends because of the 
higher financing needs of growing firms and the reduced free cash flow problems. Hence, we 
expect a negative relationship between growth and dividends.  
Finally, we define EBIT scaled by firm assets as Profitability. More profitable firms 
are going to signal their quality by paying out dividends and for this reason we expect a posi-
tive relation between Profitability and dividend payouts (LaPorta et al., 2000). 
In addition to company-specific control variables, we also have a couple of country-
specific controls. The data for Total Taxes − which stem from Djankov et al. (2010) − express 
country-specific tax ratios. According to our consideration of Section 2, one would expect 
higher taxes to coincide with lower dividends as capital gains, e.g. profits from stock sales, 
are generally less heavily taxed than dividend income.  
We have repeated our empirical analysis with an alternative measure of tax influences 
which refers to the differences in taxation regarding dividends and capital gain (data taken 
from Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010, who adopted the concept defined by La Porta et al., 2000, to 
quantify tax disadvantages of dividends and expanded their analysis to more countries). The 
results are the same with this alternative tax measure measuring tax disadvantages of dividend 
payments as well. We refrain from presenting these additional results, since the data on Tax 
Differences are only available for 23 countries instead of all of the 31 countries in our sample. 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index developed by Djankov et al. (2008) is another helpful variable 
to control for the relevance of informational asymmetries and agency problems on the country 
level. For example, higher values of Anti-Self-Dealing Index point out that it may be easier for 
outside investors to directly overcome managerial overinvestment problems so that dividend 
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payments may be ceteris paribus higher. At the same time, in a country with weak shareholder 
protections, firms may benefit more from establishing a good reputation which they can 
achieve through higher dividend payouts. Hence, the impact of legal protections of such sort 
is not unambiguous. In any case, it seems necessary to account for these aspects in our analy-
sis. Therefore, we integrate Anti-Self-Dealing Index in our empirical analysis. Table I gives an 
overview of descriptive statistics with respect to all variables in our regressions.  
>>> Insert Table I about here <<< 
In contrast to our firm-specific data, country-specific data including our behavioral 
preference parameter estimates are not given as panel data. However, we assume that country-
specific characteristics change only relatively slowly across time so that we are allowed to 
work with given country-specific data over the whole observation period from 1992 to 2012. 
For example, a corresponding assumption typically also underlies cross-country analyses that 
are based on cultural features (Bae et al., 2012) or governance structures (Brockman and Un-
lu, 2009; Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012). 
5. Results 
As already mentioned, we utilize a Tobit regression model with firm-clustered robust 
standard errors to explicitly account for the left-censored nature of dividend payout ratios with 
Div/Cash, Div/EBIT, and Div/Sales being the respective dependent variables. The first regres-
sions in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table II are only based on the control variables intro-
duced before, while the regressions in columns (2), (4), and (6) present results based on all 
control variables as well as on the three behavioral parameters. For all regressions, we check 
multicollinearity problems with the help of the variance inflation factor (VIF) and no variable 
has a VIF larger than 4, hence multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem (Kutner et al., 
2004).  
Our findings are essentially identical for all three dividend measures. The signs of the 
corresponding coefficients are always in line with our hypotheses and different from zero on 
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high significance levels for each of the three behavioral parameters. Furthermore, all control 
variables other than Anti-Self-Dealing Index seem to have most of the time a significant im-
pact on dividend policy with signs in line with the literature even after accounting for our be-
havioral parameters. Anti-Self-Dealing Index is positively correlated with dividend payouts in 
columns (1), (3), and (5), hence without behavioral parameters supporting the previous results 
of La Porta et al. (2000). Yet after introducing behavioral factors, Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
becomes insignificant suggesting that behavioral parameters cover the same grounds as Anti-
Self-Dealing Index. Contrary to our expectations, Profitability seems to be negatively corre-
lated with Div/EBIT, but this is probably due to the fact that EBIT enters the numerator in the 
definition of Profitability. In the next section, we are going to discuss the impact of further 
control variables in our empirical model, but these additional factors are not going to change 
our main results.  
>>> Insert Table II here <<< 
According to our findings, Patience, Loss Aversion, and Ambiguity Aversion seem to 
be of high practical importance for the determination of cross-country differences. The influ-
ence is also economically significant. An increase of one standard deviation in the standard-
ized regression coefficient of Patience causes a decrease in the original dividend to cash flow 
(EBIT, sales) ratio of about 8.12 (5.76, 8.33) % of the corresponding mean and thus seems to 
be economically highly significant. For Loss Aversion, a one standard deviation increase im-
plies an even more significant increase in the original dividend to cash flow (EBIT, sales) 
ratio of 28.83 (31.11, 27.42) % of the respective mean values. Once again, this change seems 
to be of high economic significance. For Ambiguity Aversion, this effect is again very strong 
with corresponding values of 17.65 (16.95, 15.89) %. 
Our analysis considers also firms located in Chile, Germany, and Greece. According 
to La Porta et al. (2000), Chile and Greece have mandatory dividend rules. Moreover, La Por-
ta et al. (2000) state that there is some kind of minimum dividend requirement in Germany as 
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well. For this reason, we exclude firms located in Chile and Greece as a first robustness check 
and firms from Chile, Greece, and Germany as a second robustness check. In both cases, we 
reached exactly the same results as before. Hence, our findings are not driven by legal regula-
tions regarding dividend payments. 
6. Discussion 
6.1 An Alternative Measure of Time Preferences  
Up to now, our empirical results seem to be quite promising. Nevertheless, our find-
ings critically hinge upon the fact that our cross-country data regarding Patience, Loss Aver-
sion, and Ambiguity Aversion are sufficiently reliable. As our data set is unique, it is difficult 
to verify its quality. However, at least, it seems possible to compare our data for Patience with 
a related variable named Future Orientation. In the Project Globe survey (House et al., 2004), 
leadership and processes within firms were studied with respect to cross-country differences, 
whereby one of the considered dimensions was Future Orientation, reflecting the tendency to 
think and act in a future-oriented way, such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying 
gratification. In the survey, managers judged on a scale from one to seven whether people in 
their country were more present-oriented or more future-oriented. Lower values indicate low-
er future orientation, whereas higher values indicate higher future orientation.  
Since the Project Globe survey analyzes work values in the working environment and 
is also related to aspects like flexibility of organizations in a country and the level of im-
portance attached to spiritual fulfillment or traditional values, it is not as adequate as our Pa-
tience variable to reproduce time preferences, but it may still be utilized to cross-check the 
results of the preceding section. First of all, the correlation between Patience and Future Ori-
entation is 0.74, which is significantly positive at the 0.1 % level for a two-tailed Pearson cor-
relation test. Replacing Patience with Future Orientation in our multivariate regression ap-
proach actually verifies all of our previous results in Table II, although the results are less 
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significant with Future Orientation. This is not very surprising considering that this indicator 
is related to other aspects than the propensity to save.  
>>> Insert Table III here <<< 
Moreover, there are some studies that try to investigate the relevance of Long-Term 
Orientation on dividend policy – a cultural dimension introduced by Hofstede (2001). Alt-
hough this latter variable is not quite easy to understand (see Yeh and Lawrence, 1995), there 
is certainly a connection to time preferences. Results by Bae et al. (2012) as well as Khambata 
and Liu (2005) reveal a negative influence of this cultural dimension on dividend levels which 
is in line with our finding for Patience. Another reliability check can be found in Wang et al. 
(2010) where a highly significant correlation of Patience with the “Time Pace” variable of 
Levine (1997) is reported. 
6.2 Foreign Ownership and The Impact of Preference Parameters  
So far, we have assumed that domestic investors dominate every company in our sam-
ple, hence mainly the preferences of those investors that are located in a certain country 
should be relevant for the regulation of corporate dividend policies. As we have mentioned 
above, several papers have demonstrated that indeed companies are owned to a large propor-
tion by domestic investors even in free market economies.  
Our theory, however, predicts that local investor preferences should render (rather) un-
important in companies controlled by foreigners. Using data on Foreign Ownership, which is 
defined in Datastream as the percentage of strategic share holdings of 5 % or more held in a 
country outside that of the issuer, we divide our sample in two subsets: companies with For-
eign Ownership smaller than 50 % and companies with higher Foreign Ownership. First of 
all, we see that only a very small portion of companies in our sample is controlled by foreign 
investors which backs up our earlier assumption based on the home bias effect.  
We run our regression models of the previous section for both subsamples and observe 
that Patience and Loss Aversion are only relevant, as long as the majority of shares belongs to 
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domestic investors (see Table IV). While Ambiguity Aversion is significantly positively relat-
ed to dividend payouts for companies controlled by foreign investors as well, the correlation 
becomes substantially smaller. These findings circumstantiate the validity of our theory and 
also address concerns regarding the representativeness of our student sample for the whole 
population: Students’ preferences work well as a proxy for overall preferences only in exactly 
those situations in which we expect them to do so. 
In addition, other differences in our results for the sample with a majority share owned 
by domestic investors and for the sample with a majority share held by foreign owners seem 
reasonable: In the case of dominant foreign ownership, domestic taxes will be typically of less 
relevance. Similarly, a firm’s debt-equity ratio is less important for dividend policy, if it is 
dominated by foreign owners. This is also plausible, as these firms may be often part of a 
multinational conglomerate. In contrast, sales growth and profitability remain important de-
terminants of corporate dividend policy even with increased foreign ownership. 
>>> Insert Table IV here <<< 
6.3 Market Valuation and Preference Parameters  
We argue in our model that managers try to satisfy their investors’ preferences. A po-
tential reason for this managerial behavior might be to strive for firm value maximization 
which will lead to higher bonus payments for managers and help them keep their jobs. 
This assumption has also further implications that need to be investigated. If managers 
indeed use dividend payouts to cater to their investors’ needs, the relationship between divi-
dend policy and firm value should also be related to investor preferences (Brockman and Un-
lu, 2009). In order to test this hypothesis, we rely on a method first applied by Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) to analyze the impact of cash holdings on excess market returns.  
We adapt this novel methodology to analyze the market reaction to changes in divi-
dend payouts and we run regressions of excess market returns (defined as yearly stock re-
turnriskless returnbeta×(index returnriskless return) for the firm under consideration) on 
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the interactions between dividend payout changes and our preference parameters. We have 
retrieved data on national stock exchange index returns from the Datastream list of key eco-
nomic indicators for each country in our analysis. Similarly, we work with data on policy in-
terest rates in the same database as country-specific riskless returns. According to our theoret-
ical model and our empirical results so far, we would expect to find more affirmative market 
reactions to dividend changes in countries with high values of Loss Aversion and Ambiguity 
Aversion as well as small values for Patience. 
Except for leverage, all firm-specific control variables are also deflated by lagged 
market value of equity and they are all winsorized at the 1 % level. Running a regression 
model with firm-clustered robust standard errors and year dummies, we find indeed – accord-
ing to Table V – that excess market returns are increasingly positively correlated with divi-
dend payouts in countries with high values for Loss Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion and low 
values for Patience. This suggests that investors with high loss and ambiguity aversion and 
low patience value changes in dividend payouts relative to their reference points more favora-
bly and are willing to pay more to own these stocks that distribute more dividends.   
>>> Insert Table V here <<< 
6.4 Additional Control Variables  
The literature on dividend policy decisions are growing vastly and new empirical work 
has been successful in identifying new key determinants for dividend policy decisions. Institu-
tional ownership constitutes one such example, as different papers have found evidence that 
institutions favor lower dividend payouts (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005), which is mostly 
driven by tax disadvantages and other specific transaction costs of dividends for institutions 
(Desai and Jin, 2011). To control for the impact of the institutional ownership on dividend 
payouts, we integrate Institutional Ownership, defined as the percentage of total shares in 
issue held as long-term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking a long-
term return according to Datastream. 
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Furthermore, DeAngelo et al. (2006) proposed recently a life-cycle theory of firms 
predicting that the propensity to pay dividends increases in later stages of the life-cycle of the 
company. In order to account for the life-cycle of the company, we include Age of the compa-
ny as another control variable, which is equal to the days past since the foundation of the 
company.  
We have neglected to control for these aspects in our original regressions of Table II, 
since including these control variables reduces the number of our firm-years in our analysis 
drastically. At the same time, these factors are shown to be important determinants of divi-
dend policies in recent empirical studies; hence ignoring them might raise some concerns that 
an omitted variable bias is driving the results. In particular, controlling for institutional own-
ership may be interpreted as a further robustness check of the representativeness of our esti-
mates regarding naïve investors’ preferences based on students’ choices in our survey. After 
incorporating these factors in our regressions, our behavioral parameters remain highly signif-
icant, as is revealed in Table VI. We only observe that Age replaces Size to a certain extent 
and this makes sense, as both variables are related to company-specific informational asym-
metries in the same vein. Hence, we can rule out a potential omitted variable bias due to ne-
glecting these factors in our analysis. 
>>> Insert Table VI here <<< 
7. Conclusion 
The main objective of our study was to investigate the relevance of behavioral prefer-
ence patterns for investors’ dividend preferences in a straightforward way. We showed analy-
tically and empirically that there is a negative relationship between investors’ patience level 
and dividend payouts and that there are positive relationships between loss aversion and am-
biguity aversion on the one side and dividend payouts on the other side. This presents evi-
dence for the boundedly rational investor story, as for rational investors behavioral biases 
should be completely unrelated to dividend payout strategies. Hence, our paper is the first one 
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to analyze the connection between boundedly rational investor preferences and corporate div-
idend policies in a rigorous way. Most importantly, we have provided the first empirical re-
sults to back up the theories that link loss aversion and ambiguity aversion to dividend poli-
cies. Furthermore, our results concerning the relationship between time preferences and divi-
dend payouts are much more straightforward than previous empirical work focusing on divi-
dend clienteles. 
As we relied on cross-country comparisons for the empirical part of our study, we also 
contributed to the literature researching the differences in corporate dividend policies across 
countries. Behavioral preference parameters like patience, loss aversion, and ambiguity aver-
sion can explain a very significant portion of the variation in cross-country differences in cor-
porate dividend policies. Our study could also be linked to a new branch of literature that is 
called “cultural finance”. The economic background of cultural values, however, is still not 
clearly understood and their link to investor preferences and decision making processes is not 
theoretically well-founded. Certainly, this is why we prefer behavioral parameters because of 
their unambiguous economic relevance, while cultural variables are much harder to interpret 
from an economical point of view. 
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Figure I. Illustration of our two-period model with three mental accounts. Due to the payment of divi-
dends d1 at time t = 1 firm value depreciates from x1 to S1. We are looking at a (representative) bound-
edly rational investor with different mental accounts. While d1 is assigned to the investor’s current in-
come account, S1 is part of the investor’s current asset account. From t = 1 to t = 2 firm value changes 
from S1 to S2 and this change is evaluated in the investor’s future income account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x1
S1
S2
d1
t = 1 t = 2
Current
income
account
Current
asset
account
Future 
income
account
 53 
 
Table I. Summary statistics  
 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation (STD), minimum (Min), maximum (Max) and number 
of observations (N) for all the variables used in the paper.   
 
Variable Mean STD Min Max N 
Div/Cash 0.71 2.82 0 28.24 63,323 
Div/EBIT 0.21 0.29 0 1.98 64,180 
Div/Sales 0.03 0.07 0 0.71 65,232 
Behavioral Variables      
Patience 0.70 0.11 0.37 0.89 73,612 
Future Orientation 4.12 0.34 3.06 4.80 68,776 
Loss Aversion 3.28 2.84 0.43 13.66 73,612 
Ambiguity Aversion 0.56 0.09 0.42 0.80 73,612 
Company-Specific Control Variables      
Company Size 15.39 2.89 10.47 21.02 66,262 
Debt-Equity Ratio 22.89 17.28 0 79.51 66,409 
Sales Growth 1.16 0.35 0.40 4.01 62,467 
Profitability 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.39 65,222 
Age 1.39E+07 3.45E+07 444 1.00E+08 48,586 
Institutional Ownership 7.13 12.86 0 99 39,984 
Country-Specific Control Variables      
Total Taxes 47.27 11.26 24.35 107.38 73,242 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 0.57 0.22 0.17 0.96 72,554 
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Table II. Results of regressions of Div/Cash, Div/EBIT, Div/Sales on behavioral parameters controlling 
for other factors 
 
This table presents the results of firm level Tobit regression results on dividend to cash flow, dividend 
to earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and dividend to net sales ratios, respectively in Columns (1) 
and (2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6). Sample period is 1992 to 2012. All dependent variables and firm-
specific control variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and we use year dummies. t-values are reported under the coefficient estimates. Statistical signifi-
cance at the 0.1 %, 1 %, and 5 % level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Div/Cash Div/EBIT Div/Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Patience 
 -0.155***  -0.102**  -0.038*** 
 -4.643  -2.844  -3.364 
Loss Aversion 
 0.022***  0.022***  0.005*** 
 13.984  13.653  7.482 
Ambiguity Aversion 
 0.446***  0.397***  0.096*** 
 9.647  7.574  6.902 
Firm Size 
0.002* 0.005*** -0.001 0.002 0.001** 0.001*** 
2.011 3.742 -0.475 1.604 2.889 3.453 
Debt-Equity Ratio 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 
-4.456 -4.156 -6.570 -6.169 -1.448 -1.311 
Sales Growth 
-0.148*** -0.150*** -0.158*** -0.160*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
-16.357 -16.616 -16.94 -17.038 -10.451 -10.505 
Profitability 
0.266*** 0.324*** -0.485*** -0.432*** 0.165*** 0.178*** 
4.754 6.206 -7.647 -7.121 10.898 12.229 
Total Taxes 
-0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000* -0.000** 
-3.254 -4.159 -5.261 -5.181 -2.110 -3.083 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
0.126*** -0.037 0.132*** -0.014 0.033*** -0.009 
7.129 -1.830 7.069 -0.628 5.614 -1.364 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.293 0.154 0.439 0.263 0.013 -0.006 
10.179*** 3.035** 14.042*** 4.641*** 1.449 -0.364 
F statistics 27.02*** 32.01*** 35.37*** 36.61*** 17.43*** 19.46*** 
Observations 46,875 45,721 47,364 46,210 47,364 46,210 
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Table III. Future orientation and dividend policy 
 
This table presents the results of firm level Tobit regression results on dividend to cash flow, dividend 
to earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and dividend to net sales ratios, respectively in Columns 
(1), (2), and (3). Behavioral parameter Patience of Table III is replaced by Future Orientation (House et 
al., 2004) in an attempt to circumstantiate the quality of our data. Sample period is 1992 to 2012. All 
dependent variables and firm-specific control variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and we use year dummies. t-values are reported under the coeffi-
cient estimates. Statistical significance at the 0.1 %, 1 %, and 5 % level are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Div/Cash Div/EBIT Div/Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Future Orientation 
-0.047*** -0.033* -0.018*** 
-3.487 -2.254 -3.450 
Loss Aversion 
0.024*** 0.023*** 0.005*** 
14.664 14.038 7.654 
Ambiguity Aversion 
0.444*** 0.393*** 0.089*** 
9.473 7.199 6.170 
Firm Size 
0.005*** 0.002 0.002*** 
3.487 1.357 3.405 
Debt-Equity Ratio 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 
-4.213 -6.235 -1.833 
Sales Growth 
-0.153*** -0.162*** -0.028*** 
-16.72 -16.784 -10.815 
Profitability 
0.320*** -0.442*** 0.173*** 
6.053 -7.215 11.835 
Total Taxes 
-0.001** -0.002*** -0.000** 
-2.718 -3.805 -2.607 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
-0.017 0.000 -0.007 
-0.868 0.016 -1.05 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.214** 0.311*** 0.043 
2.722 3.544 1.503 
F statistics 31.56*** 35.91*** 18.73*** 
Observations 44,735 45,224 45,224 
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Table IV. Differences in dividend policies between firms controlled by domestic and foreign owners 
 
This table presents the results of firm level Tobit regression results on dividend to cash flow, dividend 
to earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and dividend to net sales ratios, respectively in Columns (1) 
and (2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6). In Columns (1), (3) and (5) we report the results for the subsample 
of firms with the majority of stocks owned by domestic investors. In Columns (2), (4) and (6), we only 
examine firms with 50 % or more of the shares are owned by foreign investors. Sample period is 1992 
to 2012. All dependent variables and firm-specific control variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Ro-
bust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and we use year dummies. t-values are reported under 
the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 0.1 %, 1 %, and 5 % level are indicated by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Div/Cash Div/EBIT Div/Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Patience 
-0.179*** -0.105 -0.118** -0.176 -0.035** -0.019 
-4.548 -0.701 -2.634 -0.827 -2.743 -0.396 
Loss Aversion 
0.022*** 0.008 0.022*** 0.01 0.005*** -0.001 
12.444 1.101 11.797 0.954 6.520 -0.653 
Ambiguity Aversion 
0.497*** 0.854** 0.529*** 1.025** 0.112*** 0.335** 
9.265 3.137 8.294 2.720 6.205 3.163 
Firm Size 
0.004* 0.020* 0.002 0.020 0.001* 0.008* 
2.050 2.367 0.923 1.657 2.566 1.989 
Debt-Equity Ratio 
-0.001** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.002 0.000 -0.000 
-3.091 0.003 -3.424 -1.193 0.798 -0.586 
Sales Growth 
-0.139*** -0.285*** -0.162*** -0.296*** -0.023*** -0.089*** 
-10.494 -5.498 -11.197 -4.887 -6.822 -3.588 
Profitability 
0.399*** 1.312*** -0.403*** 0.370 0.214*** 0.371*** 
6.696 5.521 -5.614 1.167 12.66 4.141 
Total Taxes 
-0.002*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.001 
-4.373 -1.016 -5.266 -0.549 -3.386 -0.974 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
-0.063** -0.093 -0.031 -0.124 -0.007 -0.015 
-2.577 -1.026 -1.142 -0.976 -1.067 -0.401 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.132* -0.212 0.245*** -0.017 -0.033 -0.147 
2.179 -0.748 3.535 -0.043 -1.845 -1.412 
F statistics 35.18*** 4.27*** 36.39*** 3.11*** 23.97*** 4.19*** 
Observations 25,904 942 25,907 942 25,907 942 
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Table V. Valuation of dividend policy 
 
This table presents the results of regressing the excess stock return on changes in firm characteristics 
over the fiscal year. All variables except leverage (Lt) and excess stock return are deflated by the lagged 
market value of equity. NFt is calculated as the total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issu-
ance minus debt redemption. ΔEt is the change in earnings before interests paid and taxes (EBIT), and 
ΔNAt is the change in total assets minus cash holdings. ΔRDt represents the changes in R&D expendi-
tures, which is set to zero if missing. ΔIt is the yearly change in interest expense and ΔDt is the change in 
total dividends. ΔCt is the notation for the realized 1-year change in cash. Dependent variable and firm-
specific control variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and we use year dummies. t-values are reported under the coefficient estimates. Statistical signifi-
cance at the 0.1 %, 1 %, and 5 % level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Excess Stock Return 
ΔDt×Patience 
-5.378*** 
-4.137 
ΔDt×Loss Aversion 
0.111* 
2.174 
ΔDt×Ambiguity Aversion 
6.769*** 
3.989 
ΔDt 
-0.490** 
-3.027 
ΔEt 
0.563*** 
28.161 
ΔNAt 
0.097*** 
12.702 
ΔRDt 
2.981*** 
8.149 
ΔIt 
-1.977*** 
-11.049 
Lt 
-0.001*** 
-5.171 
Ct 
0.484*** 
22.129 
NFt 
-0.059*** 
-4.251 
Patience 
0.074* 
2.35 
Loss Aversion 
0.003** 
3.144 
Ambiguity Aversion 
-0.014 
-0.515 
Constant 
0.074*** 
26.735 
Adjusted R2 0.074 
F statistics 156.84*** 
Observations 27,545 
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Table VI. Additional Control variables 
 
This table presents the results of firm level Tobit regression results on dividend to cash flow, dividend 
to earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and dividend to net sales ratios, respectively in Columns (1) 
(2) and (3). We consider here additionally two new control variables, Age and Institutional Ownership. 
Sample period is 1992 to 2012. All dependent variables and firm-specific control variables are winso-
rized at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and we use year dummies. t-
values are reported under the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 0.1 %, 1 %, and 5 % 
level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Div/Cash Div/EBIT Div/Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Patience 
-0.234*** -0.184*** -0.057*** 
-4.769 -3.431 -3.686 
Loss Aversion 
0.017*** 0.019*** 0.003** 
5.837 5.711 2.918 
Ambiguity Aversion 
0.410*** 0.456*** 0.073** 
5.111 4.923 3.153 
Firm Size 
-0.000 -0.002 0.000 
-0.178 -0.757 0.650 
Debt-Equity Ratio 
-0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 
-4.719 -5.035 1.417 
Sales Growth 
-0.125*** -0.134*** -0.018*** 
-7.032 -6.666 -5.219 
Profitability 
0.272*** -0.558*** 0.197*** 
3.720 -6.501 11.084 
Age 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
4.986 4.760 2.292 
Institutional Ownership 
-0.001** -0.001 -0.000*** 
-2.723 -1.779 -4.043 
Total Taxes 
-0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
-3.377 -5.649 -4.609 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
-0.004 0.024 0.002 
-0.134 0.652 0.254 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.286*** 0.403*** 0.026 
3.619 4.801 1.313 
Observations 16,896 16,898 16,898 
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1. Introduction 
The traditional corporate finance literature neglected to analyze determinants of cash 
policies for a long time. Mostly, cash is regarded as negative debt and therefore, it is consid-
ered to be a tool to reach the optimal leverage target (Opler et al., 1999; Acharya et al., 2007). 
Of course, under this assumption, debt redemption and cash holdings are substitutes and only 
net leverage should matter for the market value of a company. 
However, the markets are far from being perfect and financially constrained firms do 
not always have access to external financing channels in times of need or they have to sell 
new securities for unreasonable prices to finance new investments or they have to terminate 
profitable investments too early due to liquidity constraints. In this sense, preserving liquidity 
serves as an insurance policy, which safeguards a firm against possibly terminating good pro-
jects or issuing new equity or debt under unfavorable conditions (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1998; Almeida et al., 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007). In these scenarios, companies may prefer to 
cut down dividends or share repurchases today in order to hoard cash for future investments.  
Different papers have found empirical support for this story which we refer to as the 
precautionary motive of cash holdings (Keynes, 1936). For instance, Opler et al. (1999) 
demonstrated that growth firms with volatile cash flows are more likely to retain their earn-
ings as cash instead of distributing them to shareholders. More recently, Bates et al. (2009) 
showed that firms started to hoard more cash in the last decade and this rise is related to in-
creased opaqueness (high R&D spending) and cash flow volatility. Due to augmented under-
investment (Myers, 1977) and asset substitution problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jen-
sen, 1986), these firms face larger agency costs of debt and they should respond to increased 
costs of external financing by building up cash reserves in order to avoid agency costs of debt. 
Furthermore, this relationship should disappear for unconstrained firms, as they already have 
enough funds in place or unutilized credit lines to implement value-increasing projects. In-
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deed, Almeida et al. (2004) advocates that the cash holding policy is sensitive to cash flow 
only for constrained firms, i.e. firms facing difficulties raising external funds. 
Following these results, another branch of research has focused on the relation be-
tween cash holdings and the market value of a company. Although the literature in this field is 
relatively scarce, the empirical evidence suggests that investors of constrained firms benefit 
from cash holdings to a larger extent compared to the investors of non-constrained firms 
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007; Denis and Sibikov, 2010). 
This result is consistent with earlier work analyzing the amount of cash holdings and it ex-
plains why constrained firms prefer to retain a larger portion of their earnings as cash. 
Thus, until now, the literature on cash holdings has tried to justify large cash reserves 
with the precautionary motive story, while some papers also discussed how cash holdings 
might amplify agency problems (Pinkowitz, 2002; Dittmar et al., 2003). Yet, these papers 
have not considered another important financial imperfection that might affect the valuation 
of cash and firms’ cash policy as well. In imperfect markets with financial constraints, inves-
tors’ bounded rationality would also play a role for the valuation of cash holdings and manag-
ers should try to satisfy investors’ needs and secure their jobs. Thus, investors’ preferences 
may have an impact on cash policies.  
Interestingly, the cash holding decisions have not been dissected from this perspective, 
although there is extensive evidence that companies adjust other financial decisions such as 
dividend payouts (Baker and Wurgler, 2004) or mergers and acquisitions (Baker et al., 2009) 
according to investors’ preferences. Similarly, evidence also hints that investors’ reaction to 
corporate financial policies and the returns after the announcement of specific corporate 
events are correlated with investor sentiment (see e.g., Becker et al., 2011, Bouwman et al., 
2004).  
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In this paper, we want to close this research gap extending the “catering” literature by 
investigating the connection between investor preferences and cash management. For this 
purpose, we analyze how the valuation of cash depends on investor preferences and how 
managers choose cash holding policies as a tool to satisfy investors. 
Furthermore, the previous catering literature has neglected to discuss which aspects of 
investors’ preferences are responsible for the investors’ demand for certain financial policy 
decisions. Instead, researchers either focus on geographical or demographical aspects to iden-
tify certain clienteles with similar preferences which companies need to cater to in order to 
have higher returns (Graham and Kumar, 2006) or discuss how changes in market sentiment 
force managers to adjust their decisions (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). To our knowledge, Breu-
er et al. (2013) is the only paper to discuss the relevance of investors’ risk and time prefer-
ences for their reaction to financial decisions (for the example of dividend policy) in a 
straightforward way. Breuer et al. (2013) utilize a unique dataset on actual (country-specific) 
preference parameters according to prospect theory (Kahmenann and Tversky, 1979). Similar-
ly, this paper also elaborates on a specific aspect of investors’ risk preferences (ambiguity 
aversion) that might affect the valuation of cash holdings. In a related manner, this paper al-
lows us to discuss whether management pays attention to investors’ ambiguity preferences as 
a determinant of the cash holding policy. 
Last but not least, we can also contribute to the literature focusing on cross-country 
differences in corporate cash holdings examining whether investor preferences can explain 
cross-country differences in the valuation of cash holdings and in cash policies besides inves-
tor protection (Dittmar and Marth-Smith, 2007), the development of credit markets (see, e.g., 
Lins et al., 2010) or cultural aspects (see, e.g., Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009).   
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To recap, the contribution of our paper is threefold. First of all, our paper is the first 
one studying cash holdings as a vehicle to cater for investors’ needs, as we analyze how in-
vestors value cash and whether managers correctly adapt cash holding policies to satisfy their 
investors. Secondly, emanating from the precautionary motive story for cash holdings, we 
connect investor preferences directly to cash management decisions both theoretically and 
empirically for the first time in the literature. This way, thirdly, we also offer an alternative 
explanation for cross-country differences in the valuation of cash and in cash holdings based 
on investor preferences and biases.  
Our paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present a theoretical model 
linking investors’ ambiguity preferences to the valuation of cash. Section 3 describes the ob-
tained data, our regression model and the initial results for our empirical analysis. Conse-
quently, in Section 4, we discuss further implications of our theory and the robustness of our 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Behavioral Explanation for Cash Holdings: A Simple Model 
As we have mentioned above, some papers have demonstrated that the reaction to cer-
tain corporate events is not consistent over time and depends on the respective temporary in-
vestor sentiment. At the same time, certain demographic characteristics of investors such as 
age or income level are also instrumental in understanding stock price movements after corpo-
rate events. Yet, other than Breuer et al. (2013), we are not aware of any attempt that investi-
gate the relation between the actual investor preference parameters and different corporate 
financial decisions in a straightforward way. More astonishingly, the question of whether cash 
holding policies serve to catering purposes has not been discussed before us at all, not even in 
a time series context.  
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To fill these gaps, we want to analyze the impact of investors’ ambiguity aversion on 
their attitude towards cash policies. As we discussed above, cash holdings are treated as an 
insurance tool against the illiquidity risks in imperfect markets according to the precautionary 
motive story. We argue that if an investor exhibits high ambiguity aversion, she prefers to 
limit investments with uncertain outcomes and to receive dividends instead (see also Breuer et 
al., 2013), since investment opportunities are afflicted with uncertainty. As a result, this 
would render cash holdings rather unnecessary, as future investments are not very valuable 
for ambiguity averse investors. In other words, if cash holdings serve as an important insur-
ance tool against the risks of illiquidity in imperfect markets, their value should depend on 
investors’ preferences towards ambiguity.  
To grasp this idea more rigorously, it is necessary to set up a formal model. Our model 
is based on the same principles as the models of Almeida et al. (2004) or Han and Qiu (2007), 
but it additionally integrates investors’ preferences into the problem setting. Like these mod-
els, we also abstract from the managerial entrenchment problem and assume that managers 
choose the investment, cash and dividend policy in order to maximize the market value of the 
company and there are no conflicts of interest between managers and investors. Hence, we 
ignore agency problems between managers and investors. We discuss this issue further in our 
empirical analysis. 
Our model has a finite planning horizon. In the first period (period 1), the manager de-
termines the amount of cash that she wants to retain in the company. At the beginning of the 
second period (period 2), she decides simultaneously how much the company should borrow 
and invest. In the following and last period (period 3), all uncertainty is resolved, investment 
projects are terminated and debt is going to be repaid (see also Figure 1). 
>> Insert Figure 1 
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In period 1, the firm starts with an initial distributable free cash flow, X  0. After 
holding some portion of X as cash (C), the rest is distributed as dividends. In period 2, C is 
paid out to investors as dividends or deployed to finance new investments (I) with uncertain 
earnings ݃ሺܫ, ෤ሻ where ෤ describes the uncertainty of investment payoffs. The cash reserves C 
are dissolved completely, because the company is terminated after the period 3. Furthermore, 
the company has current operations that can generate non-negative cash flow (ܿ̃) during the 
first period as well and it can issue new debt (B). With respect to cash flow c in period 2, we 
assume this to be risky, but – in contrast to ݃ሺܫ, ෤ሻ – not to be uncertain. This means ambigui-
ty is only associated with ݃ሺܫ, ෤ሻ, but not with ܿ̃. We assume that the company can assess the 
return distributions of the cash flows from assets in place much easier, as it gained experience 
based on the performance in the past and observed some error terms already, while new in-
vestments might have unforeseeable results for the company. Alternatively, we can also as-
sume that return uncertainty (according to the plans in period 1) is only related to the returns 
in period 3, as this would also imply that only earnings from new investments are uncertain. 
Moreover, without loss of generality we assume – for ease of exposition – ෤ and ܿ̃ to be inde-
pendent. 
The interest rate for debt is equal to the riskless rate R0, since we assume that creditors 
do not grant credits that cannot be repaid with certainty after period 3. Hence: 
																																																											ܤሺ1 ൅ ܴ଴ሻ ൑ 	ܫ൫1 ൅ ܴ௟௜௤൯.																																																							ሺ1ሻ 
Rliq stands for the (riskless) return from investments, if the company is forced by debt 
holders to liquidate its investments. This occurs if investment returns ݃ሺܫ, ෤ሻ in the third peri-
od are not high enough to repay outstanding loans including interest expenses, hence if ݃ሺܫ, ෤ሻ 
< B(1+R0). We assume Rliq to be smaller than R0, because otherwise there would be no risk 
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for creditors to lose money and the firm under consideration can borrow unlimited amount of 
credit. Hence, no firm would be financially constrained in this case. 
Since we have a three-period-model, we also assume that company operations are ter-
minated at the end of period 3 after receiving returns from investments and after repaying 
outstanding debt. Taken together, a manager, whose task it is to maximize a representative 
investor’s utility, faces the following optimization problem in period 1: 
	ܼ൫ܥ, ܤሺܿ̃, ܥሻ, ܫሺܿ̃, ܥሻ൯ ൌ ܺ െ ܥ ൅ ଵଵାோబ  ቀܥ ൅ ܧ൫ܤሺܿ̃, ܥሻ൯ െ ܧ	൫ܫሺܿ̃, ܥ, ܤሻ൯ ൅ ܧሺܿ̃ሻቁ ൅
	௙ሺఋሻா൫௚ሺூሺ௖̃,஼ሻ,෤ሻ൯ሺଵାோబሻమ 	െ
ா൫஻ሺ௖̃,஼ሻ൯ሺଵାோబሻ
ሺଵାோబሻమ 				ݏ. ݐ																																																																																							ሺ2ሻ  
																																																							ܫሺܿ̃, ܥሻ ൑ 		 ܿ̃ ൅ ܤሺܿ̃, ܥሻ ൅ ܥ	,																																																			ሺ3ሻ					 
																																																				ܤሺܿ̃, ܥሻ ∙ ሺ1 ൅ ܴ଴ሻ ൑ ܫ ∙ ൫1 ൅ ܴ௟௜௤൯,																																									ሺ4ሻ				 
																																																																									ܥ ൒ 0.																																																																								ሺ5ሻ				 
In period 1, the manager has to determine C, while her task in period 2 is to fix the 
values for B and I. As a consequence, both B and I might be depending on the former decision 
regarding C and the resulting state of nature as described by realized cash flows ܿ̃ from assets 
in place. Therefore we have to write ܫሺܿ̃, ܥሻ and ܤሺܿ̃, ܥሻ. Moreover, let UA denote the utility 
from the uncertain investment returns for an ambiguity averse investor. We model ambiguity 
aversion similar to Klibanoff et al. (2005), who first calculate the certainty equivalent for an 
uncertain probability set Δ, the possible probabilities over S. Consequently, this certainty 
equivalent for Δ is used to compute expected utility according to one’s risk preferences. For-
mally, their smooth ambiguity model has the following representation: 
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																																											 ஺ܷሺ݃ሺܫሻሻ ൌ නߔ
߂
ቌනݑሺ݃ሺܫሻሻ
ܵ
݀ߨቍ݀ߤ.																															ሺ6ሻ 
We assume that investors are risk neutral so that: ׬ ݑሺ݃ሺܫሻሻௌ ݀ߨ ൌ ܧሺ݃ሺܫሺܿ̃, ܥሻ, ෤ሻሻ. 
Such a (simplifying) assumption is justified if investors diversify away risk to a large extent 
on efficient capital markets. In fact, one essential difference between risk and ambiguity fea-
tures is that uncertainty cannot be diversified away, but risk can (at least the unsystematic risk 
can) (Epstein and Schneider, 2008; Epstein and Schneider, 2010). However, we will return to 
this issue in our empirical section. 
In addition, we further simplify equation (6) by assuming that the decision maker dis-
plays a constant ambiguity aversion which requires ׬ ߔ௱ ሺݔሻ ൌ െ ଵఋ ݁ିఋ௫. Hence, with in-
creasing δ, the decision maker becomes more ambiguity averse and uncertain returns from 
investments are valued less favorably. These assumptions enable us to rewrite the ambiguity 
utility UA(g(ܫሺܿ̃, ܥሻ)) by simply introducing an ambiguity factor f(δ) < 1 as a decreasing func-
tion of an ambiguity aversion parameter δ (f’(δ) < 0): 
																																							 ஺ܷሺ݃ሺܫሺ෤ܿ, ܥሻሻሻ ൌ ݂ሺߜሻܧ൫݃ሺܫሺ෤ܿ, ܥሻ, ෤ሻ൯	.																																										ሺ7ሻ 
As a consequence of assuming risk neutrality and no uncertainty with respect to future 
cash holdings ܿ̃, there is no need for an ambiguity discount with respect to ܫሺܿ̃, ܥሻ and ܿ̃. 
Therefore, in (2), we simply write ܧሺܤሺܿ̃, ܥሻሻ, ܧሺܫሺܿ̃, ܥሻሻ, and ܧሺܿ̃ሻ. 
Based on (2), it is easy to see that riskless borrowing has no direct impact on the over-
all objective function Z. Yet, in order to minimize the risk of forgoing profitable investment 
opportunities due to limited funds, a manager is going to draw on the entire credit line that is 
granted to her company. Due to this indirect relation, Z is monotonously increasing in B. 
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Thus, the inequality (4) of our model is binding with an optimal value Bopt of B according to 
ܤ௢௣௧ ൌ ܫ൫1 ൅ ܴ௟௜௤൯/ሺ1 ൅ ܴ଴ሻ. 
This is going to simplify the problem at hand, since at the beginning of period 2, we 
just have to maximize the objective function with respect to I. In states of high cash flow (c), 
where the (first-best) optimal investment program I* is feasible, we have: 
																																																									݂ሺߜሻܧ ቀ݃′ሺܫሺܿ, ܥሻ, ෤ሻቁ ൌ 	1 ൅ ܴ0.																																																ሺ8ሻ 
It might be possible that we have Bopt+c+C > I*, because of very high cash flows c. In 
this situation, excess cash I*BoptcC is paid out as dividends in period 2. Assuming that the 
second derivative of the investment yield function is negative, equation (8) defines the opti-
mal investment program, ܫ∗. On the other hand, if the company is (ex-post, after period 1) 
financially constrained (ܫ∗ 	൒ 		ܥ ൅ ܤ௢௣௧ ൅ ܿ), it needs cash holdings to finance the optimal 
investment program. In this scenario, the company is going to be able to invest more as cash 
holdings increase. In other words, the restriction ܫ ൑ 	ܥ ൅ ܤ௢௣௧ ൅ ܿ is binding and the result-
ing investment is equal to: 
																																																											ܫ௖௢௡ ൌ 		 ሺܥ ൅ ܿሻሺ1 ൅ ܴ଴ሻܴ଴ െ ܴ௟௜௤ 	.																																																				ሺ9ሻ				 
Hence, the investment program depends on cash holdings for financially constrained 
firms, but is completely detached from cash holdings in firms where the optimal investment 
program can be implemented regardless of cash holdings. This ex-post solution after period 1 
molds the cash holding policy at the beginning of period 1.  
Let Iopt stand for the state-dependent optimal investment. With h(c) being the density 
function of ܿ̃, we can rewrite the objective function (2): 
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	ܼ൫ܥ, ܫ௢௣௧, ܤ௢௣௧൯ ൌ ܺ െ ܥ ൅ ׬ ൤ ஼ଵାோబ ൅
௖̃
ଵାோబ െ
ூ∗
ଵାோబ ൅
ூ∗൫ଵାோ೗೔೜൯
ሺଵାோబሻమ ൅
௙ሺሻாሺ௚ሺூ∗,෤ሻሻ
ሺଵାோబሻమ െ
ஶ	
ூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼
ூ∗൫ଵାோ೗೔೜൯
ሺଵାோబሻమ ൨ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿ ൅
׬ ൤௙ሺሻாሺ௚ሺூ೎೚೙ሺ௖,஼ሻ,෤ሻሻሺଵାோబሻమ െ
ூ೎೚೙ሺ௖,஼ሻ൫ଵାோ೗೔೜൯
ሺଵାோబሻమ ൨ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿ
	ூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼
଴ .																																															ሺ10ሻ  
It should be noticed that Icon  as seen from period 1  is a random variable as well due 
to its dependence on c. Based on ܼ൫ܥ, ܫ௢௣௧, ܤ௢௣௧൯, the first-order necessary condition for op-
timal cash holding runs 
ܩሺܥ, ሻ ≔ ௗ௓൫஼,ூ೚೛೟,஻೚೛೟൯ௗ஼ ൌ 	െ1 ൅ ׬ ቂ
ଵ
ଵାோబቃ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿ
ஶ	
ூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼ ൅ ቀ
௙ሺሻாሺ௚ሺூ∗,෤ሻሻ
ሺଵାோబሻమ െ
ூ∗൫ଵାோ೗೔೜൯
ሺଵାோబሻమ ቁ ൅
׬ ൤௙ሺሻாሺ௚ᇱሺூ೎೚೙ሺ௖,஼ሻ,෤ሻሻି൫ଵାோ೗೔೜൯ሺோబିோ೗೔೜ሻሺଵାோబሻ ൨ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿ
ூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼	
଴ െ ቀ௙ሺሻாሺ௚ሺூ
∗,෤ሻሻ
ሺଵାோబሻమ െ
ூ∗൫ଵାோ೗೔೜൯
ሺଵାோబሻమ ቁ ൌ 0				ሺ11ሻ		
In a situation with ܫ∗		ܤ௢௣௧, i.e., even without cash holdings no danger of a binding 
financial constraint (note that we assume that c as well as C can only take non-negative val-
ues), we have ׬ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿஶ	ூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼ ൌ 1 and ׬ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿ
ூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼	
଴ ൌ 0. In this case, the derivative 
ܼ൫ܥ, ܫ௢௣௧, ܤ௢௣௧൯/ܥ is equal to 1+1/(1+R0) < 0, which directly implies Copt = 0 due to (5). 
Apparently, in such a setting, ambiguity aversion does not influence the marginal utility con-
tribution of cash holdings which is always negative, as I = I* is possible even for C = 0.  
However, cash holdings may also serve other purposes. For instance, cash holdings 
can finance daily operations, which help companies avoid transaction costs of short-term ex-
ternal financing. Hence, optimal cash holding levels are not going to be zero even for finan-
cially unconstrained companies, as we demonstrate in the empirical section. Yet, even in such 
settings with exogenous reasons for cash holdings as transaction costs, we conjecture that the 
marginal utility contribution and the optimal value Copt would be independent of the magni-
tude of ambiguity, which is characterized by . In other words, we assume that these market 
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imperfections such as transaction costs are not afflicted with uncertainty. As a result, ambigui-
ty preferences are irrelevant for the cash management policy for financially unconstrained 
companies, as we show below.  
For financially constrained firms, i.e. ׬ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼	଴ ൐ 0, the choice C = 0 does 
not necessarily have to be optimal even if we ignore transaction costs or other advantages of 
cash holdings. Cash holdings are more valuable, if a company is financially constrained ac-
cording to our model and potentially positive, as it is evident in (11). This follows from the 
fact that ௙ሺሻாሺ௚ᇱሺூ೎೚೙ሺ௖,஼ሻ,෤ሻሻି൫ଵାோ೗೔೜൯ሺோబିோ೗೔೜ሻሺଵାோబሻ ൐
ଵ
ሺଵାோబሻ, since ݂ሺሻܧሺ݃′ሺܫ௖௢௡ሺܿ, ܥሻ, ෤ሻሻ ൐ 1 ൅ ܴ଴ for 
every ܫ௖௢௡ ൏ ܫ∗. This implies that companies facing financial constraints have more valuable 
investment opportunities. This is logical as these companies cannot implement all profitable 
investment projects and the second derivative of investment return function, ݃′′ሺܫ௖௢௡ሺܿ, ܥሻ, ෤ሻ 
is negative. As a result, cash holdings are increasingly valuable as the probability of being 
financially constrained (׬ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼	଴ ) increases. This result of our model is also in line 
with the empirical findings regarding marginal expected gross returns of cash holdings of fi-
nancially constrained firms (Denis and Sibikov, 2010). This conclusion of our model is also in 
line with the findings of empirical studies such as Opler et al. (1999), Pinkowitz and William-
son (2007), and Bates et al. (2009) that argue that companies with better growth opportunities 
are going to hold more cash. 
In particular, we are interested in the influence of varying degrees of ambiguity aver-
sion on the marginal utility contribution of cash: ∂2Z/∂C∂δ. We therefore just need to study 
how G is related to δ, thus we determine G/δ:  
																			ܩሺܥ, ሻ ൌ 		݂′ሺሻන ቈ
ܧሺ݃′ሺܫ௖௢௡ሺܿ, ܥሻ, ෤ሻሻ
ሺܴ଴ െ ܴ௟௜௤ሻሺ1 ൅ ܴ଴ሻ቉ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿ
ூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼	
଴
	൏ 0																ሺ12ሻ 
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The sign of this derivative is negative, as f’() < 0. The intuition behind (12) is very 
simple. Clearly, with cash holdings, firms are going to be able to realize more value-
increasing investments in the future even at times when they cannot turn to external credit 
markets for financing purposes. This might increase the value of the company to a certain 
extent despite the opportunity costs of cash holdings that are equal to 1+1/(1+R0). However, 
with increasing ambiguity aversion, uncertain investments are less valuable for investors and, 
as a consequence, cash holdings become (relatively) superfluous. At the same time, this rela-
tion between ambiguity aversion and value of cash is only apparent for firms that face finan-
cial constraints, i.e. if	׬ ݄ሺܿሻ	݀ܿூ∗ି஻೚೛೟ି஼	଴ ൐ 0. Summarizing, our formal analysis implies that 
ambiguity aversion determines the marginal utility contribution of cash holdings for financial-
ly constrained firms, but not for financially unconstrained firms.  
Based on these results, we can also calculate the connection between ambiguity aver-
sion (δ) and the level of optimal cash holdings, Copt. Since we abstract from the managerial 
entrenchment problem and assume that managers’ interests are aligned with the interests of 
their investors. In other words, we assume that the managers have the same target function Z 
like their investors. In this case, because of	ܥ௢௣௧ ⁄ ൌ െ	
ಸቀ಴೚೛೟,ቁ

ಸቀ಴೚೛೟,ቁ
಴೚೛೟
൙ , we immediately 
get ܥ௢௣௧ ⁄ ൏ 0 combining the negative sign of (12) with ீ൫஼೚೛೟,൯஼೚೛೟  < 0, which simply de-
scribes the sufficient condition for an inner solution Copt. This means that the optimal level of 
cash holdings is decreasing with the level of ambiguity aversion, but this is only true if 
ீ൫஼೚೛೟,൯
 	< 0, i.e., for financially constrained companies. This gives rise to the following four 
hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis 1a: With increasing ambiguity aversion of investors, the market value contribu-
tion of cash holdings decreases for financially constrained firms. 
Hypothesis 1b: For financially unconstrained firms, the market value contribution of cash 
holdings is not related to the magnitude of investor’s ambiguity aversion. 
Hypothesis 2a: The optimal amount of cash holdings decreases for financially constrained 
firms with ambiguity aversion of investors. 
Hypothesis 2b: For financially unconstrained firms, the optimal amount of cash holdings is 
independent of the magnitude of investor’s ambiguity aversion. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
After presenting our theoretical model, we want to investigate its implications empiri-
cally in the next section. It should be noted that we expect Hypotheses 1a and 1b to be more 
strongly confirmed than Hypotheses 2a and 2b, because firm valuation is directly related to 
investor preferences, but for Hypotheses 2a and 2b to hold we also need the assumption that 
managers act according to investor preferences – and we know from the literature discussed 
above that managerial behavior may also be driven by egoistic motives as well. Keeping this 
in mind, we first explain our dataset and then illustrate our regression approach. Last but not 
least, we discuss our results. 
3.1 Data  
3.1.1 Ambiguity Aversion  
The main variable of interest in our study is the preference parameter ambiguity aver-
sion. We have obtained this parameter via the international test of risk attitudes (INTRA) sur-
vey that is carried out mainly between 2005 and 2009 among undergraduate students of eco-
nomics in 46 countries. Overall, 6,000 university students have participated, as we requested 
from each participant to complete a questionnaire that included questions on risk and time 
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preferences, cultural attitudes, and some personal information (Wang et al., 2010; Rieger et 
al., 2011; Rieger and Wang, 2012) 
We have elicited average ambiguity aversion of participants in each country based on 
the answers to the well-known Ellsberg’s urn game where participants can choose between an 
uncertain lottery with an unknown probability of winning and a risky lottery with a winning 
probability less than 50 % (for the same potential payoff). Investing in the risky rather than 
the uncertain lottery indicates ambiguity aversion, the unease resulting from dealing with un-
known probability distributions, i.e. a concave function, Φ. 
In what follows, we utilize elicited preferences in these choice tasks as proxies for 
preference patterns of the investor population in the respective countries. This might be sub-
ject to some critique, since this approach implicitly assumes that our student sample is repre-
sentative for the whole population in a country. Clearly, students are younger and less experi-
enced compared to the rest of the society and this may cast doubt on the representative quality 
of our sample. Yet, in different areas of experimental economics, there is enough evidence 
revealing similarities between average investor preferences in a society and students’ prefer-
ences (King et al., 1993). Moreover, since we are conducting a cross-country empirical com-
parison, what really matters is the difference between the preferences located in different 
countries and there is no reason to believe that cross-country differences in ambiguity aver-
sion should be distributed differently for students compared to the investors. 
Furthermore, despite globalization, our empirical analysis emanates from the assump-
tion that only preferences of domestic investors count for the valuation of cash. Although this 
assumption seems to be very restrictive, many empirical studies document a very strong home 
bias, i.e., a tendency to invest in stocks listed in domestic stock markets (see Lau et al., 2010). 
For this reason, we think it is acceptable to work with country-specific investor preference 
parameters, since even the shares of large companies in open markets are mostly held by local 
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investors. Still, in Section 4, we are going to discuss whether our results become less clear 
with an increasing proportion of foreign ownership.  
3.1.2 Data on Other Dependent and Independent Variables 
Data regarding company information including annual returns, cash holdings, and oth-
er control variables are extracted from Datastream, a service of Thomson Reuters. We have 
chosen to analyze all the companies listed under the constituent list “World Market” provided 
by Datastream consisting of 6,922 companies from 59 countries. Cross matching this sample 
with the countries for which we have data for ambiguity aversion leaves us with 3,059 com-
panies from 29 countries. We find this sample much better suited for our purposes than the 
Compustat Global Data, since Compustat Global Data are dominated by companies located in 
the United States, especially in the early years. Our sample is much more balanced across 
different countries. 
Our analyses cover all firm years between 1992 and 2011, since the global benchmark 
portfolio returns formed on size and market-to-book ratio are only available for this 20-year 
period in the data library of Kenneth French, which we use in order to calculate the excess 
returns required to analyze the first hypothesis. We omit all financial and utility companies 
from our analysis (four digit SIC classification numbers between 6000-6999 and 4900-4949, 
respectively), since these firms are mostly regulated and should have a small difference be-
tween the cost of internal and external funds. 
3.2 Regression Models 
Our hypotheses require two different empirical analyses. In the first regression model, 
we examine the impact of ambiguity aversion on the valuation of cash holdings distinguishing 
between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. In the second empirical model, we 
investigate the impact of ambiguity aversion on the amount of cash holdings again separately 
for financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
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3.2.1 First Hypothesis: Valuation Effects of Cash Holdings 
We start discussing our empirical analysis concerning the first hypothesis. Generally, 
we can distinguish between two types of empirical methods investigating the value of cash. 
The first one goes back to Fama and French (1998) and many papers including Pinkowitz et 
al. (2006) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) used this method to analyze how the market 
value of a company (divided by total assets) is related to cash holdings or changes in cash 
holdings. However, we prefer another approach applied by Faulkender and Wang (2006) for 
two reasons (see also Denis and Sibikov, 2010). First of all, Fama and French (1998) did not 
consider time-varying sensitivities to risk factors, i.e. changes in discount rates over time. 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) address this problem by correcting stock returns with the help of 
benchmark returns. Secondly, the market-to-book ratio is not comparable across different 
companies especially across different countries due to different accounting conventions and 
methods. On the other hand, yearly returns of listed companies are defined identically in eve-
ry country and for each company.  
Hence, we conduct linear regressions of excess returns of the companies in our sample 
on ambiguity aversion with robust standard errors clustered by firm. We control for several 
other factors such as leverage, net financing, and change in R&D expenditures and in divi-
dends according to the methodology of Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibikov 
(2010). All firm-specific control variables and independent variables are winsorized at the 1 
% level and all control variables are also deflated by the lagged market value of equity except 
for leverage.  
Moreover, we use the common law dummy (La Porta et al., 1998), a corruption index, 
the annual inflation rate and total taxes (Djankov et al., 2010) as additional country-specific 
control variables. In contrast to our firm-specific data, country-specific data (except the annu-
al inflation rate) including our ambiguity aversion parameter are not given as panel data. 
 77 
 
However, we assume that country-specific characteristics change only relatively slowly across 
time so that we are allowed to work with given country-specific data over the whole observa-
tion period from 1992 to 2011. For example, a corresponding assumption typically also under-
lies cross-country analyses of cash holdings that are based on cultural features (Chang and 
Noorbakhsh, 2009) or governance structures (Dittmar et al., 2003). We also utilize year dum-
mies and industry dummies based on two-digit SIC codes. 
Since we analyze companies from 29 different countries, we take the global bench-
mark portfolios from the database of Kenneth French. Thus, we define the excess return as the 
difference between the annual stock return and the matching global benchmark portfolio re-
turn formed on size and market-to-book ratio. Although we do not report them here, the re-
sults are not much different if we run regressions of the excess returns (annual company re-
turn minus risk free return) on the factors of Fama and French’s three factor model (market 
index return, size and market-to-book ratio) with the same set of control variables. Including 
momentum as the fourth risk factor does not affect our results either. Table I gives an over-
view of descriptive statistics with respect to all variables in our regressions.  
>> Insert Table I 
3.2.2 Second Hypothesis: The Amount of Optimal Cash Holding 
In order to analyze the second hypothesis regarding the relation between cash holdings 
and ambiguity aversion, we use a similar empirical model as Opler et al. (1999), since this is 
the most-renowned method for the analysis of cash holding policies of a company. The de-
pendent variable in all regressions is cash holdings divided by total assets minus cash hold-
ings (Cash/NetAssets). Since we cannot have negative cash values; we use a Tobit model with 
the lower bound set equal to zero to account for the non-normal distribution of our dependent 
variable. Robust standard errors are again clustered at firm-level and like in the first model we 
use year dummies and industry dummies. 
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As we perform a cross-country analysis, we again add some country-specific legal var-
iables in our regression model similar to the empirical model of Dittmar et al. (2003) and to 
the empirical model of the previous section such as the common law dummy, inflation, cor-
ruption, and total taxes besides the usual set of company-specific control variables of previous 
empirical models based on Opler et al. (1999). Table II gives an overview of descriptive sta-
tistics with respect to new variables in the second regression model.  
>> Insert Table II 
3.3 Results  
Our model conjectures that ambiguity aversion should only be relevant for financially 
constrained companies or in other words if the likelihood of experiencing financial difficulties 
is high. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we divide our dataset into two subsets. One 
group consists of (relatively) financially constrained firms and the other one includes (rela-
tively) unconstrained firms. We define the level of financial constraints based on three differ-
ent proxies, which we discuss below.  
The investigation of the first hypothesis requires us to compare the impact of ambigui-
ty aversion on the valuation of cash for these two groups. For this purpose, we have to gener-
ate an interaction term between changes in cash and the ambiguity aversion parameter. We 
center both parameters to avoid multicollinearity problems regarding this interaction term. We 
predict a negative estimator for this interaction term for financially constrained firms which 
would imply that changes in cash holdings lead to lower excess returns if ambiguity aversion 
is high in line with Hypothesis 1a). According to our Hypothesis 1b), this interaction term 
should be insignificant for financially unconstrained firms. 
In order to analyze our second hypothesis, we again divide our sample into two groups 
based on the level of financial constraints. We predict that ambiguity aversion is negatively 
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correlated with cash holdings only for financially constrained firms and it is uncorrelated with 
cash holdings for unconstrained firms.  
The literature has discussed several possibilities to identify the level of financial con-
straints faced by firms. However, there is no general consensus on a single measure. There-
fore, like other researchers before us, we are also going to rely on multiple proxies to distin-
guish between financially constrained and unconstrained firms (see also Almeida et al., 2004). 
Dividend payout ratio: Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that unconstrained firms are likely 
to have higher payout ratios, while constrained firms prefer to pay less dividends. Our model 
also yields a similar prediction, as constrained firms are going to pay less dividends in period t 
= 1 according to our model. Hence, we assign all firms with a lower than median dividend 
payout ratio to the group of financially constrained firms and we refer to companies with 
above-median dividend payout ratios as financially unconstrained companies. Dividend pay-
out ratio is defined as the ratio of cash dividends divided by total assets. 
Company size: Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) posit that large firms benefit more 
from sharing information and, consequently, they suffer less from problems related to infor-
mational asymmetry. In our model, this is captured by increased borrowing possibilities (B) or 
a higher Rliq, which reduces the probability that a firm is unable to put the optimal investment 
program in practice. In other words, large firms need relatively less cash holdings, since they 
have easier access to outside funding (Fazzari et al., 1988). Thus, we generate another con-
straint dummy, which assumes the value 1 for all firm-years with above-median total assets 
and the value 0 for the other firm-years with below-median total assets. All figures for total 
assets are inflation-adjusted and in constant 1992 dollars. 
Company age: Some researchers have also originated indices to measure the degree 
of financial constraints faced by a company by weighting different factors including company 
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size and dividend payments. In a recent study, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) recommend that 
researchers rely solely on firm size and age, two relatively exogenous firm characteristics, to 
identify constrained firms instead of using measures such as the Kaplan and Zingales (Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997; Lamont et al., 2001) or the Whited and Wu Index (Whited and Wu, 
2006). Leaning on this paper, we use company age as another proxy to distinguish between 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Again, we divide our data sample into two 
groups based on the median score of company age. This third constraint dummy assumes the 
value of 0 for young firms, which are more likely to be financially constrained. 
For all three financial constraint dummies, we find that the interaction between chang-
es in cash and ambiguity aversion, ΔCt×Ambiguity Aversion is significantly negative only for 
the subset of financially constrained firms. Otherwise, ambiguity aversion is not related to the 
valuation of cash holdings. Furthermore, we observe that both cash holdings (Ct) and changes 
in cash holdings (ΔCt) are valued more favorably for financially constrained firms, as is evi-
dent by the larger coefficients and higher significance levels. Thus, these results are also in 
line with the findings of earlier studies of Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis and 
Sibikov (2010). At the same time, all control variables except net financing (NFt) are signifi-
cant in our model with the same signs as previous empirical studies by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) and Denis and Sibikov (2010), although we use a different sample of companies from 
29 different countries. This demonstrates that the results of previous empirical studies investi-
gating only US companies are also valid internationally. 
>> Insert Table III 
The regressions analyzing our second hypothesis also demonstrate that Ambiguity 
Aversion is negatively significant for the subsample of financially constrained firms. Other 
control variables taken from the study of Opler et al. (1999) are also significant with the signs 
in agreement with this work. Hence, in line with Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we find that managers 
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anticipate investors’ preferences regarding cash holdings and adjust the cash policy accord-
ingly. On the other hand, for financially constrained firms, the correlation between cash hold-
ings and Ambiguity Aversion is most of the time insignificant as we predicted. Although Hy-
potheses 2a and 2b rely on the additional assumption of managers acting in the interest of 
shareholders, the empirical evidence backs both hypotheses as well. Yet, we observe in one 
case (with size dummy) that cash holdings are positively correlated with ambiguity aversion 
for financially unconstrained firms. This result also implies that managers have other motives 
than the simple maximization of company value. Still, the strong negative correlation in the 
sample consisting of constrained firms suggests that the catering motive is dominant.  
>> Insert Table IV 
4. Discussion 
After confirming our main hypotheses, we would like to discuss some further implica-
tions of our theory. First, we elaborate on the main assumption of our model, a strong home 
bias effect. Our model implies that with an increasing foreign ownership share, the correlation 
between country-specific preference parameters and the value of cash holdings should be de-
creasing. Secondly, in our model, we have assumed risk neutrality (or perfect risk diversifica-
tion) and ambiguity aversion. However, risk aversion combined with ambiguity neutrality 
would also lead to the same conclusions and to the same results in our formal set-up. There-
fore, we analyze whether risk aversion or ambiguity aversion is the actual decisive factor for 
our results. 
4.1 Foreign Ownership and the Relationship between Cash and Ambiguity Aversion 
 As we mentioned in Section 2, our model implicitly assumes that only local investors’ 
preferences are vital for the market reaction to liquidity management. Several papers have 
demonstrated that indeed a very large portion of companies is owned by domestic investors 
 82 
 
even in free market economies. Now, we analyze how our results are affected by an increas-
ing foreign ownership share in the company. For this purpose, we use data on Foreign Own-
ership, which is defined in Datastream as the percentage of strategic share holdings of 5 % or 
more held in a country outside that of the issuer. 
We divide our firm-year observations into two groups. The first group consists of 
firm-years where Foreign Ownership is higher than 30 %. The second subsample includes all 
other firm-years. After that, we run the regressions in Section 3 for both subsamples and ob-
serve that the relation between the value of cash and ambiguity aversion is only strong for the 
financially constrained companies of the second subsample. Changing the cutoff level for the 
Foreign Ownership has no impact on our results, as the interaction between ambiguity aver-
sion and changes in cash remain insignificant for the subsample controlled by foreign owners 
even when we assign firm-years with a Foreign Ownership higher than 40 % or 50 % to this 
subsample. We report here only the results for the subsample consisting of foreign controlled 
firms, as the results for the other subsample is basically the same as in Table III, since most of 
the firms are controlled by domestic investors. The share of firms owned by domestic inves-
tors also implies that our assumption regarding the magnitude of the home bias effect is not 
very critical, as shown in different studies.   
>> Insert Table V 
 After that, we repeat the same comparing analysis for the second regression model as 
well. We again find that cash holdings are not related to the country-specific ambiguity aver-
sion measure either for constrained or unconstrained firms. Results in Table VI demonstrate a 
negative correlation between cash holdings and ambiguity aversion only if financially con-
straints are defined according to company age. Furthermore, this negative relationship disap-
pears if we set the cutoff level for Foreign Ownership to be 50 %. In the other two regressions 
using different financial constraint criterion (company size and dividend payout ratio), we 
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observe no relation between cash holdings and ambiguity aversion for financially constrained 
firms consistent with our model predictions.  
>> Insert Table VI 
Hence, we conclude that our local investor preference parameter for ambiguity aver-
sion is decisive for the market valuation of cash and the optimal amount of cash holdings only 
if the company is controlled by local investors. This circumstantiates the validity of our theory 
and also addresses concerns regarding the representativeness of our student sample for the 
whole population: Students’ preferences work well as a proxy for overall preferences only 
when we expect them to do so. 
4.2 Risk Aversion or Ambiguity Aversion 
 In Section 2, we emanated from risk neutral and ambiguity averse investors. At the 
same time, it is clear that our model yields exactly the same predictions if we assume risk 
averse and ambiguity neutral investors. Of course, we use our preference parameter for ambi-
guity aversion in the regressions; hence our assumption regarding ambiguity aversion seems 
to hold.  
Yet, risk aversion can also have an impact on the value of cash together with ambigui-
ty aversion, if investors are both risk and ambiguity averse. Still, we have ignored the possible 
relevance of risk preferences until now arguing that investors have diversified unsystematic 
risk away to a very large extent, i.e. the relevance of risk preferences for subjective valuation 
and optimization is limited in comparison to the importance of ambiguity aspects. Now, we 
want to put this assumption into test by investigating the impact of risk aversion on the value 
of cash and its optimal amount by using a preference parameter for risk aversion that we have 
obtained in our INTRA survey as well.  
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Similarly to the preference parameter for ambiguity aversion, risk aversion is also elic-
ited in our survey this time with the help of a matching task. Participants had to declare the 
minimum amount of certainty equivalent for which they are indifferent between this certainty 
equivalent and a lottery with a 50 % probability of winning some money. To each country, we 
have assigned a score for risk aversion depending on the average amount of the certainty 
equivalent, which we refer to as Risk Aversion in our regressions. 
Now, we add Risk Aversion and its interaction with changes in cash (ΔCt×Risk Aver-
sion) as an additional variable in the regression models of Section 3. We only report the re-
sults concerning the main variables of interest, as the addition of the new interaction term 
ΔCt×Risk Aversion does not change the results with regard to the other control variables. 
According to Table VII, we observe no systematically significant correlation between 
this interaction term and excess returns defined as in Section 3 neither for financially con-
strained companies nor for unconstrained ones. On the other hand, the interaction term 
ΔCt×Ambiguity Aversion remains to be significant and negative and it is only significant for 
financially constrained firms even after including the parameter for Risk Aversion. Hence, we 
can conclude that our results in Table III can be traced back to ambiguity preferences and our 
assumption regarding the irrelevance of risk preferences seems to hold. 
>> Insert Table VII 
We perform a similar robustness check for the second regression model as well. Anal-
ogously, we add Risk Aversion into the second regression model as an additional variable and 
run our regressions from Table IV one more time. Once again, there is no consistent evidence 
of a negative relationship between Risk Aversion and cash holdings for financially constrained 
firms while this kind of relationship is confirmed with respect to Ambiguity Aversion for each 
financial constraint proxy. Thus, for constrained companies, Ambiguity Aversion is the only 
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preference pattern that shapes the pattern of cash holdings, which is consistent with our mod-
el. Yet, we also have to admit that the results are somewhat less consistent with our predic-
tions here, as we observe a positive relation between both Ambiguity Aversion and Risk Aver-
sion and cash holdings for unconstrained firms in two out of three regressions. However, as 
we mentioned above, this is understandable, since managers have other incentives than share-
holders and this can lead to excess cash holdings and this can be related to Ambiguity Aver-
sion or Risk Aversion. We are not going to discuss this issue further in this paper, as it is be-
yond its scope. 
>> Insert Table VIII 
5. Conclusion  
To recap, our paper provides the first theoretical and empirical analysis discussing the 
potential relevance of investor preferences for the value of cash and cash holding policies. 
Our empirical evidence suggests that cash is valued less favorably by ambiguity averse inves-
tors of financially constrained firms. On the other hand, if insuring a firm against the future 
illiquidity problem is not value increasing, ambiguity aversion is not related to the value of 
cash and this insurance is irrelevant for financially unconstrained firms. For the same reasons, 
ambiguity aversion is related to the amount of cash holdings only for financially constrained 
firms implying that managers are not only aware of investors’ preferences, but they also cater 
to these needs. 
We have also run some other robustness tests revealing that (domestic) ambiguity 
aversion is only relevant for the value of cash or the amount of cash holdings in companies 
which are controlled by domestic investors. Moreover, we demonstrated that ambiguity aver-
sion and not risk aversion is responsible for our results which points out to the possibility that 
risk can be diversified to a good extent, but ambiguity aversion cannot. 
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Summing up, our paper is the first one to analyze the connection between boundedly 
rational investor preferences and corporate cash policies. We develop a theoretical framework 
that can integrate investors’ preferences and catering motives in the cash management process 
investigating both the valuation of cash and aggregate cash demand of a company from this 
perspective. Furthermore, unlike previous empirical studies with similar scope (mostly con-
cerning dividend policies), our empirical work provides a straightforward test regarding the 
link between behavioral biases and cash management.  
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Figure I. Illustration of our three-period model.  
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Table I. Summary statistics  
 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation (STD), minimum (Min), maximum (Max) and number 
of observations (N) for all the variables used in the first regression model. All variables except total 
debt to book value of assets (Lt) and excess stock return are deflated by the lagged market value of equi-
ty. ΔEt is the change in earnings before paid interests and taxes (EBIT), and ΔNAt is the change in total 
assets minus cash holdings. ΔRDt represents the changes in R&D expenditures, which is set to zero if 
missing. ΔIt is the yearly change in interest expense and ΔDt is the change in total dividends. NFt is cal-
culated as the total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. ΔCt is 
the notation for the realized 1-year change in cash holdings. Dependent variables and firm-specific con-
trol variables are winsorized at the 1 % level. 
 
Variable Mean STD Min Max N 
Excess returns 0.07 0.54 -0.89 2.44 65,041 
Company-Specific Control Variables      
ΔEt 0.02 0.18 -0.65 1.02 48,695 
ΔNAt 0.09 0.54 -1.93 3.46 49,240 
ΔRDt 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.04 51,667 
ΔIt 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.09 32,122 
ΔDt 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.10 48,733 
NFt 0.01 0.32 -1.07 2.91 56,996 
ΔCt 0.02 0.15 -0.54 0.86 49,328 
Lt 23.35 17.93 0.00 79.51 74,351 
Ct 0.25 0.39 0.00 2.88 67,262 
Country-Specific Control Variables      
Common Law Dummy  0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 79,926 
Corruption 7.09 1.80 0.00 9.40 79,926 
Inflation 0.03 0.18 -0.08 7.50 75,520 
Total Taxes 47.28 11.22 24.35 107.38 79,926 
Behavioral Variables      
Ambiguity Aversion 0.56 0.09 0.42 0.80 80,080 
Uncertainty Avoidance 61.72 25.18 0.00 112 79,200 
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Table II. Summary statistics for second regression model 
 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation (STD), minimum (Min), maximum (Max) and number 
of observations (N) for all the company-specific control variables used in the second regression. We re-
frain from reporting the summary statistics for the variables that are included both in the first and sec-
ond regression models. Real size is the value of total assets in constant 1992 dollars. The market-to-
book ratio is measured as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets 
(MB-Ratio). Net working capital is calculated without cash before being divided by total assets 
(NWC/Assets). Lt is total debt over total assets. SG is the sales growth defined as net sales in year t di-
vided by net sales in year t1. We also control for research and development (R&D) spending and capi-
tal expenditures, denominated by net sales (R&D/Sales) and total assets (Capex/Assets), respectively. 
Dividend Dummy assumes the value 1 (0) for company-years with above-median (below-median) levels 
for cash dividends to total assets. Cash flow is denominated by total book value of assets as well 
(CF/Assets). All variables listed in this table are winsorized at 1 % level. 
 
Variable Mean STD Min Max N 
Cash/NetAssets 0.22 0.37 0.00 2.73 72,710 
Company-Specific Control Variables      
Real Size 15.13 3.41 0.76 22.80 74,187 
MB-Ratio 1.35 1.15 0.07 6.86 68,718 
NWC/Assets 0.01 0.16 -0.49 0.44 71,361 
Lt 23.35 17.93 0.00 79.51 74,351 
SG 1.16 0.39 0.41 4.01 69,188 
R&D/Sales 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.21 74,022 
Capex/Assets 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.31 70,894 
Dividend Dummy 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 72,983 
CF/Assets 0.10 0.08 -0.15 0.35 73,431 
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Table III. Financial constraints and the valuation of cash as a function of ambiguity aversion 
 
This table presents the results of regressions on the excess stock returns distinguishing between two 
subsamples: the financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms. The main variable of inter-
est is the interaction term, ΔCt×Ambiguity Aversion. We use dividend payouts to assets, the value of to-
tal assets and company age as defining criteria for the level of financial constraints in Columns (1) and 
(2), (3) and (4) and (5) and (6), respectively. In Columns (1), (3) and (5), we report the results for finan-
cially constrained firms and in Columns (2), (4) and (6) for unconstrained firms. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and we use year and industry dummies. All t-values are reported under the 
coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level are indicated by ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
 
 Dividend Dummy Size Dummy Age Dummy 
 Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
ΔCt×Ambiguity Aversion -1.173** 0.878 -1.560** 0.306 -1.715** 0.639 
-2.395 1.350 -2.448 0.614 -2.111 1.012 
ΔEt 0.357*** 0.350*** 0.427*** 0.295*** 0.385*** 0.268*** 
9.714 6.986 9.119 7.616 5.836 6.473 
ΔNAt 0.074*** 0.098*** 0.117*** 0.064*** 0.099*** 0.082*** 
5.138 5.693 6.291 4.529 3.868 4.341 
ΔRDt 2.216*** 1.120 4.133*** -0.369 2.329** -0.509 
3.288 1.603 5.390 -0.646 2.013 -0.926 
ΔIt -0.351 -1.194*** -0.331 -0.962** -1.644*** -0.258 
-0.997 -3.065 -0.933 -2.488 -3.214 -0.573 
ΔDt -1.071** 1.145*** 0.907*** 0.159 1.052** 0.109 
-2.050 4.978 3.281 0.485 2.551 0.284 
NFt 
-0.010 -0.078** -0.048 -0.056* -0.020 -0.192*** 
-0.341 -2.361 -1.416 -1.873 -0.428 -5.557 
ΔCt 0.696*** 0.652*** 0.768*** 0.539*** 0.941*** 0.454*** 
12.401 11.132 12.486 9.573 10.380 7.320 
Lt 
-0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000 
-6.545 -4.674 -7.349 -1.720 -4.702 -0.945 
Ct-1 
0.233*** 0.182*** 0.316*** 0.183*** 0.286*** 0.155*** 
9.751 5.422 9.480 8.358 6.739 6.480 
ΔCt×Ct-1 -0.176** -0.301*** -0.365*** -0.082 -0.076 -0.117* 
-3.201 -3.725 -4.291 -1.554 -0.736 -1.894 
ΔCt×Lt -0.005** -0.004 -0.005** -0.003 -0.009** -0.001 
-2.282 -1.285 -2.068 -1.389 -2.573 -0.405 
Ambiguity Aversion 
-0.223*** -0.059 -0.259*** -0.174*** -0.250*** -0.107* 
-3.085 -1.534 -5.082 -3.039 -3.521 -1.954 
Common Law Dummy 
0.068*** 0.015* 0.068*** 0.011 0.042*** 0.004 
3.900 1.688 6.086 0.874 3.002 0.307 
Inflation 
0.204 1.038*** 1.618*** -1.255*** 0.866** 0.453 
0.486 3.715 4.343 -2.894 2.155 1.039 
Corruption 
-0.008 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.022*** -0.012** -0.022*** 
-1.298 -5.108 0.570 -5.306 -2.164 -3.356 
Total Taxes 
-0.001 -0.003*** -0.001* -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
-1.303 -7.912 -1.702 -9.482 -5.064 -5.589 
Constant 
0.445** 1.303** 0.351 0.887*** 0.926*** 0.411** 
2.051 2.119 1.300 6.733 3.870 2.455 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.164 0.148 0.187 0.140 0.190 0.154 
Observations 13,843 17,210 14,658 16,259 7,387 11,430 
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Table IV. Cash holdings and ambiguity aversion 
 
This table presents the results of regressions of cash holdings divided by net assets (Cash/NetAssets) on 
various firm characteristics. The main variable of interest is our preference parameter, Ambiguity Aver-
sion. We use dividend payouts to assets, the value of total assets and company age as defining criteria 
for the level of financial constraints in Columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4) and (5) and (6), respectively. In 
Columns (1), (3) and (5), we report the results for financially constrained firms and in Columns (2), (4) 
and (6) for unconstrained firms. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and we use year 
and industry dummies. All t-values are reported under the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance 
at the 1 %, 5% and 10 % level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
   
 Dividend Dummy Size Dummy Age Dummy 
 Con-
strained
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
Ambiguity Aversion 
-0.309*** 0.031 -0.500*** 0.253*** -0.416*** 0.081 
-3.902 0.640 -6.790 4.703 -3.592 1.587 
Real Size 
-0.003* 0.001 -0.006*** -0.008** 0.004* -0.001 
-1.807 0.758 -2.936 -2.304 1.646 -0.669 
MB-Ratio 
0.109*** 0.068*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.102*** 0.058*** 
13.134 8.540 11.498 9.560 10.177 6.214 
NWC/Assets 
-0.632*** -0.576*** -0.647*** -0.526*** -0.844*** -0.377*** 
-14.452 -14.676 -15.075 -12.236 -13.485 -8.910 
Lt 
-0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 
-15.324 -17.310 -14.767 -14.996 -14.077 -12.643 
SG 
0.054*** 0.009 0.061*** 0.008 0.042*** -0.026*** 
4.810 1.034 5.401 1.067 2.832 -3.234 
R&D/Sales 
1.903*** 1.185*** 2.296*** 0.910*** 1.347*** 0.965*** 
7.890 5.770 9.400 5.325 4.468 6.706 
Dividend Dummy 
. . -0.022** -0.018** -0.009 0.011 
. . -2.469 -2.419 -0.663 -1.545 
Capex/Assets 
-0.757*** -0.931*** -0.702*** -0.974*** -1.113*** -0.751*** 
-10.334 -11.947 -9.897 -11.749 -9.491 -7.852 
CF/Assets 
-0.710*** 0.054 -0.612*** 0.084 -0.358** 0.007 
-4.785 0.721 -4.720 1.108 -2.174 0.099 
Common Law Dummy 
-0.026* -0.092*** -0.046*** -0.068*** -0.056** -0.088*** 
-1.698 -10.757 -3.497 -6.091 -2.745 -8.441 
Inflation 
-0.397*** -0.790*** -0.253* -0.515*** -0.722*** -0.383*** 
-3.647 -6.319 -1.939 -4.767 -4.709 -4.064 
Corruption 
-0.005 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.003 -0.017*** -0.005 
-1.153 -4.053 -2.596 -1.142 -3.124 -1.522 
Total Taxes 
-0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 0.000 -0.001* 
-2.162 -3.988 -4.643 -1.147 -0.652 -1.814 
Constant 
0.371*** 0.483*** 0.514*** 0.447*** 0.230*** 0.387*** 
5.673 6.919 7.985 4.992 2.454 5.746 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,145 24,330 22,850 22,625 11,931 17,008 
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Table V. Foreign ownership and the valuation of cash as a function of ambiguity aversion 
 
This table presents the results of the same regression model as in Table III only for companies with 
Foreign Ownership > 30 %. In Columns (1), (3) and (5), we report the results for financially con-
strained firms and in Columns (2), (4) and (6) for unconstrained firms. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm level and we use year and industry dummies. All t-values are reported under the coeffi-
cient estimates. Statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 Dividend Dummy Size Dummy Age Dummy 
 Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
ΔCt×Ambiguity Aversion 2.652 2.633 -0.833 3.065 4.045 4.522 
1.200 1.105 -0.401 1.035 1.265 0.991 
ΔEt 0.462*** 0.013 0.408*** 0.393* 0.466 0.430** 
2.851 0.057 2.602 1.737 1.464 2.387 
ΔNAt 0.075 0.144* 0.068 0.041 0.008 0.100 
1.457 1.710 0.977 0.647 0.121 1.299 
ΔRDt -0.672 -0.094 -2.049 4.422 -3.404 -4.609 
-0.169 -0.026 -0.403 1.352 -0.396 -1.235 
ΔIt -0.793 -3.199 -2.948* 0.584 -2.362 -2.09 
-0.469 -1.280 -1.735 0.320 -1.320 -1.332 
ΔDt -1.923 1.538** 1.363* 0.712 2.499** 2.625* 
-1.241 2.147 1.914 0.607 2.104 1.844 
NFt 
0.128 0.171 -0.079 0.111 0.271 -0.117 
1.216 1.319 -0.615 0.926 1.642 -0.508 
ΔCt 0.285 0.303 0.410** 0.258 0.975*** 0.625 
1.217 1.311 1.994 0.824 2.736 1.659 
Lt 
-0.004** -0.002 -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003* 
-2.394 -1.377 -2.408 -2.473 -2.402 -1.682 
Ct 
0.379*** 0.349** 0.396*** 0.344*** 0.843*** 0.052 
4.144 2.474 3.697 3.517 4.498 0.448 
ΔCt×Ct -0.291 0.142 -0.738*** -0.041 -0.626 -0.683*** 
-1.336 0.699 -3.606 -0.21 -1.018 -2.777 
ΔCt×Lt -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.01 -0.015 0.053*** 
-0.383 -0.405 -0.847 -0.792 -0.885 2.656 
Ambiguity Aversion 
-0.284 0.516** -0.084 -0.044 0.196 0.307 
-0.871 2.182 -0.352 -0.127 0.349 0.677 
Common Law Dummy 
-0.010 0.075 0.090** -0.025 -0.018 -0.014 
-0.146 1.538 2.151 -0.351 -0.284 -0.161 
Inflation 
3.002 -0.251 0.603 0.509 1.78 2.486 
1.559 -0.299 0.498 0.383 1.189 1.188 
Corruption 
-0.002 -0.011 -0.006 -0.026 -0.017 -0.006 
-0.067 -0.949 -0.367 -1.305 -0.712 -0.196 
Total Taxes 
-0.005* -0.002 0.000 -0.006** -0.001 -0.002 
-1.697 -1.110 0.166 -2.424 -0.23 -0.915 
Constant 
-0.272 0.261 -0.28 0.556** 0.309 0.207 
-0.777 1.482 -1.222 2.11 0.809 0.495 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.354 0.262 0.28 0.342 0.506 0.363 
Observations 530 864 703 661 302 283 
 95 
 
 
Table VI. Cash holdings and ambiguity aversion 
 
This table presents the results of the same regression model as in Table IV only for companies with 
Foreign Ownership > 30 %. We use dividend payouts to assets, the value of total assets and company 
age as defining criteria for the level of financial constraints in Columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4) and (5) 
and (6), respectively. In Columns (1), (3) and (5), we report the results for financially constrained firms 
and in Columns (2), (4) and (6) for unconstrained firms. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and we use year and industry dummies. All t-values are reported under the coefficient estimates. 
Statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
   
 Dividend Dummy Size Dummy Age Dummy 
 Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
Ambiguity Aversion 
-0.562 0.125 -0.324 -0.125 -1.078** -0.189 
-1.497 0.554 -0.902 -0.484 -2.26 -0.873 
Real Size 
-0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.018* -0.006 0.003 
-0.592 0.203 -0.190 -1.811 -0.917 0.797 
MB-Ratio 
0.067*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.047*** 0.093*** 0.014 
2.736 3.331 2.969 2.659 3.487 0.739 
NWC/Assets 
-0.463*** -0.564*** -0.542*** -0.383*** -0.768*** -0.475*** 
-3.494 -4.534 -4.271 -3.872 -3.883 -3.045 
Lt 
-0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.002*** 
-5.505 -5.347 -5.076 -4.071 -5.064 -2.946 
SG 
0.033 0.086 0.086 -0.027 0.087 -0.039* 
0.934 1.062 1.390 -1.088 0.720 -1.992 
R&D/Sales 
1.000 1.774** 1.889** 1.129 1.282 2.090*** 
1.090 2.041 2.037 1.215 1.161 3.296 
Dividend Dummy 
. . -0.006 -0.035 -0.015 0.002 
. . -0.213 -1.440 -0.385 0.122 
Capex/Assets 
-0.623** -0.663*** -0.464* -0.595*** -1.305*** -0.116 
-2.448 -2.809 -1.867 -3.146 -2.876 -0.388 
CF/Assets 
-0.374 -0.168 -0.436 0.713*** -0.569 0.280** 
-1.002 -0.567 -1.357 3.66 -1.228 2.013 
Common Law Dummy 
0.008 -0.004 -0.013 -0.055 -0.081 -0.001 
0.163 -0.113 -0.248 -1.525 -1.155 -0.030 
Inflation 
0.461 0.012 -0.579 0.314 -2.067 -0.804 
0.543 0.020 -0.836 0.508 -1.571 -1.564 
Corruption 
-0.006 -0.003 -0.015 -0.005 -0.028 -0.032** 
-0.381 -0.285 -1.227 -0.402 -1.446 -2.284 
Total Taxes 
-0.003** -0.002** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.005 -0.000 
-2.037 -2.185 -1.436 -3.227 -1.595 -0.426 
Constant 
0.693*** 0.254 0.471** 0.875*** 1.320*** 0.381** 
3.048 1.882 2.515 3.483 2.619 2.422 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,145 24,330 22,850 22,625 11,931 17,008 
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Table VII. Valuation of cash holdings depending on ambiguity aversion and risk aversion 
This table presents the results of regressions of the excess stock returns on changes in firm characteris-
tics over the fiscal year. Our main variables of interest are ΔCt×Ambiguity Aversion and ΔCt×Risk Aver-
sion. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and we use year and industry dummies. All t-
values are reported under the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table VIII. Valuation of cash holdings depending on ambiguity aversion and risk aversion 
 
This table presents the results of regressions of cash holdings divided by net assets (Cash/Net Assets) on 
various firm characteristics. Our main variables of interest are Ambiguity Aversion and Risk Aversion. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and we use year and industry dummies. All t-
values are reported under the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
   
 Dividend Dummy Size Dummy Age Dummy 
 Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
ΔCt×Ambiguity Aversion 
-1.109* 1.030 -1.691** 0.775 -1.998** 1.088 
-1.889 1.512 -2.312 1.398 -2.258 1.006 
ΔCt×Risk Aversion 
0.269 1.01 -0.528 2.173** -1.091 1.241 
0.234 0.884 -0.418 2.053 -0.765 0.550 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.164 0.148 0.187 0.141 0.190 0.155 
Observations 13,843 17,210 14,658 16,259 7,387 11,430 
 Dividend Dummy Size Dummy Age Dummy 
 Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
Ambiguity Aversion 
-0.313*** 0.068 -0.435*** 0.317*** -0.540*** 0.170** 
-3.423 1.149 -5.252 4.875 -4.176 2.477 
Risk Aversion 
-0.015 0.110 0.245* 0.187* -0.349** 0.248** 
-0.112 1.127 1.815 1.798 -2.282 2.003 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,145 24,330 22,850 22,625 11,931 17,008 
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1. Introduction 
Many of our decisions have consequences in the future. In such intertemporal deci-
sions, we need to determine the weight given to future periods in order to compare multiple 
alternatives with temporal distance. Mostly, we attach a higher value to earlier outcomes than 
to later outcomes which implies positive time preferences and positive discount rates. 
There are several possible explanations why we discount future outcomes with posi-
tive discount rates. Some researchers have attributed this to the lack of necessary self-control 
to postpone consumption and the willpower costs that follow in order to do that (Shefrin and 
Thaler, 1988). The necessity of willpower for deferring consumption can be attributed to 
many reasons including our shortsightedness, i.e., we do not care about our future selves as 
much as we care about our present situation (Frederick, 2006).   
Still, there is much more to learn about discounting functions like their shape as well 
as their relationship to other factors such as outcome magnitude, sign or the description of 
time (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Read et al., 2005a; Onculer and Onay, 2007). For in-
stance, Loewenstein (1988) has shown in an experimental setting using willingness-to-pay 
(henceforth WTP) tasks that outcome framing effects are at work in intertemporal decisions as 
well and that we observe different decisions in different outcome frames (Thaler and Johnson, 
1990). 
However interesting these results are, the setting of WTP tasks (which are a specific 
form of matching tasks) is not very realistic and we often face choice tasks instead in real-life 
decisions. For instance, households have to decide for given investment opportunities whether 
they want to spend their income right away or invest a certain portion of this income rather 
than determining the premium that they request to postpone consumption, as they are usually 
rate-takers in capital markets with a weak bargaining hand. Similarly, if an extension or early 
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maturation option is embedded in financial products such as extendible or putable bonds, at 
the exercise date, the buyer has a choice to make between consuming right away or waiting, 
and is not requested to specify the WTP to change the maturity of the bond or in other words, 
the value of the option. 
Different tasks affect the choices of individuals, as Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) 
have demonstrated in their study, where they compared the participants’ answers in WTP and 
choice tasks. In choice tasks, no outcome serves as the reference point (status quo), since all 
possible alternatives are listed prior to the decision. Decision makers will cancel the common 
parts of alternatives in these tasks out and become less prone to framing effects due to this 
editing process as advocated in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky et al., 
1990). In matching tasks such as WTP tasks, this editing will not occur in general, because 
each alternative is evaluated separately. As a consequence, we show that framing effects are 
very much marginalized in choice task experiments compared to framing effects in matching 
tasks (see also Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997).  
In what follows, we can frame the same choice tasks differently by shifting the refer-
ence point of time instead of the reference point of outcomes. In a delay frame, the timing of 
the earlier outcome becomes the reference point of time, while in a speedup frame the refer-
ence point of time is the date of receipt of the later alternative. We refer to the differences in 
decision patterns in different frames of choice tasks without a status quo alternative as “time 
framing effects” and discuss how this more “realistic” form of framing affects intertemporal 
decisions.  
In other words, our experiment extends prior literature by investigating time framing 
effects rather than outcome framing effects. This type of framing resembles the framing ef-
fects in real-life intertemporal decisions that we have mentioned above much more, since in 
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reality, individuals face mostly i) choice tasks, ii) where different time frames produce fram-
ing effects rather than outcome frames. Therefore, we expect our experimental results to have 
practical relevance as well. In order to verify this conjecture, we investigate empirically bor-
rowing and lending decisions of private households via a panel analysis across 54 countries 
and show that household behavior is in line with our theory. This way, to the best of our 
knowledge, we provide the first ever empirical evidence for framing effects in intertemporal 
choices.  
To sum up, our paper contributes to the literature in several different ways. First of all, 
in choice tasks, we show that framing effects in intertemporal decisions are not as strong as 
framing effects in matching tasks, especially for positive outcomes. Secondly, we provide a 
theoretical justification for the observed differences between framing issues in WTP and 
choice tasks. Last, but not least, we demonstrate empirically that the framework of our exper-
imental questions can indeed portray actual intertemporal decision tasks better. Hence, our 
experimental evidence has practical consequences as well.   
In the next section, we start by drawing the outline of time framing effects and isolate 
them from outcome framing effects. In Section 3, we talk about the purpose and design of our 
experiment. In Sections 4 and 5, we present and discuss the results of our experiments, re-
spectively. In Section 6, we seek empirical support for our findings in the field of household 
finance. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Separating Time and Outcome Framing Effects 
Standard discounted expected utility (DEU) theory does not allow our choices to be 
subject to framing effects, which is called the invariance principle. This means that different 
formulations of the same problem should not affect our decisions. Of course, this applies to 
intertemporal decisions under certainty as well. Let Ct stand for an individual’s initial (fixed) 
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consumption at time t = 0, 1 and  be a subjective discount factor. Then, according to DEU, in 
WTP tasks, if we define the delay (speedup) premium d (s) as the amount of money which we 
want (are ready) to receive (pay) today in order to delay (hasten) the consumption of x at time 
t = 0 (1), the delay (speedup) premium is implicitly defined as follows: 
																																						ܷሺܥଵ ൅ ݔሻ1 ൅ ߩ ൅ ܷሺܥ଴ ൅ ݀ሻ ൌ ܷሺܥ଴ ൅ ݔሻ ൅
ܷሺܥଵሻ
1 ൅ ߩ 	,																																	ሺ1ሻ 
																																						ܷሺܥଵ ൅ ݔሻ1 ൅ ߩ ൅ ܷሺܥ଴ሻ ൌ ܷሺܥ଴ ൅ ݔ െ ݏሻ ൅
ܷሺܥଵሻ
1 ൅ ߩ.																																		ሺ2ሻ 
According to DEU, the delay or speedup premium will be integrated with the initial 
consumption level C0, and the relation between the delay and the speedup premium is given 
by: U(C0 + d) – U(C0) = U(C0 + x) – U(C0 + x – s). For linear utility functions, there should be 
no difference at all between d and s, if decision makers act according to DEU theory. Howev-
er, we know that utility functions are (strictly) concave. Thus, speedup premiums should be 
somewhat larger than delay premiums due to the concavity of utility functions, yet these dif-
ferences will be negligible, if x is small relative to initial consumption level C0.  
Some studies challenged the descriptive quality of DEU in terms of explaining delay 
and speedup premiums observed in experiments, since experimental studies demonstrated that 
delay premiums are more than twice as large as speedup premiums. This ratio between the 
delay and the speedup premium is by no accident almost as large as the typical value of the 
loss aversion parameter known from prospect theory (Loewenstein, 1988; Benzion et al., 
1989). Therefore, these studies ascribe this large difference between inferred discount rates in 
delay and speedup frames to prospect theory aligned preferences.  
The explanation is as follows: In the delay frame, the sooner consumption of x is pre-
sented as the status quo, which defines the dynamic reference point (x, 0) (with x being valid 
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as reference for t = 0 and 0 being valid for t = 1) and test subjects are asked to state the delay 
premium d they would require in order to delay the initial reward x. Prospect theory investors 
evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point and segregate the delay premium from the 
initial amount x due to the specific formulation of the WTP tasks. Hence, the delay premium 
will be determined according to the following formula, with v denoting the value function 
according to prospect theory: 
																																																									ݒሺെݔሻ ൅ ݒሺ݀ሻ ൅	 ݒሺݔሻ1 ൅ ߩௗ ൌ 0.																																																		ሺ3ሻ 
On the other hand, if the same reward x is supposed to be received later in a speedup 
frame, the reference point shifts to (0, x). In this case, indifference between the later and the 
sooner alternative is ensured for: 
																																																									ݒሺݔሻ ൅ ݒሺെݏሻ ൅	ݒሺെݔሻ1 ൅ ߩ௦ ൌ 0.																																																			ሺ4ሻ 
Due to outcome framing effects, the delay premium will be higher than the speedup 
premium in absolute value even when the delay discount rate ρd is equal to the speedup dis-
count rate ρs. The future (present) consumption becomes more valuable in a speedup (delay) 
frame as a consequence of a decision maker’s loss aversion and the resulting reluctance to 
change an established behavior, which is labeled as the status quo bias. Loewenstein (1988) 
named this observation the delay-speedup asymmetry and many researchers have later con-
firmed his results in different contexts (see Frederick et al., 2002, for a review).  
Benzion et al. (1989) repeated the same experiment with a similar matching task with-
out segregating the delay or speedup premium from the initial reward x and they were able to 
confirm the findings of Loewenstein (1988). Moreover, for negative payments, Benzion et al. 
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(1989) found evidence for a reversed delay-speedup asymmetry which is again in line with 
the outcome framing story.  
Yet, decision makers do not encounter matching tasks in reality often and it is more in-
teresting to analyze framing effects in choice tasks. Thus, the practical relevance has motivat-
ed us to investigate the impact of framing effects in choice tasks. In such tasks, no alternative 
is tagged as the status quo, therefore we refer to these frames as neutral (outcome) frames 
following Shelley (1993) who investigated sign effects in a similar setting.  
Even with choice tasks, the same intertemporal decision problem is going to be per-
ceived either in a delay (the reference point of time is the timing of the early alternative and 
the later alternative is described by “m months later”) or in a speedup frame (the reference 
point of time is the timing of the later alternative and the sooner alternative is described by “m 
months earlier”) because of differing descriptions of temporal distance. However, compared 
to matching tasks, in choice tasks framing effects are marginalized due to a different editing 
process which we discuss further in Section 5.  
In the absence of framing effects, decision makers would exhibit the same preferences 
in delay and speedup frames in choice tasks. Hence, they would choose the same consumption 
path in both time frames. In the following experiment, we now want to look closely at this 
prediction and try to understand whether framing effects can be eliminated entirely in choice 
tasks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to understand framing effects in 
choice tasks or time framing effects, as we refer to them.  
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3. The Experiment  
3.1 Hypotheses 
As we have mentioned in the previous section, our experiment is devised to examine 
framing effects in neutral outcome frames, which we define as time framing effects. For this 
purpose, we want to conduct an experimental analysis with choice tasks which also emulates 
intertemporal decisions generally much better. We argue that choice tasks marginalize fram-
ing effects, hence our null hypothesis is that time framing effects are not existent. Thus, we 
conjecture the following: 
Hypothesis 1: On average, decisions are consistent in the delay and the speedup frame in 
choice tasks (no time framing effects). 
Moreover, we repeat our experiment in different scenarios to investigate the relation-
ship between time framing and other possible determinants of time discounting. Usually, fac-
tors such as sign, size, or timing of the outcomes are found to be relevant for discount rates 
(Frederick et al., 2002). Therefore, we want to examine the impact of these factors on time 
framing effects. We do not expect to observe any correlation between those factors and time 
framing effects. In other words, we argue that time framing effects should be always negligi-
ble regardless of the timing, size or sign of the outcomes. Hence, we predict the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In addition to being non-existent on average, there are also no time framing 
effects for certain scenarios distinguished by timing, size or sign of the outcomes. 
3.2 Design of the Experiment 
To start the experiment, we have informed as many students as possible (probably 
more than 2,000 students) via the online learning portals of different courses of RWTH Aa-
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chen University in Germany and via e-mail newsletters of student unions about a scientific 
study on discounting preferences. The survey was available online and was accessible for all 
students. Overall, 229 participants responded. In order to assure that each student participates 
in the questionnaire only once, each participant was required to register with an e-mail ac-
count with RWTH domain. After the completion of the questionnaire, we sent each registered 
account an e-mail which had to be confirmed; otherwise the respective answers were not 
evaluated. This confirmation was also necessary in order to participate in the raffle which 
rewarded the winners with 3 iPods. We eliminated participants who have failed to provide 
consistent answers (see explanation later on) or have not confirmed their identity. After this 
correction, we are left with 178 students in our sample, 100 in the basic scenario with imme-
diate (sooner) outcomes (54 with delay frame, 46 with speedup frame) and 78 in the delayed 
scenario with delayed (sooner) outcomes (three months delay) (44 with delay frame, 34 with 
speedup frame), respectively.  
Each participant in both basic and delayed scenarios faced three question sets in their 
questionnaire with small (100 € vs. 105 €), negative (100 € vs. 105 €) and large outcomes 
(1,000 € vs. 1,050 €) either in the delay or the speedup frame. Hence, for each participant, we 
elicit three potentially different discount rates. This way, we can analyze time framing effects 
(the difference between choices in delay and speedup frames) in different settings in order to 
control for the link between time framing and outcome timing, size and sign and thus to elab-
orate on the second hypothesis. Moreover, this will also enable us to control for delay, size 
and sign effects in our setting (see Frederick et al., 2002, for a definition of these effects).  
The questionnaires consist of choice tasks where subjects have to decide between a 
later larger and a sooner smaller reward, while the temporal distance between the two alterna-
tives is increased among questions of the same question set (Coller and Williams, 1999). Each 
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question set consists of seven questions and the shift from a later to a sooner alternative marks 
the interval for discount rates of each participant (for negative outcomes, it is the other way 
around). Participants are divided into two groups in both the basic and the delayed scenario; 
each group receives the same question set, but in different time frames, i.e. either in a delay 
frame or in a speedup frame. We are going to trace different choices in different frames back 
to time framing effects, as mentioned above. A sample question set in the delay frame will 
have the following general form: 
Imagine that you are creditor and your borrower offers you two alternative repayment 
plans for the money he/she owes you. Which alternative would you choose? 
a) Receive 100 € on 01.12.2012, 
b) Receive 105 € 6 months after 01.12.2012. 
Correspondingly, in the speedup frame, the reference calendar date and the description 
of the time interval between the alternatives are modified and alternatives are formulated as 
follows: 
a) Receive 105 € on 01.06.2013 
b) Receive 100 € 6 months before 01.06.2013. 
In each question set, the same alternatives are separated simply by seven different time 
intervals (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, or 12 months) holding the date of the sooner alternative always con-
stant. For the basic scenario in the delay frame, it is the first day of the following month in 
which the questionnaire has been filled. For the delayed scenario in the delay frame, the soon-
er alternative is to be received on the first day of the fourth following month. We thus have to 
distinguish clearly between the delayed scenario and the delay frame. The delayed scenario 
simply refers to choice tasks where even the sooner outcome is not available immediately, but 
it is to be received three months after the decision is made. On the other hand, the delay frame 
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is the label for the question sets where the calendar date of receipt is declared for the sooner 
of two outcomes between one has to choose. Hence, both the basic scenario and the delayed 
scenario can be utilized for an investigation of potential differences in the speedup and the 
delay frame. 
We have excluded all participants who switched either twice or who switched from 
sooner smaller to later larger alternatives with increasing temporal distance, exhibiting nega-
tive time preferences in one of the question sets in the questionnaire. Both indicate an inabil-
ity to understand our questions.  
>>>>Insert Table 1 here<<<< 
We have also asked our participants for some demographic information. Table 1 pre-
sents some descriptive statistics regarding demographics of our participants. We have utilized 
binary dummy variables for participants’ gender (Gender; male = 0, female = 1) and major 
(Major; non-economics students = 0, economics students = 1), while age (Age) is measured 
by integers describing the age of participants in years. 
4. Results  
4.1 Direct and Indirect Effects of Time Framing 
Now we can evaluate the results of our experiments and compare choices of our par-
ticipants in the delay and the speedup frame in different scenarios. We categorize our partici-
pants into groups depending on where they start to prefer earlier to later rewards (or later to 
earlier payment obligations), as interval lengths grow. Since we have seven questions in each 
set, participants are divided into eight groups, with 1 being the most patient group (chooses 
the later reward (earlier payment) in every question) and 8 being the least patient group 
(chooses the earlier reward (later payment) alternative in every question). As we cannot de-
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termine the exact value of discount rates in choice tasks, the discount rates can either be de-
fined as an ordinal variable or in ranges as explained in more detail below. On the other hand, 
time framing effects are represented by a dummy variable, TimeFraming, which assumes the 
value of zero in the delay frame and the value of one in the speedup frame. 
We want to explore the relationship between the discount rates and TimeFraming. In-
terval regressions allow us to work with censored dependent variables while controlling for 
the impact of multiple factors on the dependent variable simultaneously. As mentioned above, 
we want to control for the other discounting anomalies such as delay, size and sign effects as 
well as for demographic factors, including age, gender (Harrison et al., 2002), or familiarity 
with the present value concept (Matsumoto et al., 2000) together with time framing effects on 
time preferences.  
In order to utilize interval regressions, we have to define a lower bound and an upper 
bound for each category of discount rates. We denote this form of the dependent variable as 
Discounting_Interval and the range for each category can be seen in Column (1) of Table 2. 
We refer to these discount rates as “linear”, since we have assumed linear utility functions in 
order to calculate these ranges. In the next section, we also discuss the sensitiveness of our 
results to this assumption with the help of ordinal regressions. 
>>>>Insert Table 2 here<<<< 
Furthermore, in order to check our second hypothesis, we include interaction terms in 
our regression models between time framing and delay, size and sign effects to gauge whether 
time framing effects are correlated with these effects. Similar to time framing effects, delay, 
size and sign effects are also represented by binary dummy variables. The dummy variable for 
delay effects (Delay) assumes the value 0 in the basic scenario and 1 in the delayed scenario. 
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The dummy for size (sign) effects, Size (Sign) assumes the value 1 for larger (negative) out-
comes and 0 for smaller (positive) outcomes.  
As we have mentioned above, there are 178 participants combined in the basic and the 
delayed scenario and all of them have answered three question sets in their questionnaire 
which yields three different discounting results for small, negative and large outcomes, re-
spectively. Therefore, we have a sample of 534 observations in our regressions. The outcomes 
of our regressions are demonstrated in the first column of Table 3 where the standard errors 
are clustered by participants in order to account for the correlation between the answers of 
each participant. 
>>>>Insert Table 3 here<<<< 
The estimates of Sign and Size are highly significant at a 1 % significance level, but 
Delay is insignificant, as demonstrated in Column (1) of Table 2. This suggests that sign and 
size effects are also statistically significant in choice tasks with neutral outcome frames, 
which contradicts Shelley (1993), but is in line with a more recent study of Abdellaoui et al. 
(2009). Thus, the underlying reasons for these effects are open to further discussion. Moreo-
ver, the absence of delay effects indicates that there is no significant difference between deci-
sion patterns in the basic and the delayed scenario, i.e. there is no significant present bias, 
which contradicts other studies pledging the relevance of this bias. However, recently, a body 
of work has found that decreasing impatience is not as robust as it was previously believed, 
especially in choice tasks such as ours (Read et al., 2005b; Sayman and Öncüler, 2009). 
Now, we want to turn our attention to our main hypotheses. In line with our first hy-
pothesis, the results in Column (1) show that TimeFraming is not significant in our interval 
regression model which disagrees with earlier experiments focusing on framing effects in 
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matching tasks. Choice tasks (neutral outcome frames) thus seem to countervail outcome 
framing effects.  
Yet, the estimate for the interaction term between time framing and outcome sign pre-
sents an interesting link between time framing effects and sign effects which conflicts with 
our second hypothesis. The interaction term Sign*TimeFraming is significant at the 5 % level 
with a positive sign which suggests that differences between discount rates in the speedup and 
the delay frame are significantly more pronounced for negative outcomes. This result is also 
consistent with earlier studies investigating outcome framing effects which find that the 
speedup premium is larger than the delay premium for negative outcomes. Hence, this implies 
that framing effects cannot be eliminated completely even in neutral (outcome) frames. We 
discuss this issue in detail in Section 5.    
On the other hand, the other interaction terms between delay and time framing or size 
and time framing are insignificant. To sum up, we have not found strong enough evidence for 
time framing effects on average which agrees so far with our first hypothesis. However, there 
seems to be some interaction between time framing and sign effects, but not between time 
framing and the timing or the size of the outcomes. Thus, our results are less affirmative re-
garding our second hypothesis. In order to elaborate on this correlation between time framing 
and outcome sign, we now want to analyze time framing effects separately for negative and 
positive outcomes in the next subsection. 
4.2 Time Framing Effects for Different Outcome Signs  
The results of our first regression model suggest that Hypothesis 2 can be rejected with 
respect to the relation between time framing and outcome signs. This implies that although 
time framing effects are not significant on average, they are correlated with the outcome sign, 
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as the outcome sign seems to affect time preferences differently in the delay and the speedup 
frame.  
This also means that framing effects can be powerful to varying degrees for positive 
and negative outcomes. Therefore, we want to analyze the significance of time framing effects 
for different outcome signs separately and for this purpose, we first take a look at the choices 
in question sets with negative outcomes. The results in Column (2) of Table 3 demonstrate 
that TimeFraming is indeed statistically significant (p = 0.042) and positive when we only 
analyze preferences for negative outcomes. Thus, our participants are significantly less patient 
in the speedup frame compared to the delay frame for negative outcomes. In other words, time 
framing effects are statistically significant for choices involving negative outcomes. Further-
more, the interaction between delay and time framing is not significant, implying that time 
framing effects are equally strong both in the basic and the delayed scenario for negative out-
comes. Time framing effects for negative outcomes are also economically significant, as line-
ar discount rates are ceteris paribus on average 11.4 percentage points higher in a speedup 
frame than in a delay frame. 
After that, we also analyze results for positive outcomes separately, in a similar fash-
ion. Time framing effects are insignificant for positive outcomes. In addition, the interaction 
between time framing and delay or size effects is not substantial, confirming the results in 
Column (1) and Column (2).  
Summing up, our results are in line with Hypothesis 1, but Hypothesis 2 can be reject-
ed to a certain degree. Time framing effects become stronger and significant, as we consider 
negative outcomes regardless of the timing of the outcomes, which contradicts Hypothesis 2. 
On the other hand, although time framing effects correlate with the sign of the outcomes, the 
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same relation does not exist between time framing and delay or size effects. These interaction 
terms are insignificant. 
Just like outcome framing effects, time framing effects imply inconsistent behavior, 
too. Our results allege that decision makers arrive at different decisions in delay and speedup 
frames for negative outcomes, while this problem is less accentuated for positive outcomes. 
This suggests that people might hesitate to exercise both early termination and delay options 
for two identical choice tasks, if they are framed differently.  
In order to demonstrate this with an example, we consider a decision problem where it 
is assumed that a decision maker has an (linear) annual delay discount rate of 6.95 % and (due 
to higher impatience) an (linear) annual speedup discount rate of 14.25 %, and this individual 
has to choose between a negative payment of 100 € today or 105 € six months later. Then, 
in a delay frame, we arrive at 105/1.06956/12 = 101.353 < 100 so that the delay option will 
not be exercised. However, in the speedup frame we have 105/1.14256/12 = 98.23 > 100. 
Consequently, the speedup option will not be exercised, either. In the first situation, the indi-
vidual will prefer not to delay the payment and end up consuming less today. On the other 
hand, in the second scenario she chooses not to expedite her payments, and, hence, consumes 
more today. Therefore, she exhibits inconsistent behavior in delay and speedup frames. 
Hence, our results revealing different choices in delay and speedup frames imply that decision 
makers might tend to have a hard time exercising maturity options and this inconsistency is 
only strong for negative outcomes. 
4.3 Discussion  
Now we want to further circumstantiate the quality of our results with some robustness 
tests. For this purpose, we first estimate ordinal logistic regressions instead of interval regres-
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sions. Secondly, we also debate the relevance of a potential selection and non-response bias 
for our results. 
 
4.3.1 Ordinal Regressions  
Our original dependent variable consists of eight categories. An ordinal regression is 
another empirical method to analyze ordinal variables with unknown exact values. Interval 
regressions allow us to predict the exact value of the dependent variable even when it is cen-
sored, while ordinal regressions can only predict the likelihood that a variable falls into one of 
these eight categories. Therefore, the results of interval regressions are more informative and 
we prefer interval regressions to ordinal regressions initially. Yet, since we cannot specify the 
shape of utility functions, we cannot exactly calculate the upper and lower bounds for each 
category in our example. Due to this problem, the results of ordinal regressions actually are 
more robust, since this specification becomes irrelevant. 
In this case, we have to define our dependent variable as an ordinal variable. We refer 
to this version of the dependent variable as Discounting_Ordinal and it can assume integer 
values between 1 and 8.  Yet, when we use Discounting_Ordinal as our dependent variable in 
ordinal regressions, two assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regressions are violated. 
First, a simple crosstab analysis shows that there are too many empty or extremely small cells. 
Another critical assumption of the ordinal logistic regression model is the proportional odds 
assumption. We find that this assumption is violated, too. 
Both of these problems can be solved by reducing the number of categories of our de-
pendent variable. With four categories or more, the proportional odds assumption is still vio-
lated, which is why we have to reduce the number of categories to three in ordinal logistic 
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regressions. This is also a reason why we prefer interval regressions to ordinal logistic regres-
sions to begin with. 
We only report here the results for the recoding, which we define as “3 Group (3)”. 
The details for the definitions of the categories can be found in Table 2. In any case, our find-
ings remain qualitatively unchanged for the other category definitions listed in Table 2. 
Hence, results of the ordinal logistic regressions are also robust with respect to the definition 
of categories. Moreover, as Table 4 demonstrates, these results are also very similar to the 
results of the interval regressions and fortify our earlier conclusions.  
>>>>Insert Table 4 here<<<< 
4.3.2 Robustness Test: Non-Response (Selection) Bias 
One possible concern regarding our findings is a potential non-response bias, as only 
about 10 % of all students who had been contacted eventually participated in our study. Fol-
lowing Armstrong and Overton (1977), we control for this issue by comparing the answers of 
early and late respondents. We implicitly assume that late respondents should generally be 
more similar to non-respondents than early respondents. However, we find no significant dif-
ferences between the choices of these two groups based on χ2-tests. In particular, neither in 
the basic nor in the delayed scenario, the null hypothesis that the choices are identical for ear-
ly and late respondents, can be rejected. Hence, we can rule out a potential selection bias in 
our experiments.  
5. Theoretical Discussion  
There are two important findings of our experimental analysis: 
 Our results show that choice tasks indeed counteract framing effects to a certain ex-
tent, as these effects are not significant on average in neutral frames. 
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 However, time framing effects are correlated with the outcome sign. Changes in the 
outcome sign affect the magnitude of time framing effects. 
Taken together, these results indicate that the status quo bias can be alleviated, but 
cannot be eliminated completely in choice tasks. As we have discussed above, previous exper-
imental studies advocate that people edit the outcomes in a way that they only focus on the 
differences between different alternatives in choice tasks in contrast to matching tasks. Hence, 
decision makers are likely to segregate the difference between alternatives from the common 
part in choice task based experiments (Tversky et al., 1990; Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997). This 
obviously reduces the impact of the status quo bias resulting from loss aversion, since com-
mon parts are evaluated identically in both frames. Only the differences between alternatives 
are going to be treated differently depending on the framing of the question.  
If the difference between alternatives is defined according to time frames, delaying a 
positive outcome yields an additional return yx which is the difference between the later 
payment y and the (smaller) sooner payment x and this is perceived as a gain. In contrast, 
speeding up a reward results in a reduced payment (from y to x with x < y) and this small dif-
ference xy is understood as a loss after canceling out the common part of both alternatives. 
On the other hand, after a delay, financial obligations will be higher in absolute terms, and 
this is going to be perceived as an additional loss. In a similar vein, speedups are rewarded 
with a smaller (absolute) obligation which will be perceived as a gain as well. 
Summing up, we think that the intertemporal decision problem for choice tasks in neu-
tral outcome frames can be modeled in the following way in delay and speedup frames, re-
spectively: 
																																																												ݒሺݔሻ ⋛ 		 ݒሺݕ െ ݔሻ ൅ ݒሺݔሻሺ1 ൅ ߩௗሻ௧ 	,																																																				ሺ5ሻ 
 117 
 
																																																								ݒሺݕሻ ൅ ݒሺݔ െ ݕሻ 	⋛ 		 ݒሺݕሻሺ1 ൅ ߩ௦ሻ௧ .																																															ሺ6ሻ 
Clearly, for linear value functions and identical discount rates d = s in the delay and 
the speedup frame, people choose the same option regardless of the framing of the question or 
time. Yet, experimental studies have demonstrated that value functions are not linear, but s-
shaped (convex-concave) with a kink implied by loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1990). A typical value function with such features is the fol-
lowing one with a loss aversion parameter   1:  
																																																			ݒሺݔሻ ൌ ൜ ݔ
ఈ																												ሺݔ ൒ 0ሻ
െߣሺെݔሻఈ															ሺݔ ൏ 0ሻ.																																									ሺ7ሻ 
It is possible to compute critical values td  and ts that equate both sides of (5) and (6): 
																																																						ሺ1 ൅ ߩௗሻ௧೏ ൌ 		 ݒሺݕ െ ݔሻ ൅ ݒሺݔሻݒሺݔሻ 	,																																													ሺ8ሻ 
																																																				ሺ1 ൅ ߩ௦ሻ௧ೞ ൌ 		 ݒሺݕሻݒሺݕሻ ൅ ݒሺݔ െ ݕሻ.																																																ሺ9ሻ 
First assume y, x > 0 with y > x. A finite positive solution for ts requires v(y)+v(xy) > 
0. In this case, a larger loss aversion parameter implies smaller (negative) values of v(xy) and 
thus higher values of ts in (9) with ts approaching infinity for v(y)+v(xy)  0. On the other 
hand, loss aversion is irrelevant for td, as each term in equation (8) is positive. Therefore, loss 
aversion leads to ceteris paribus greater differences between ts and td and eventually to ts > td, 
i.e., for positive outcomes people prefer to wait longer in a speedup frame if loss aversion is 
sufficiently high. 
For negative outcomes y, x < 0 with y < x and a value function according to (7), the 
right-hand side of (8) becomes independent of , while the right-hand side of (9) is a decreas-
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ing function of  approaching 1 with ts converging towards zero for increasing loss aversion 
parameter. Summarizing, an increase in the loss aversion parameter eventually implies td > ts 
for negative outcomes. 
In addition, we may utilize these critical values td and ts to calculate corresponding 
“linear” discount rates ( ) lind  and ( )lins  under the fictitious assumption of linear utility func-
tions. These “linear” discount rates obey the following equations: 
																																												 ݕ
ቀ1 ൅ ߩௗሺ௟௜௡ሻቁ
௧೏ ൌ 	ݔ,							
ݕ
ቀ1 ൅ ߩ௦ሺ௟௜௡ሻቁ
௧ೞ ൌ 	ݔ																											ሺ10ሻ 
As these critical linear discount rates are negatively correlated with td and ts, we can 
conclude ( ) ( )lin lind s   for positive and ( ) ( )lin lind s  for negative outcomes. If loss aversion is 
sufficiently strong, we should therefore observe time framing effects even in our neutral (out-
come) frames and even when the decision maker applies the same discount rate for both the 
delay and the speedup frame (d = s). However, our experimental study also shows that time 
framing effects are in fact too small to be statistically significant for positive outcomes which 
cannot be explained with the arguments until now.  
In order to understand the absence of time framing effects for positive outcomes, we 
need to distinguish between different loss aversion parameters + and  for positive and neg-
ative outcomes. In fact, going back to as far as Thaler (1980), it is clear that decision makers 
treat out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs differently and opportunity costs tend to be 
undervalued compared to out-of-pocket costs. Therefore, we think that the relevant loss aver-
sion parameter is much smaller for the opportunity costs resulting from speeding up positive 
outcomes compared to the loss aversion parameter for the delay costs yx for negative out-
comes as well as for the original payment obligations, since they constitute out-of-pocket 
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costs. As we discussed above, the differences between ( ) lind  and ( )lins for positive outcomes 
are driven by the loss aversion parameter of opportunity costs of speeding up positive out-
comes and this difference is increasing in the loss aversion parameter. Consequently, if this 
loss aversion parameter is small, the imputed linear discount rates in the delay and the 
speedup frame will be less distinguishable.  
These general conclusions can also be highlighted by a numerical example. We addi-
tionally assume the discount rates ρ to be smaller for negative outcomes in order to justify 
sign effects, for which there is extensive evidence even after controlling for the shape of utili-
ty functions (Abdellaoui et al., 2009). This is also in line with our experimental findings. 
To be more precise, for positive outcomes, we have on average a critical value of t that 
is about two to three months for delay as well as speedup frames in our experimental study. In 
contrast, for negative outcomes, participants are more patient with a critical value for td of 
about six to nine months in the delay frame and for ts of about four to six months in the 
speedup frame.  
In order to replicate these results based on (8) and (9), we set   = 0.88 (Kahnemann 
and Tverksy, 1979) and loss aversion parameters + = 1 and  = 2. Hence, we work with a 
typical loss aversion parameter for out-of-pocket costs, but assume also that participants ex-
hibit no feeling of loss aversion at all regarding opportunity costs. With these parameters and 
discount rates d = s = 0.35 for positive outcomes and d = s = 0.10 for negative outcomes, 
we arrive at critical values td and ts (in months) amounting to td = 2.77 and ts = 2.84 for posi-
tive outcomes and to td = 8.71 and ts = 4.40 for negative outcomes in line with our experi-
mental findings. This numerical example visualizes also clearly that time framing effects are 
of an extent that is worth to be mentioned only for large loss aversion parameters. 
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Moreover, these critical values for td and ts correspond to (annual) calculated critical 
linear discount rates for fictitious linear utility of ( )lind = 6.95 % and ( )lins  = 14.25 % for neg-
ative outcomes and are hence identical to those discount rates which we have assumed in our 
numerical example of the preceding section. Corresponding critical discount rates for positive 
outcomes are ( )lind  = 23.57 % and ( )lins = 22.87 % and are thus almost indistinguishable. 
Such linear discount rates (approximately) in the range between 20 % and 25 % for positive 
outcomes are also in line with the results of a more comprehensive survey of Andersen et al. 
(2006). Since Andersen et al. (2006) have also elicited the discount rates in their study with 
the help of the multiple price list method, this similarity also endorses the quality of our re-
sults. To sum up, our model can explain the results in our experiments with reasonable pa-
rameter values. 
To recap, even when choice tasks can eliminate the status quo bias for the common 
parts of the alternatives, the perception of the differential amount between sooner and later 
alternatives depends on the definition of time frames. Therefore, we might observe delay-
speedup asymmetries even in neutral (outcome) frames for loss averse investors. However, 
the time framing effect is not expected to be strong for positive outcomes, since speeding up a 
receipt causes only opportunity costs which is not connoted with the same negative associa-
tions as out-of-pocket costs following delaying payment obligations. 
6. Practical Implications of Time Framing Effects 
Our results reveal that people exhibit greater consistency in choice tasks and framing 
effects are less significant. Yet, we observe consistent exercise of delay and speedup options, 
only for decisions involving positive outcomes. Otherwise, decision makers are prone to er-
rors and make inconsistent decisions even in neutral outcome frames and we describe this 
inconsistency as time framing effects. 
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As we have already mentioned, these results are important, because real-life inter-
temporal tasks resemble choice tasks usually more than matching tasks. Therefore, in this 
section, we try to verify the applicability of our findings for real-life decisions with the aid of 
an empirical analysis which addresses households’ portfolio decisions.  
We can first demonstrate the meaning of our experimental results with the aid of our 
earlier numerical example. As a starting point, we keep the parameters of the preceding sec-
tion. This means, we assume  = 0.88, + = 1,  = 2, d = s = 0.35 for positive outcomes 
and d = s = 0.10 for negative outcomes. In a choice task with negative outcomes, for an in-
dividual with these preference parameters, we observe a personal critical (linear) discount rate 
of ( )lins  = 14.25 % so that speedup options for negative payments will only be exercised for 
borrowing rates beyond 14.25 %. Similarly, the corresponding critical (linear) personal dis-
count rate ( )lind  amounts to 6.95 % for decisions involving delay options. Only for smaller 
interest rates, payments will be delayed by taking on a credit. Thus, an individual would exer-
cise neither the delay nor the speedup option embedded in (potential) credits for market inter-
est rates between 6.95 % and 14.25 %. If an individual exercises neither of these options, her 
answers are clearly inconsistent in different time frames. Analogously, for the same parame-
ters and for positive outcomes, an individual hesitates to exercise both speedup and delay op-
tions for market interest rates between 22.87 % and 23.57 %. Hence, (only) for interest rates 
between 22.87 % and 23.57 %, time framing effects impact an individual’s choice. Apparent-
ly, we observe a stronger inertia regarding payment obligations, since for given parameters, 
people forgo both delay and speedup options embedded in payment obligations for a larger 
interval of market interest rates.  
Once again, this example demonstrates that framing effects are not only less signifi-
cant in choice tasks, but they are also much stronger for negative outcomes. Until now, re-
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search has focused on the magnitude of framing effects in intertemporal decisions, but left the 
question out when framing effects are going to be stronger. The reason for this inattention is 
probably the fact that previous studies have conducted experiments via matching tasks and 
this aggravated framing effect. Owing to matching tasks, framing effects were very strong 
even for positive outcomes in previous experiments (Benzion et al., 1989), although a devia-
tion from the status quo entails only opportunity costs in this case. Since our methodology in 
general reduced the impact of framing effects, we have been able to observe that the outcome 
sign also plays an important role for the magnitude of framing effects in intertemporal deci-
sions. 
Now, we want to discuss the potential empirical consequences of our theory. As men-
tioned above, decision makers encounter time framing effects in many decisions. For instance, 
after an income shock, households have to decide about the optimal consumption stream. In 
this case, the desired consumption path might deviate from the given income stream, but 
households can turn to capital markets. For instance, after a positive income shock, if a 
household wants to consume less than its income in a given period (saver household), it can 
either invest this difference in deposits which is going to affect household’s total assets or it 
can redeem existing loans which is going to reduce its debt stock. Analogously, borrower 
households can either raise credits or terminate investments after a negative income shock to 
reach to the same consumption path. In a related analysis, Gilkeson et al. (1999) found that 
time deposit portfolios experience early withdrawals at economically significant levels, but 
they have not contrasted the changes in asset and liability sides with each other. 
These transactions have the same influence on the consumption stream and the dis-
counted expected utility in perfect capital markets. Hence, they are perfect substitutes in per-
fect capital markets with equal lending and borrowing rates. Yet, our numerical example 
above demonstrates that people are neither going to delay nor expedite their payment obliga-
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tions for a large range of interest rates, while this status quo bias is effective only for a smaller 
range in the asset account. Hence, the differences between consumption and income are going 
to be reflected mainly in the asset account.  
In order to demonstrate this, let us assume that borrowing and lending interest rates are 
both equal to 10 %. In this case, the decision maker of our numerical example with critical 
linear discount rates of ( )lins  = 14.25 % (speedup options) and of ( )lind = 6.95 % (delay op-
tions) for debt payments is prone to time framing effects, because for an interest rate of 10 % 
she will – at the same time – neither be willing to repay (existing) debt prematurely nor to 
postpone debt obligations to the far future. Yet, according to our previous computations, the 
same household will choose to actively increase current consumption by liquidating (or not 
prolonging) investments with a 10 % interest rate, since framing effects for positive outcomes 
are only effective for a smaller range of discount rates.  
Hence, the existence of time framing effects entails a more proactive reaction on the 
asset side and predicts that households experience difficulties exercising delay or speedup 
options embedded in (potential) credits compared to the same options embedded in invest-
ment plans, although these decisions have the same consequences in perfect capital markets. 
Thus, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Changes in the households’ net financial position are driven more by changes 
in total assets than in total liabilities even in perfect capital markets due to time framing ef-
fects. 
6.1 Data and Methodology 
In order to test this prediction, we need a data set on households’ financial wealth 
which has to be representative of the total population and features a high level of accuracy. 
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Such a data set on households’ total assets and total liabilities in a country is made available 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) World Data panel. The EIU World Data is a panel 
data set that provides information on the country level about the household population in 54 
countries (partially) available for the period between 2003 and 2013 with data for 2012 and 
2013 being forecasts.  
For our empirical analysis, we use difference in differences (henceforth, DiD) estima-
tors. Obviously, for our analysis, DiD is well suited, as we want to examine the changes in 
households’ liability (control group) and asset accounts (treatment group) for a country i, after 
a change in net financial wealth from year t1 to t. Since we compare the changes in asset and 
debt accounts in the same country, these changes are perfect substitutes, provided that markets 
are perfect. Hence, in a perfect capital market, no factor should be able to explain systemati-
cally whether households should prefer to raise a new credit or liquidate an asset to adjust 
consumption.  
In order to test our Hypothesis 3 empirically, we disaggregate changes in (US-Dollar 
denominated) net financial wealth of households, ΔNFWit, into two parts, namely changes in 
the asset and in the liability account. Hence, for each country i, we have two accounts, the 
total assets and the total liabilities account. The aggregate changes in both accounts make up 
ΔNFWit in a country i for a certain year t. The treatment dummy Asset assumes the value of 1 
for changes in the asset account and the value of 0 for changes in the debt account. Therefore, 
we get two values for each country-year net financial wealth change. In other words, half of 
the sample of our dependent variable refers to changes in the asset account and thus coincides 
with Asset = 1, and the other half refers to changes in the debt account where Asset takes the 
value of 0. It should be noted that ΔNFWit is always considered in absolute values, since we 
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compare the amount of value changes in debt or asset accounts and not their signs. Therefore, 
we work with |ΔNFWit| instead of ΔNFWit as our dependent variable.  
According to our hypothesis, the coefficient for our treatment dummy Asset should be 
positive, as this suggests that changes in net financial wealth, |ΔNFWit|, are mainly driven by 
changes in the asset account for year t, i.e., if Asset assumes the value 1.  
In order to control for the correlation between standard errors across country and time, 
we prefer robust standard errors clustered by both country and time (Petersen, 2009). This 
method yields estimates robust to the correlation of standard errors in both dimensions and is 
particularly recommendable for panel data, since this way, we can capture the impact of coun-
try- and time-specific factors that might affect our results, such as institutional and legal dif-
ferences. Moreover, the t-statistics are very conservative in this approach, therefore a valida-
tion of our hypothesis would be even more convincing with this method (Thompson, 2011). 
Since the value range of our dependent variable is limited (non-negative), we have also esti-
mated a Tobit regression again with double clustering as a robustness check. We do not report 
these results here, since they are completely in line with the findings for ordinary least squares 
regressions with double-clustered standard errors. Our model is of the following form: 
																																																						|∆ܰܨ ௜ܹ௧| ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																										ሺ11ሻ 
6.2 Results 
As mentioned above, a positive estimate for the regression coefficient  would support 
our theory, since it suggests that households accumulate or liquidate assets faster than they 
redeem their loans or take on new debt. Indeed, our t-statistics demonstrate that there is a sig-
nificant difference between |ΔNFWit| in the asset and the liability account in favor of the asset 
side. The DiD estimator for the treatment dummy Asset is significantly positive even for this 
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very conservative measure (t-statistic = 3.14, p-value = 0.002). This result is also economical-
ly significant: An absolute change in net financial wealth of $ 1 coincides on average with an 
absolute change of $ 0.7637 in the asset account and of only $ 0.2363 in the liabilities ac-
count. Moreover, according to Table 5, we can also reject the null hypothesis that the mean on 
the asset side is smaller than on the liability side for |ΔNFWi| at least at a 6 % level, for each 
year between 2003 and 2013, separately. 
>>>>Insert Table 5 here<<<< 
This means that our results are in line with our third hypothesis and show that if the 
optimal consumption stream deviates from the income stream, these differences concern 
households’ assets more than their liabilities. Thus, households prefer to adjust consumption 
with the help of asset rebalancing in line with our third hypothesis (see also Gilkeson et al., 
1999). This result is also somehow in line with the so-called “refinancing puzzle”, an empiri-
cal finding demonstrating the reluctance of households to clear their debts earlier and to take 
on new credit (for the same remaining term of maturity) with more favorable conditions (see 
Agarwal et al., 2007, for a discussion of the “refinancing puzzle”). 
6.3 Discussion 
Up until here, we have emanated from perfect capital markets and neglected the possi-
bility that capital market frictions may also explain households’ portfolio decisions. For in-
stance, lenders might ask for extra payments to dissolve a credit relationship earlier than the 
maturity date. Similarly, penalties might be attached to liquidating a time deposit before ma-
turity, as well. Therefore, in order to control for the possible impact of these capital market 
frictions on our results, we repeat our DiD analysis for a subsample of country-years with 
negative changes in net financial wealth in a certain year (negative ΔNFWit). If the mean for 
|ΔNFWit| is larger for the asset side in this subsample, this insinuates that even if households 
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need to decide between taking on new debt and withdrawing their assets before maturity, they 
prefer to liquidate their assets. Obviously, transaction costs involving this decision would 
work against that, since households face higher transaction costs and penalties if they want to 
withdraw their time deposits before maturity. As a consequence, households would be en-
couraged to take on new debt instead of withdrawing their deposits.  
In line with our third hypothesis, we can reject the null hypothesis of equal means at a 
5 % level (p-value < 0.001), and the t-statistic (3.65) is even larger for the subsample consist-
ing of negative ΔNFWit again for double-clustered standard errors. Hence, even in periods of 
negative savings, households prefer to liquidate their assets instead of raising new credits haz-
arding the resulting penalties, which contradicts the transaction costs story.  
However, this result could also be attributed to the credit supply of banks rather than 
to the credit demand of households. Banks seem to reduce credit supply in crisis times (see 
e.g., Adrian and Shin, 2010). In this case, households without credit access are obliged to liq-
uidate their assets in order to make the ends meet. Consequently, even with large transaction 
costs, households are forced to sell assets in crisis times. To account for this alternative expla-
nation for the invalidity of the transaction costs story, we add private lending (credit amount 
to the private non-financial sector) divided by GDP as a proxy for credit rationing in a certain 
country in a given year. If the credit supply measured by Private lending to GDP is high for 
the private sector in aggregate, this would imply that households have easier access to credits. 
If the transaction costs story is valid, after controlling for Private lending to GDP, our treat-
ment dummy Asset should not remain significant for the subsample with negative ΔNFW.  
However, we find that credit rationing cannot explain the preference of households to 
liquidate assets rather than taking on a new credit, as Asset is still significant at a 5 % level 
after adding Private lending to GDP in our regression models (t-statistic = 3.47). Further-
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more, we added the interaction term between Asset and Private lending to GDP in order to see 
whether the impact of Asset is at least significantly diminished for increasing lending oppor-
tunities. But the interaction term is not significant either (t-statistic = −0.29), hence we can 
conclude that our results are driven by household credit demand and not by bank credit sup-
ply.  
An alternative explanation for this seemingly puzzling decision pattern of households 
might be the discrepancy between borrowing and lending interest rates. On imperfect capital 
markets, borrowing rates rb are usually higher than lending rates rl for households. Due to 
higher borrowing interest rates, borrower households might be financially better off terminat-
ing their deposits instead of taking out a new loan in periods of negative savings even in the 
case of transaction costs c (as percentage of initial capital) for premature liquidation. This 
means we may explain our empirical finding for the subset of negative values of negative 
ΔNFWit by cost-earnings considerations with rb > rl +c. 
In practice, c is the compensation of a household’s contractual partner for searching a 
new creditor or a new debtor as a substitute for the withdrawing household under possibly less 
favorable conditions due to changes in current market interest rates. This means that for sta-
tionary interest rate processes over time, one may reasonably assume similar average transac-
tion costs c for premature liquidation of assets and liabilities. As a consequence, if rb > rl +c 
for negative ΔNFWit, the difference between borrowing and lending interest rates is a bigger 
concern than penalties involving exercising call options for liabilities, too. This would imply 
that households would also prefer to redeem their loans earlier instead of tying up their money 
elsewhere for investment purposes in periods of positive savings (ΔNFWit > 0).  
To check the relevance of this theory, we calculate DiD estimators for Asset, this time 
for the subsample of country-years with ΔNFWit > 0. Again, we find that saver households 
 129 
 
prefer to invest their savings in their deposits rather than to pay down debt with them (t-value 
= 3.21 with double-clustered standard errors, p-value = 0.001). Hence, the discrepancy be-
tween lending and borrowing interest rates cannot explain our results for this subsample. 
More formally, our empirical results for positive values of ΔNFWit would require a cost-
earnings consideration with rbc < rl. This apparently contradicts our previous finding con-
cerning the subset for negative values of ΔNFWit which requires rb > rl +c.  
To sum up, neither the transaction costs nor the uneven interest rate story can accom-
modate the fact that both saver and lender households choose to forgo the options embedded 
in their credit agreements rather than in their investment plans. However, our time framing 
story can explain our findings in both sides, since it conjectures that if the income stream is 
not identical with the preferred consumption stream, these differences are reflected in the as-
set account. 
7. Conclusion 
We can now sum up the findings of our paper briefly. Our main purpose is to explore 
framing effects in choice tasks with neutral (outcome) frames. It is easy to imagine that deci-
sion makers encounter such decision tasks more often than matching tasks; still experimental 
studies have ignored this more realistic setting before our study. With our experiment, we are 
able to compare subjective discount rates in the delay and the speedup frame in choice tasks. 
We reveal that framing effects are still at work to a certain extent even in this setting and we 
refer to this specific form of framing effects as time framing effects. Moreover, we observe 
that framing effects are only relevant for negative outcomes.  
In order to explain this correlation between framing effects and outcome sign, we have 
developed a theory based on the different perception of out-of-pocket and opportunity costs. 
As a result of their different treatment, the opportunity costs incurred by speeding up a gain 
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do not disturb decision makers as much as costs incurred by delaying a loss. For this reason, 
exercising options related to positive outcomes becomes less difficult than exercising options 
related to negative outcomes for decision makers. 
Since we argue that choice tasks are more likely to be encountered in real-life deci-
sions than willingness-to-pay tasks, we expect our results regarding time framing effects to 
bear also practical implications. A general aversion to exercise options involving transactions 
with negative cash flows implies that people prefer to adjust their consumption by dipping 
into their savings or by accumulating wealth. We have been able to find supporting empirical 
evidence for this prediction which cannot be explained with the aid of other market imperfec-
tions.  
Summarizing, our paper contributes to the existing literature both in the field of 
household finance and in the field of experimental economics. First, we have conducted an 
experiment investigating framing effects in intertemporal decisions in a much more realistic 
setting using choice tasks. The result of this experiment helped us to identify and to explain a 
very interesting puzzle regarding households’ borrowing and lending behavior. Furthermore, 
our empirical analysis of household behavior is to our knowledge the first one to explore the 
influence of framing effects in intertemporal decisions empirically, although the first experi-
mental evidence in this regard goes back to Loewenstein (1988).  
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Table I. Summary statistics for the demographic variables in our regression model 
Dummy variables are utilized to describe participants’ gender (male = 0, female = 1) and major (non-
economics students = 0, economics students = 1), while age is represented by an integer characterizing 
the age of participants. In the basic scenario, the sooner of the two eligible outcomes is to be received 
immediately, in the delayed scenario the sooner of the two eligible outcomes is to be received three 
months later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Mean S.D. Median N 
Basic Scenario     
All Answers     
Gender 0.23 0.42 0 121 
Age 21.60 2.39 21 121 
Major 0.81 0.39 1 121 
Consistent Answers     
Gender 0.24 0.43 0 100 
Age 21.69 2.52 21 100 
Major 0.80 0.40 1 100 
Delayed Scenario     
All Answers     
Gender 0.32 0.47 0 108 
Age 23.54 2.51 23 108 
Major 0.71 0.45 1 108 
Consistent Answers     
Gender 0.36 0.48 0 78 
Age 23.44 2.43 23 78 
Major 0.74 0.44 1 78 
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Table II. Coding of subjective discount rates in different ways  
ρ(lin) stands for a participant’s subjective “linear” discount rate computed under the fictitious assumption 
of a linear value function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 No Grouping 3 Groups (1) 3 Groups (2) 3 Groups (3) 
Group 1 0 % < ρ(lin) < 5 % 0 % < ρ(lin) < 16 % 0 % < ρ(lin) < 10 % 0 % < ρ(lin) < 10 % 
Group 2 5 % < ρ(lin) < 7 % 16 % < ρ(lin) < 34 % 10 % < ρ(lin) < 22 % 10 % < ρ(lin)  < 34 % 
Group 3 7 % < ρ(lin) < 10 % 34 % < ρ(lin) 22 % < ρ(lin) 34 % < ρ(lin) 
Group 4 10 % < ρ(lin) < 16 %    
Group 5 16 % < ρ(lin) < 22 %    
Group 6 22 % < ρ(lin) < 34 %    
Group 7 34 % < ρ(lin)  < 80 %    
Group 8 80 % < ρ(lin)    
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Table III. Results of the interval regressions 
This table presents the results of interval regressions of the subjective discount rates on various inde-
pendent variables combining the answers of the basic and the delayed scenario. TimeFraming is a bina-
ry dummy variable assuming the value of 1 for the speedup frame and a value of 0 for the delay frame. 
Delay, Size, and Sign are additional binary dummy variables characterizing the delayed scenario, large 
outcomes, or negative outcomes, respectively. Cluster adjusted z-values are reported below the regres-
sion coefficients. *** p ≤ 1 %, ** p ≤ 5 %, * p ≤ 10 %. 
  Independent 
Variables 
(1) 
All Outcomes 
(2) 
Only Negative 
(3) 
Only Positive 
Delay 
0.070 0.145 0.029 
1.18 2.23** 0.41 
Size 
-0.188  -0.189 
-6.31***  -6.31*** 
Sign 
-0.319   
-7.83***   
TimeFraming 
-0.039 0.114 -0.054 
-0.61 2.03** -0.81 
Delay*TimeFraming 
-0.027 -0.095 0.010 
-0.30 -0.88 0.09 
Size*TimeFraming 
0.002  0.002 
0.05  0.05 
Sign*TimeFraming 
0.128   
2.24**   
Gender 
-0.018 -0.039 -0.008 
-0.39 -0.65 -0.14 
Age 
0.006 0.009 0.005 
0.66 0.95 0.37 
Major 
0.101 0.127 0.087 
1.73* 2.11** 1.17 
Constant 
0.305 -0.132 0.370 
1.29 -0.55 1.19 
Likelihood-Ratio χ2 
119.53 73.80 16.91 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.010*** 
Observations 534 178 356 
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Table IV. Results of the ordinal logistic regressions 
This table presents ordinal logistic regression results of the subjective discount rate (with three catego-
ries) on various independent variables combining the answers of the basic and the delayed scenario. 
TimeFraming is a binary dummy variable with a value of 1 for the speedup frame and a value of 0 for 
the delay frame. Delay, Size, and Sign are additional binary dummy variables characterizing the delayed 
scenario, large outcomes, or negative outcomes, respectively. Cluster adjusted z-values are reported be-
low the regression coefficients. *** p ≤ 1 %, ** p ≤ 5 %, * p ≤ 10 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Independent 
Variables 
(1) 
All Outcomes 
(2) 
Only Negative 
(3) 
Only Positive 
Delay 
0.231 0.837 -0.061 
0.68 2.03** -0.15 
Size 
-1.012  -1.045 
-6.20***  -6.20*** 
Sign 
-2.100   
-8.10***   
TimeFraming 
-0.310 0.777 -0.409 
-0.90 2.11** -1.12 
Delay*TimeFraming 
-0.284 -0.860 -0.010 
-0.59 -1.41 -0.02 
Size*TimeFraming 
-0.054  -0.070 
-0.23  -0.29 
Sign*TimeFraming 
0.924   
2.69***   
Gender 
-0.150 -0.706 0.105 
-0.57 -1.82* 0.35 
Age 
0.012 0.056 -0.009 
0.19 0.96 -0.11 
Major 
0.631 0.961 0.486 
1.99** 2.36** 1.26 
Likelihood-Ratio χ2 
122.52 15.17 73.25 
0.000*** 0.019** 0.000*** 
Pseudo  R2 0.070 0.041 0.047 
Observations 534 178 356 
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Table V. Univariate analysis of changes in households’ net financial wealth 
This table presents the results of t-statistics (accounting for unequal variances) for the null hypothesis 
that the mean value of changes |ΔNFWit| in households’ net financial wealth is smaller for the asset side 
than for the liabilities side. p-values are below the t-statistics. *** p ≤ 1 %, ** p ≤ 5 %, * p ≤ 10 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Year Dif < 0 
2003 
1.954 
0.028** 
2004 
1.684 
0.049** 
2005 
1.633 
0.054* 
2006 
2.127 
0.019** 
2007 
2.313 
0.012** 
2008 
1.861 
0.034** 
2009 
1.524 
0.067* 
2010 
1.661 
0.051* 
2011 
1.900 
0.031** 
2012 
1.870 
0.033** 
2013 
1.763 
0.041** 
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Abstract. Previous literature has shown that in choice tasks with disclosed effective interest 
rates, some discounting anomalies such as hyperbolic discounting might disappear. In the 
following paper, we show that another discounting anomaly called size effect is still persistent 
in a similar experimental task. Subsequently, we discuss the empirical implications of our 
experiments for decisions in internet credit markets for the example of Germany where the 
decision tasks resemble our experimental tasks to a very large degree. This also provides first 
evidence regarding the empirical implications of the size effect. 
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1. Introduction 
According to traditional neoclassical theories, decision makers are forward-looking 
and they maximize the aggregate lifetime utility in intertemporal decision settings using 
backwards induction (Samuelson, 1937; Samuelson, 1969). Time preferences are very deci-
sive to solve such problems, since they determine the weight given to future utility compared 
to today’s utility.  
Therefore, it is essential to define discounting functions and discounting behavior in 
order to understand how investors determine their consumption path (Shefrin and Thaler, 
1988). For this reason, it is not very surprising that numerous researchers have attempted to 
identify the shape and the determinants of discounting functions both with the help of experi-
mental studies (see e.g., Thaler, 1980; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Andersen et al., 2006) and 
field studies (see e.g., Hausman, 1979; Viscussi and Moore, 1989; Warner and Pleeter, 2000).  
In experimental studies, which are designed to explore the discount rates, the subjects 
mostly have to choose between two mutually exclusive (predefined) monetary outcomes (Ex-
ample: 100 € today or 102.47 € in 6 months) and the implicit interest rate between the sooner 
and later alternatives (for our example: 5%) is not revealed by experimenters. These experi-
ments sometimes even work deliberately with complicated numbers to make it difficult for the 
participants to calculate the interest rates on their own. As a result, the elicited discount rates 
are usually unrealistically large, which exceed 100% in some scenarios (see Frederick et al., 
2002, for a review). On the other hand, when disclosing the internal interest rates of alterna-
tive payments, personal discount rates assume smaller and more realistic values (Coller and 
Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002; Andersen et al., 2006). In the rest of this paper, we re-
fer to the former question frame as the money frame and the latter question frame as the inter-
est rate frame, respectively. 
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Although there has been only a handful of attempts to investigate time preferences in 
the interest rate frame, Read et al. (2005) demonstrate further that besides the magnitude of 
discount rates, time discounting functions exhibit a generally different shape if effective inter-
est rates are disclosed. Their experimental results have been able to reject the prevalence of 
hyperbolic discounting functions in interest rate frames. Furthermore, again in contradiction 
with other studies utilizing money frames (see e.g., Read and Roelofsma, 2003), they have 
found evidence for reversed interval effects. This means that discount rates are not larger, but 
smaller if the delay between sooner and later outcomes is divided into subintervals.  
These differences between discounting functions in experiments utilizing different 
frames frame can be attributed to the obvious simplicity of the decision tasks in interest rate 
frames due to disclosure of effective interest rates. In interest rate frames, the participants are 
not obliged to calculate the present value of a later outcome themselves. Clearly, this would 
help participants to avoid miscalculations and increases the likelihood that the answers in such 
experiments reveal actual preferences much better. As previous studies witness, the complexi-
ty of the discounting/compounding principle might lead to mistakes (see e.g., Stango and 
Zinman, 2009). Hence, we can argue that discounting anomalies such as excessive discount-
ing or hyperbolic discounting arise from simple miscalculations, as well.   
Other discounting anomalies might also be traced back to the inability of individuals 
to work with exponential functions. The size effect poses such an example. It refers to the 
experimental evidence showing that discount rates are decreasing in outcome size. Consider-
ing the degree of difficulty to discount or compound numbers exponentially, decision makers 
are bound to make mistakes without calculators in simple experimental settings. Instead, re-
vealing the effective interest rate between two alternatives, we can avoid these mistakes and 
eliminate size effects if these are due to miscalculations.    
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Yet, there are also alternative theories that can entail size effects. For instance, Ben-
zion et al., (1989) advocate in their paper that individuals solve intertemporal decision prob-
lems based on a heuristic, which they refer to as the added compensation approach. According 
to this theory, an individual asks for compensation (is willing to pay a premium) if he is re-
quested to delay (expedite) consumption. This amount, which the authors refer to as the added 
compensation component is fixed and independent of the underlying question. Hence, with 
this additional fixed amount, the relation between the sooner smaller (x) and the equally at-
tractive later larger reward (y) is going to look as follows: 
																																																																ݒሺݕሻ ∙ ߮ሺݐሻ ൌ 	ݒሺݔሻ ൅ ܤ.																																														ሺ1ሻ 
B is the fixed amount required to delay the rewards or the payments and it is positive if 
x > 0 (delaying a receipt) and negative otherwise. φ(t) is the discounting function that decision 
makers use to compare the later outcomes with the sooner outcomes. If that approach de-
scribes the discounting process more accurately, it can also entail size effects even when mis-
calculations are avoided, as we show later. Thus, we would expect to observe size effects 
even in interest rate frames. Therefore, with our new experimental design, we can also seek 
validation for the added compensation approach. 
Furthermore, the practical relevance of interest rate frames is another reason, why it is 
essential to understand time preferences in this setting. Intertemporal decisions are presented 
to decision makers in interest rate frames more often than not in real life.  It is easy to imagine 
that the borrowers compare the effective interest rates of different loan agreements, rather 
than their annuities. In some countries, including Germany, it is even obligatory for the finan-
cial institutions to inform investors (creditors) about the effective interest rates of their time 
deposits (loans).  
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We also investigate the practical relevance of our experimental results in interest rate 
frames, since we argue that we are more likely to be encounter this question type in real life 
decisions. For this purpose, we investigate the relationship between credit spreads and credit 
size for the borrowing applications listed on the German peer-to-peer (henceforth, P2P) lend-
ing platform “Smava”. We focus on electronic credit markets, since both parties involved are 
more likely to be less informed naïve investors in such transactions who are more prone to 
discounting anomalies. In traditional lending relationships involving sophisticated financial 
institutions (like banks or other financial intermediaries), standard mathematical formulas are 
utilized more often than rule of thumbs (Barber et al., 2009; Chiang et al., 2011). Moreover, 
as we discuss later, the decision problems in online credit markets resemble the question types 
in our interest rate frame almost perfectly.  
In sum, repeating the usual intertemporal decision experiments in an interest rate 
frame can help us gain more insight about time preferences and the underlying principles of 
time discounting. This way, we can also question the accuracy of added compensation ap-
proach (Benzion et al., 1989) and whether a fix premium is involved in intertemporal 
tradeoffs besides the discounting component. The fact that discounting anomalies like hyper-
bolic discounting cannot be reproduced in interest rate frames has motivated us to put size 
effects in this setting in perspective as well. Moreover, interest rate frames are worthy of be-
ing investigated, as they can replicate actual choice tasks in real life much better and we query 
the relevance of our experimental findings for actual decision process with the help of an em-
pirical analysis. 
We start our paper by contrasting the possible explanations for the size effect. In Sec-
tion 3, we investigate these contrasting hypotheses with the help of an experiment and evalu-
ate the results of our experiments. In Section 4, we seek empirical support for our findings 
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focusing on loan requests carried out on the internet credit platform “Smava”. Section 5 con-
cludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
The size effect is one of the first discounting anomalies which was discussed in exper-
imental studies. Simply put, it describes the tendency of decision makers to wait more patient-
ly for larger outcomes. Thaler (1981) was the first researcher who illustrated the effects of the 
outcome magnitude on intertemporal decisions. After that, different studies have confirmed 
these results repeatedly and the size effect is considered to be a very robust phenomenon 
(Frederick et al. 2002, for a review). 
Like we mentioned above, there are two potential explanations for size effects that we 
like to contrast here. Either size effects are due to miscalculations of present value of the later 
larger outcome in the money frame or the simple discounting concept advocated by Samuel-
son (1937) is not completely accurate to describe the decision making process in inter-
temporal decisions.  
In choice tasks formulated in the money frame, decision makers are required to calcu-
late the present value later outcomes to compare this with the present value of the sooner al-
ternative. On the other hand, in the interest rate frame, effective interest rates are already giv-
en and decision maker can simply compare this rate with her own subjective discount rate to 
make her decision. Therefore, we argue:  
Hypothesis 1a: Size effects disappear in the interest rate frame, since true effective interest 
rates are given and potential present value miscalculations are avoided. 
Yet, if decision makers act according to the added compensation approach, the size ef-
fect should be present even in the interest rate frame. The added compensation premium is 
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more important in decisions involving smaller outcomes, since the magnitude of this compo-
nent is not related to the outcome size according to Benzion et al. (1989). Hence, assuming (1) 
holds, for α > 1: 
																																																					ݒሺߙݕሻ ∙ ߮ሺݐሻ ൐ 	ݒሺߙݔሻ ൅ 	ܤ.																																												ሺ2ሻ 
Even if discounting functions are not related to the magnitude of the outcome and 
v(αy)/v(αx) = v(y)/v(x) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the later larger reward becomes more 
attractive if both outcomes are multiplied with the same factor. As a result, added compensa-
tion approach implies: 
Hypothesis 1b: Size effects are significant even in the interest rate frame, since the compari-
sons between the sooner and the later outcome involve an added compensation premium. 
3. Experiment 
In the previous two sections, we have discussed the potential importance of an interest 
rate frame especially concerning its influence on discounting anomalies. The primary focus of 
this paper is on the size effect, since this has not been investigated in an interest rate frame 
unlike other discounting anomalies such as hyperbolic discounting or interval effects.  
3.1 Design 
At the beginning of the experiment, we have informed as many students as possible 
(probably more than 2,000 students) via the online learning portals of different courses of 
RWTH Aachen University and via e-mail newsletters of student unions about our online sur-
vey. The survey was accessible for all students. Overall, 231 students have responded. In or-
der to assure that each student participates in the questionnaire only once, each participant had 
to register with an e-mail account with RWTH domain. After the completion of the question-
naire, each participant received an e-mail sent to their registered account, which they had to 
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confirm; otherwise the respective answers were not evaluated. This confirmation was also 
necessary in order to participate in the raffle which rewarded the winners with 3 iPods. We 
eliminated participants who have not confirmed their identity. After that, we are left with 222 
students in our sample. Furthermore, we have excluded from our analysis about 3 % of all 
answers that revealed unrealistic discount rates larger than 100 %.  
In order to analyze size effects, we requested each participant to make a decision be-
tween two alternatives in each question set. Participants are assigned to one of three potential 
groups. In each group, participants are requested to answer identical questions, which differed 
only in outcome size of the sooner outcome (14 €, 390 €, 7700 €). Moreover, we have one 
additional group which had to answer same questions for two different outcome magnitudes 
(14 € and 390 €). With this group, we want to control the existence of size effects for within 
subject designs. 
For each group, we have questions with different delays to sooner outcomes (sooner 
outcome is delayed one year or is to obtained immediately) or with larger time intervals be-
tween the sooner and the later alternative (2 years instead of 1 year). Hence, each participant 
in the first three groups had to answer three questions, while subjects in the fourth group had 
to provide answers for six relatively similar intertemporal choice tasks. Choice tasks with 
different delays and interval lengths makes it possible to control whether our results are in 
agreement with the earlier results of Read et al. (2005). Delaying the sooner alternative and 
increasing the interval length allows us to analyse hyperbolic discounting and interval effects, 
respectively. Moreover, this will also enable us to control for size effects in different scenari-
os. 
As mentioned above, the questionnaires consist of choice tasks where subjects have to 
decide between a later larger and a sooner smaller alternative, while the personal discount rate 
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is determined by using iterative multiple price list method which will also alleviate anchoring 
effects, i.e., decision makers’ tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information 
offered (Frederick et al., 2002; Andersen et al., 2006). Moreover, we want to make sure that 
the participants understand the concept of compound interest. For this purpose, we start the 
experiment with an example. In this example, we explain how compounding principle works 
and what different annual interest rates yield for different maturities. After that, students start 
with the questionnaire and our iterative multiple price list tasks have the following basic form 
in general: 
In the following questions you assume the role of an employee who earned a bonus 
payment for his dedicated work. You can receive this bonus in two different ways. Which al-
ternative would you choose? 
a) 390 € today, 
b) Investing 390 € today in a corporate bond for a year for a yearly inter-
est rate of 10%. 
c) I am indifferent between these alternatives. 
Depending on the answer provided by the participant, in the next question, we are go-
ing to increase or decrease the interest rate, until the participant chooses option c) or the toler-
ance interval for the lower and upper bound of personal discount rates falls within 1.25 %. 
Moreover, we warn our subjects that both the early and later alternative is to be received with 
certainty, in order to counteract the perception that future outcomes are inherently uncertain 
(Halevy, 2008). Obviously, this issue is going to be a major problem for larger outcomes ra-
ther than for smaller outcomes (in our example for 7700 € rather than for 14 €) and therefore, 
this perception should work against the size effect. 
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We have also asked our participants for some demographic information. Table 1 pre-
sents some descriptive statistics regarding demographics of our participants. We have utilized 
binary dummy variables to record participants’ gender (Gender; male = 1, female = 0) and 
major (Major; non-economics students = 0, economics students = 1), while age (Age) is 
measured by integers describing the age of participants in years. 
>>>>Insert Table 1 here<<<< 
3.2. Results 
We now want to discuss the results of our experiments. As we have mentioned al-
ready, the main purpose of this experiment is to investigate size effects and we contrast the 
contradicting explanations for size effects. 
In an interest rate frame, participants do not need to rely on their math skills to calcu-
late the present value of the delayed alternatives, as effective interest rates are already dis-
closed. Therefore, we have stated in our null hypothesis H1a that size effects might be avoid-
ed in an interest rate frame. However, our univariate analysis disagrees with this prediction. 
We have employed both parametric (Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests, p-value < 0.001 for 
both tests) and non-parametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis, p-value < 0.001) for the answers in the 
first three groups and results show that the discount rates are decreasing in outcome size. Our 
dependent variable is the mid-point of the interest rate tolerance interval that we have elicited 
with our titration procedure, denoted as Interest Rate. Since Interest Rate has a tolerance in-
terval of 1.25 %, we have a margin of error of plus/minus 0.625 %, which is negligible.  
Moreover, we also performed a paired-samples t-test for the last group that answered 
two question sets with two different outcome magnitudes. This way, we can control whether 
our results can be confirmed if we analyze the size effect eliminating the potential impact of 
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other characteristic differences that cannot be controlled for in a between subjects design. The 
equality of discount rates can be rejected here at a 1 % level as well (t-statistic = −3.700, p-
value <0.001). This result can also be confirmed with a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank 
test (Z-statistic = 3.884, p-value <0.001). Hence, parametric and non-parametric univariate 
tests for independent or paired samples reject our null hypothesis H1a. In other words, mis-
calculations do not seem to be responsible for size effects alone and we observe size effects in 
a systematical manner in interest rate frames as well.  
Still, for experiments utilizing between subjects design, we have to account for demo-
graphic factors (Harrison et al., 2002), although paired-samples tests can rule out that these 
differences are responsible for our results. Hence, in the next step, we also carry out a multi-
variate test where we control for the demographic factors that we have mentioned above in 
addition to other discounting anomalies. Since we want to detect size effects, the main varia-
ble of interest is the size of underlying outcomes in a question set. As the outcome size can 
assume three different values, we need to use two category dummies, Size1 and Size2. Hence, 
Size1 (Size2) assumes the value1, if the sooner smaller outcome is worth 390 € (7700 €), oth-
erwise it assumes the value zero.  
We have already defined the demographic factors that we intended to analyze in the 
previous section: Gender, Age and Major. In addition, we analyze hyperbolic (sooner alterna-
tive is to be received immediately or a year later) and subadditive discounting (different inter-
val lengths) using dummy variables as well. This way, we can investigate all discounting 
anomalies simultaneously in interest rate frame. Since we only have two different delays and 
interval lengths, dummy coding requires only one variable for each. Interval assumes the val-
ue 1 for longer intervals (two years) and 0 for shorter intervals (one year). Similarly, Delay is 
coded with 1, if the sooner outcome is delayed and coded with 0 otherwise. Interval and De-
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lay allows us to examine interval effects and hyperbolic discounting in interest rate frames as 
well (Read and Roelofsma, 2003; Read et al., 2005). 
Our multivariate linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by partici-
pants affirm our univariate tests. The results are reported in Table 2. Both Size1 and Size2 are 
significant at the 1 % level with negative signs even after controlling for other discounting 
anomalies and demographic factors. Moreover, the estimate for Size2 is larger than the esti-
mate for Size1. Hence, we have found evidence for size effects in interest rate frames in our 
multivariate analysis as well. In sum, we cannot reject H1b neither with univariate nor with 
multivariate tests and this implies that simple miscalculations cannot solely explain size ef-
fects. On the other hand, added compensation approach seems to describe the actual discount-
ing process better than Samuelson (1937). 
Furthermore, we observe a reversed interval effect, as a positive and significant esti-
mate for Interval indicates larger yearly discount rates for undivided intervals. This result is in 
line with the previous results of Read et al. (2005). Moreover, Delay has a negative and sig-
nificant impact on discount rates. Hence, unlike Read et al. (2005), our experiment confirms 
hyperbolic discounting in an interest rate frame. This may be due to our more comprehensive 
empirical analysis, as Read et al. (2005) only rely on comparisons of median discount rates in 
different groups. Furthermore, no demographic variable seems to play a major role with re-
spect to time preferences. 
Lastly, we wanted to remove concerns regarding a potential non-response bias, as only 
about 10 % of all students who we have contacted participated in our study. Armstrong and 
Overton (1977) argue that in the case of a non-response bias, late respondents’ answers should 
also be biased and more similar to non-respondents’. We classify half of our participants as 
early respondents and the other half as late respondents depending on the time they start an-
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swering our questionnaire. We find no significant differences between the choices of these 
two groups based on Mann-Whitney-tests (p-value = 0.818). Thus, we can rule out a potential 
selection bias in our experiments.  
>>>> Insert Table 2 here<<<< 
4. Empirical Analysis  
As we have stressed above, we believe that the interest rate frame is encountered in re-
al life decisions more often. We value this as one of the strengths of our experiment, since this 
would imply that our results should explain choice patterns in actual intertemporal decisions 
better which is the main goal of any experimental work. Now, we seek support for this claim 
with the help of an empirical analysis. 
We investigate in our empirical analysis the relation between the credit spread and the 
credit size (size effects) in the lending platform “Smava”. Theoretically, credit size is not a 
risk factor on its own and, therefore, it should not be correlated with credit spreads. Indirectly, 
larger credits are going to increase the level of indebtedness of a household. This justifies a 
positive correlation between credit size and credit spread. Yet, we have to admit that this rela-
tion is far from being conclusive, since there might be a selection bias, as richer households 
are more likely to raise larger credits. However, there is absolutely no reason to believe that 
we should observe a negative correlation between credit size and credit spreads even under 
uncertainty in P2P markets. Hence, if we observe a negative relationship between credit 
spreads and credit amount, it is safe to infer that this is a consequence of the discounting 
anomaly, size effects, as we discuss later.  
The reasons why we choose P2P lending markets rather than corporate bonds markets 
for our analysis are twofold. First of all, borrowers and lenders are more likely to be unsophis-
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ticated investors in P2P markets. Conversely, institutional investors dominate the bond mar-
kets. Since naïve investors apply usually heuristics for complex decisions, while institutional 
investors or banks prefer to work with standardized solutions, naïve investors are more prone 
to decision anomalies. For this reason, the P2P credit market participants are more interesting 
subjects for our analysis. 
Secondly, Longstaff et al. (2005) revealed a negative relationship between the princi-
pal amount of the credit and credit spreads in corporate bond markets as well, and they at-
tributed this result to higher bond liquidity for larger issue sizes. Hence, in corporate bond 
markets, we cannot distinguish between liquidity and boundedly rational investor stories, if 
we observe a negative correlation between credit issue size and credit spread. However, the 
liquidity argument does not apply to internet banking platforms, since we do not have second-
ary market for P2P credits. Therefore, the relation between credit size and credit spreads can 
be indisputably attributed to size effects in our analysis. 
In addition to that, the framing of the borrowing/lending decision in P2P platforms re-
sembles the decision problem of our experiments very much. A loan application in the P2P 
lending market “Smava” looks as follows: First, a potential borrower submits a loan applica-
tion for a certain amount of money and also sets the interest rate along way, which is nonne-
gotiable. After that, all members of the credit platform are notified about this loan application 
and each can decide whether they want to contribute to this project and how much they want 
to contribute. Hence, both the borrower and the lender make their decisions based on the pro-
vided information regarding interest rates and not the annuity payments. Thus, the framework 
of the lending or borrowing decisions resembles the interest rate frame more than the money 
frame in P2P credit markets. 
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In sum, P2P credit markets are better suited to analyze the impact of size effects in real 
life decisions compared to bond markets. Before we start presenting our results, we want to 
elaborate on the theoretical determinants of the credit spread. 
4.1 Literature Review: Theoretical Determinants of Credit Spread 
According to standard theoretical bond pricing literature, the value of a debt claim is 
defined through its contractual cash flows, which is discounted by an appropriate risk-free 
rate based on the risk-neutral measures (Merton, 1974, Cox and Ross, 1976). The difference 
between the interest rate on the debt claim and this risk-free rate is defined as the credit 
spread. Thus, credit spreads are a function of the probability of default and the expected re-
covery rate.  
The existing literature has discussed the role of several macroeconomic and firm-
specific factors on the default probability and recovery rate. For instance, Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) demonstrated that a higher risk-free interest rate increases the drift in the 
risk-neutral process for the market value of a company over time. Thus, it reduces the proba-
bility of default and the credit spread (see also Duffee, 1998).  
For the same reasons, an increase in the slope of the term structure of interest rates 
leads to a reduced probability of default as well, since this implies larger interest rates in fu-
ture (Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991). Furthermore, as Fama and French (1989) revealed, 
the yield curve slope increases with improving macroeconomic conditions. Since improving 
macroeconomic conditions imply both reduced default risk and higher recovery rates, the 
yield curve slope should be negatively correlated with the credit spread. Similarly, the equity 
market returns are also an indicator for the market sentiment as higher stock returns have the 
same implications as an increasing yield curve slope (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). 
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On the other hand, the most commonly referred firm-specific determinates of credit 
spreads are leverage ratio and equity return volatility. Empirical work suggests that the proba-
bility of default is positively linked to both of these factors (Ericsson et al. 2009). As a conse-
quence, credit spreads should increase with these factors.  
Furthermore, research also suggests that the corporate bond markets are not complete-
ly perfect and that the entire credit spread cannot be attributed to the default premium. 
Longstaff et al. (2005) find that both bond-specific (such as bid-ask spreads) and market spe-
cific illiquidity measures (such as flows into money market mutual funds) are related to the 
non-default component of credit spreads and conclude that liquidity is an important determi-
nant for the credit spread even after controlling for default risk. 
4.2 Credit Size and Spreads 
The main purpose of this empirical analysis is to discuss the relationship between 
credit size and credit spread based on our experimental analysis which found a clear negative 
correlation between interest rates and credit size under certainty. Although credit size is not a 
risk factor by itself, one might argue that there should be a positive link between leverage and 
credit size, which should be reflected in larger credit spreads for larger credit amounts. Still, 
this might not be necessarily the case, as richer households are more likely to borrow larger 
amounts. Yet, empirical studies clearly demonstrate that the risk of default in internet credit 
markets is increasing in credit size even after controlling for the debt to income ratio of the 
applicants or other determinants of default risk and recovery rate (see Miller, 2011; 
Faßbender, 2012). Therefore, we should expect that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Credit spreads are increasing in credit size due to increasing default risk. 
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On the other hand, according to our experimental study, credit size and required inter-
est rates are negatively associated. Hence, our experimental framework emanating from 
boundedly rational lenders and borrowers predicts that: 
Hypothesis 2b: Credit spreads are decreasing in credit size due to the discounting anomaly 
called size effect. 
4.3 Data  
In order to investigate these contradicting hypotheses, we have handpicked the neces-
sary data for commercial credit applications on the platform “Smava” submitted between Au-
gust 2007 and November 2010, which comprises 1,213 credit requests. First, we obtain the 
data on annual interest rate and size of each credit (Credit Size). We assume that the returns 
on German government bonds are risk free. Consequently, we define the difference between 
the nominal interest rate of the credit and yield to maturity of Deutscher Rentenindex (hence-
forth, REX) as Credit Spread. REX is a bond index reproducing the performance of a portfo-
lio consisting of standard German government bonds.  
In theory, the main challenge for lenders before deciding on an appropriate credit 
spread is the estimation problem concerning the (remaining) expected cash flows of any debt 
claim. This depends both on the probability of default and the expected recovery rate and 
these parameters are not easy to predict. Unfortunately, neither we nor the lenders have in-
formation regarding the leverage ratio of the borrower household to assess the probability of 
default, which is usually utilized to estimate the default probability in corporate bond markets. 
Instead, lenders have to rely on Schufa Rating or KDF Indicator in P2P markets as risk 
indicators, which are shown to predict the probability of default quite precisely in these mar-
kets (Faßbender, 2012). Both Schufa Rating and KDF Indicator of applicants are available to 
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lenders for each credit request. Schufa is a rating company which issues ratings regarding the 
creditworthiness of individuals based on their current accounts, credit card debts, mobile 
phone contracts, leasing contracts, loans and mail order purchases. In other words, several 
determinants of an individual’s leverage ratio are indeed taken into account. Schufa assigns 
each individual to a category between A and H based on this information. While A stands for 
the highest creditworthiness and H stands for the lowest. Similarly, Smava provides itself a 
self-issued rating which is called a borrower’s KDF Indicator. This score intends to quantify 
the ability of an individual to fulfill his credit obligations. For this purpose, Smava calculates 
the free net disposable income of the borrower and transforms the ratio of this disposable in-
come to the interest payments to grades between 1 and 5, with 1 being the best and 5 being 
the worst grade. Borrowers are not allowed to apply for credits, if their KDF grades are 5. 
Since both Schufa Rating and KDF Indicator are categorical variables, we recode them using 
the worst grades as reference points. 
Furthermore, we account for the macroeconomic determinants of credit spreads. As 
we discussed above, the risk free rate also affects the default risk. Therefore, we are going to 
control for this aspect in our empirical analysis by including the (monthly) internal rate of 
return for 10-year REX index, denoted as 10 Year Treasury Yield. Furthermore, we add Yield 
Curve Slope, defined as the difference between the (monthly) internal rate of return of 10-year 
and 2-year REX index benchmarks following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). Similarly, we also 
control for the (monthly) returns of German DAX index, rDAX as a proxy for the market sen-
timent.  
In addition, previous empirical research demonstrated that the default premium cannot 
explain credit spreads alone and liquidity is also an important determinant of credit spreads. 
Bid-ask spread is the most commonly used measure for bond liquidity, but in P2P credit mar-
kets, this spread equals zero and we have to use other proxies that are shown to be correlated 
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with bid-ask spread. Maturity is one such measure, which is shown to be positively correlated 
with the bid-ask spread. Therefore, we include credit maturity in our regressions in order to 
account for a liquidity premium in our regressions. 
4.4 Results 
As we have mentioned above, our main goal is to analyze the applicability of our ex-
perimental findings in real life intertemporal decision processes. For this purpose, we are go-
ing to investigate the relevance of the size effect for the actual credit spread in P2P credit 
markets. At the same time, we control for other theoretical determinants of credit spreads that 
we have listed above.  
However, the simple OLS regression models are not suited to investigate this relation-
ship between credit spread and credit size, as an applicant determine interest rates and credit 
size simultaneously herself. Hence, we have a feedback relationship between Credit Spread 
and Credit Size and this causes a simultaneous causality problem between these factors. In 
this case, we estimate a two stage least squares model (2SLS) which is the most commonly 
utilized approach to tackle this simultaneity bias.  
In the first stage of our regression model, we need to find “excluded” instruments that 
are correlated only with the Credit Size and not with the Credit Spread. We have identified 
two instruments that satisfy this condition. The first instrument is a dummy variable, which 
we refer to as Purpose of Use. In Smava, borrowers also need to provide information regard-
ing the purpose of the credit request, where they can choose one motive for their credit appli-
cation from a possible list including capacity expansion, liquidity, acquisition or replacement 
of a plant. We create a dummy variable, Purpose of Use, which assumes the value of 1, if a 
lender states liquidity as the reason for credit application. We believe that the issued credits 
are going to be smaller, if a lender only needs funding to make ends meet rather than to ac-
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quire a new plant. Indeed, Purpose of Use is negatively correlated with Credit Size and it does 
not seem to be related to Credit Spread.  
Moreover it is advised to use lag variables in time series analysis as instruments, 
which is why we include Sum of Debt as our second instrument in the first stage regression. 
This instrument is equal to the amount that is raised by the same borrower before any particu-
lar credit. Predictably, this variable is significantly negatively correlated Credit Size.  
 In sum, our 2SLS regression model has the following form: 
ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅	ߙଵ 	ൈ	ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁	݋݂	ܷݏ݁௜ 	൅	ߙଶ 	ൈ	ܵݑ݉	݋݂	ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ 	൅	෍ߙ௜
ூ
௜ୀଷ
		ൈ 	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅	ݒ௜. ሺ1ሻ 
																			ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜ 	ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ 	ൈ	ܥݎ݁݀ଓݐ	ܵଓݖ݁ప෣ 	൅	෍ߚ௜
ூ
௜ୀଶ
		ൈ 	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ 	൅	ߝ௜.																															ሺ2ሻ 
Furthermore, we also adjust standard errors for correlation across time clusterijg 
standard errors by the month of credit application. Before we can interpret our results, we 
have to examine the assumptions underlying 2SLS models. First of all, the equation in the 
first stage should not be weakly identified. Both according to the Cragg-Donald (Wald F-
statistic: 10.800) and Kleinbergen-Paap (Wald F-statistic: 8.038) tests, we can reject the weak 
identification null hypothesis at a 1 % level. Furthermore, the F-statistic of the first stage re-
gression is larger than 10 suggesting a high overall significance of the model in the first stage. 
After that, we control whether the underlying overidentifying restrictions are valid 
with the help of Hansen J-test. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the excluded instru-
ments are not correlated with the error terms in the second stage (p-value: 0.4079). Finally, 
we have to control whether Credit Size is indeed an endogenous variable. According to Sar-
gan-Hansen statistics (p-value: 0.0075), we can reject the exogeneity of Credit Size. Hence, 
all three model assumptions of 2SLS models are satisfied. 
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Now, after verifying model assumptions, we can interpret our results. The main varia-
ble of interest is Credit Size. Column (2) of Table 3 shows that Credit Size has a negative and 
significant impact on Credit Spread even after controlling for the default risk proxies. Since – 
as already pointed out above according to the empirical literature – the default risk is actually 
increasing with Credit Size and Credit Size is not related to liquidity in P2P capital markets in 
the absence of secondary markets, this relationship can only be explained by the discounting 
anomaly size effect which seems to be effective even in the interest rate frame.  
Moreover, in line with previous studies, we find that both 10 Year Treasury Yield and 
Yield Curve Slope lead to significantly lower credit spreads (Litterman and Scheinkman, 
1991). Besides, all seven Schufa dummies are significant. This means that a rating increase 
from H to another rating level reduces the credit spreads. In a similar way, two of the three 
KDF indicator dummies are significant with a negative sign as well. Hence, market partici-
pants indeed welcome the credit ratings provided by the internet platform as useful indicators 
for default risk. On the other hand, we have to admit that Maturity is a weak indicator for 
credit liquidity especially considering that all credits have either a 3-year or a 5-year maturity. 
Therefore, the insignificant estimates for Maturity are not very surprising. Moreover, the 
German stock market index return rDAX does not have a significant impact on credit spreads, 
either. 
>>>> Insert Table 3 here<<<< 
5. Conclusion 
We can now sum up the findings of our paper briefly. Our main goal is to investigate 
size effects in interest rate frames. This setting allows us to discuss the descriptive power of 
the “added compensation approach” as an intertemporal decision model (Benzion et al., 1989, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). Furthermore, the elicited discount rates reveal individuals’ 
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actual preferences a lot better in this question frame, because present value miscalculations 
should be avoided under the disclosure of interest rates.  
Although there are reasons to expect a reduced proneness to size effects in interest rate 
frames, we have observed very strong size effects here as well. Furthermore, (reversed) inter-
val effects and hyperbolic discounting is proven to be very significant in interest rate frames, 
too.  
Moreover, it is more likely that decision makers encounter intertemporal decision 
tasks in interest rate frames. As a result, we should find empirical support for our experi-
mental results regarding size effects. For this purpose, we analyze the relationship between 
credit spreads and credit size in P2P credit markets. Other determinants of credit spreads such 
as default risk, recovery rate (indirectly measured via, e.g., the yield curve slope) or liquidity 
issues cannot justify the negative relationship between credit spreads and credit size in these 
markets. This leaves bounded rationality of investors and resulting size effects as the only 
possible reason to explain the negative relation between credit size and credit spreads in P2P 
credit markets. 
Summarizing, our paper contributes to the existing literature both in the field of exper-
imental economics and in the field of household finance. To our knowledge, we conduct the 
first experiment investigating size effects in intertemporal decisions in a more realistic setting 
using interest rate frames. Based on these results, we explore size effects empirically and find 
that they are an important determinant for credit spreads in P2P markets.  
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Table I. Summary statistics for the demographic variables in our regression model 
Dummy variables are utilized to describe participants’ gender (male = 0, female = 1) and major (non-
economics students = 0, economics students = 1), while age is represented by integers characterizing the 
age of participants. In the basic scenario, the sooner of the two eligible outcomes is to be received im-
mediately, in the delayed scenario the sooner of the two eligible outcomes is to be received three 
months later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Mean S.D. Median N 
All Participants     
Gender 0.73 0.45 1 222 
Age 22.36 2.31 22 222 
Major 0.72 0.45 1 222 
Groups 1-3     
Gender 0.72 0.45 1 162 
Age 22.41 2.31 22 162 
Major 0.71 0.46 1 162 
Group 4     
Gender 0.63 0.49 1 60 
Age 22.55 2.35 22 60 
Major 0.78 0.42 1 60 
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Table II.  Results of OLS regressions 
This table presents the results of least square regressions of Interest Rate on various independent varia-
bles. Size 1 (Size 2) is a binary dummy variable assuming the value of 1 for outcome magnitudes equal 
to 390 € (7,700 €). Interval and Delay are additional binary dummy variables characterizing longer in-
tervals and delayed outcomes, respectively. Z-values are clustered by subjects and reported below the 
regression coefficients. *** p ≤ 1 %, ** p ≤ 5 %, * p ≤ 10 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables  
Size 1 
-11.705 
-6.04*** 
Size 2 
-15.090 
-6.60*** 
Interval 
1.695 
2.06** 
Delay 
-2.890 
-2.91*** 
Gender 
-3.218 
-1.43 
Age 
0.439 
1.25 
Major 
0.798 
0.33 
Constant 
14.270 
1.70* 
R2 0.138 
F 10.94*** 
Observations 815 
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Table III. Results of the 2SLS regressions 
This table presents the results of two stage least square regressions. Credit Size is the instrumental vari-
able. Credit Spread is the dependent variable in the second stage. Z-values are clustered by month and 
reported below the regression coefficients. *** p ≤ 1 %, ** p ≤ 5 %, * p ≤ 10 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1st stage 2nd stage 
Credit Size 
 -0.000 
 -2.14** 
10 Year Treasury Yield 
-241898.800 -0.445 
-3.99*** -1.68* 
Yield Curve 
-119792.000 -22.616 
-0.16 -4.12*** 
rDAX 
-6195.023 -0.026 
-1.25 -0.61 
Maturity 
3514.805 -0.004 
5.64*** -1.10 
Schufa Rating A 
2970.249 -0.062 
3.33*** -13.19*** 
Schufa Rating B 
1128.484 -0.053 
0.99 -7.32*** 
Schufa Rating C 
1610.980 -0.050 
1.70* -11.70*** 
Schufa Rating D 
1.078.507 -0.047 
0.98 -12.25*** 
Schufa Rating E 
96.852 -0.038 
0.10 -9.91*** 
Schufa Rating F 
1341.544 -0.028 
1.14 -7.35*** 
Schufa Rating G 
659.329 -0.012 
0.58 -2.91*** 
KDF Indicator 1 
1014.272 -0.011 
0.98 -3.50*** 
KDF Indicator 2 
352.309 -0.001 
0.48 -0.19 
KDF Indicator 3 
1084.312 -0.004 
2.19** -2.05** 
Purpose of Use 
-668.743  
-1.26  
Sum of Debt 
-0.150  
-3.89***  
Constant 
17428.660 0.173 
6.46*** 11.50*** 
R2 0.102 0.220 
F 10.69*** 112.87*** 
Observations 1,213 1,213 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
